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Abstract 
 
For many years banks have been spending billions of pounds in their efforts to thwart 
both money laundering and terrorist financing activity. However, despite 
implementing a wide range of policies and procedures, forming international bodies 
to share best practice, and dramatically increasing the number of compliance staff, 
banks are still falling far short of both local and global expectations. Regulators are 
constantly criticising banks, enormous fines are regularly imposed and media 
attention continues to cause reputational damage. Adding to this burden, legal cases 
are becoming more commonplace, with courts pouring over the audit trails of risk 
assessment decisions. With banks attempting to implement fundamental changes, and 
with comprehensive and relatively consistent guidance already in place, the question 
as to why banks are failing so spectacularly is one that warrants an answer. 
 
In keeping with the ethos of a Professional Doctorate, this thesis set out to contribute 
to both theory and professional practice. Consequently, the research needed to be 
global in nature to reflect the international aspects of banking. This study therefore 
spanned 17 different countries and examined a scarcely mentioned subject in 
banking; that is, precisely how employees go about raising difficult questions with 
their customers. It explored the inherent reasons why staff may feel uncomfortable in 
talking about delicate financial affairs, how confident they feel in challenging poor 
explanations from customers, and what training they have received to assist them in 
conducting effective investigations. This thesis has drawn from some of the 
questioning practices that have been effectively introduced across public and private 
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sectors and considered whether elements of these could be implemented within 
banking.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
Money laundering is the process of concealing the origin, 
ownership or destination of illegally or dishonestly-obtained 
money by hiding it within legitimate economic activities in order 
to make it appear legal. It can mask corruptly acquired wealth – 
such as bribes, kick-backs, illicit political contributions, embezzled 
funds and loans – as well as the proceeds of other crimes. It helps 
corrupt individuals to escape justice and, after the funds have been 
successfully laundered, they can enjoy their illicit wealth or move 
the money on for other purposes. (Transparency International, 
2016, p. 4) 
The fight against ‘dirty money’ had received scant international interest until the 
impact of 11 September 2001, after which the Bush administration declared a ‘war on 
terror’ that included a significant financial element (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; 
Biersteker & Eckert, 2008; Naylor, 2006). This relied heavily on cooperation between 
government, law enforcement and the financial sector, with financial controls taking 
on new salience (Wesseling, 2013). However, financial professionals were ill 
equipped to deal with such responsibilities (Johnson, 2001; Lilley, 2003). Indeed, 
bankers were well known for providing strict confidentiality and a non-interventionist 
approach for their clients and were not originally engaged to identify and manage 
suspicious activity (Latimer, 2005; Levi, 1991; Levi, 2010; Marron, 2008; Ping, 
2004; Rahman, 2014). To address the legal requirements imposed upon them, banks 
have implemented monitoring systems and processes to identify and evaluate both 
money laundering and terrorist risks (Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy & Lascoumes, 
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2011). However, these measures have not necessarily mitigated those risks 
successfully, as evidenced by the numerous regulatory fines imposed. 
. . . banks may handle money from drug cartels, human traffickers, 
arms dealers, fraudsters, and other serious criminals, giving these 
funds a veneer of legitimacy that they otherwise would not have, and 
leaving the criminals free to perpetrate their crimes undetected, 
creating innumerable victims around the world . . . (Global Witness, 
2015, p. 9) 
 
Banks have come under increasing scrutiny during recent years, from regulatory 
bodies and the media alike, particularly in relation to their inadequate anti-money 
laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist finance (CTF) procedures. Some recent 
examples include: HSBC, which was fined a record $1.92 billion (£1.28 billion) by 
US authorities in 2012 (Peston, 2012); Barclays Bank, which was fined £72 million 
by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2015 (FCA, 2015a); EFG Private 
Bank, which was fined £4.2 million (FCA, 2013); Standard Bank, which was fined 
£7.6 million (FCA, 2014a); Commerzbank, which was fined $1.45 billion (£973 
million) (Henry, 2015); Sonali Bank (UK), which was fined £3.25 million (FCA, 
2016); and Deutsche Bank which was fined £163 million (FCA, 2017), all for not 
having appropriate AML and CTF (hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘AML’) 
measures in place.  
 
In its defence HSBC stated: “We are committed to protecting the integrity of the 
global financial system. To this end we will continue to work closely with 
governments and regulators around the world” (HSBC, 2012, para. 4). Indeed, the 
18 
 
  
bank reported that it had spent over $290 million, as of 2012, on remedial measures, 
improving its structures, controls and procedures to try to avoid a re-run of events, 
and was recently reported as having spent $800 million on compliance resources in 
the first quarter of 2017 alone (Ogilvie, 2017). As a result, HSBC, along with many 
other banks, has worked extremely hard to implement new policies that meet global 
regulatory expectations, such as the risk rating of customers, adequate transaction 
monitoring, and appropriate levels of governance, at an estimated cost of £5 billion 
annually in the UK alone (Artingstall, Dove, Howell & Levi, 2016). Nevertheless, 
little consideration has been given to the specific training requirements of the staff 
who undertake the enquiries and investigations. These individuals are tasked with 
questioning customers to establish their source of wealth or to understand unusual 
transactions that fall outside the expected parameters. Thus, whilst attention has been 
centered on what it is that banks need to uncover, precisely how they go about 
establishing this is less clear.  
 
Of course, it is not just a fear of being fined that prompts banks to undertake 
appropriate measures to mitigate their risks. Being used for money laundering or 
terrorist financing damages the reputation of not only the individual bank, but the 
whole of the financial sector in which it operates. Furthermore, in addition to fines, 
regulators could elect to revoke licences, without which the bank could not trade and 
would subsequently fail (Home Office, 2016a). 
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Regulatory Framework 
 
International regulation, legislation and AML guidance is extremely complex and 
overwhelming (Ruce, 2011). It therefore goes without saying that even with teams of 
compliance officers, lawyers and advisors, certain elements may be overlooked from 
time to time. It is nonetheless important that all relevant aspects of an effective AML 
programme are documented or codified for each country in order that they are, at the 
very least, adequately informed as to how they ought to be operating.  
 
The UK (London), US (New York), Singapore and Hong Kong top the Global 
Financial Centres Index (GFCI, 2017) and have dominated the leading four positions 
for several years. This index ranks five broad factors of competitiveness; ‘business 
environment’, ‘financial sector development’, ‘infrastructure’, ‘human capital’ and 
‘reputation’ and is therefore a useful source for identifying those countries that might 
be viewed as leading the way in terms of financial crime mitigation. Although these 
countries collectively produce extensive instruction and guidance, scant attention is 
paid to interviewing or questioning skills and investigation processes. The following 
sections explore precisely what guidance and recommendations are available within 
the above-mentioned financial markets, presented in order of ranking within the 
GFCI. 
 
UK 
The FCA is the primary regulatory body that is responsible for the conduct 
supervision of financial services firms within the UK. As part of their remit they 
focus on material weaknesses within firms’ money laundering controls, through both 
individual assessment and thematic review. Within its handbook the FCA states under 
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SYSC 3.2.6G that “A firm should ensure that the systems and controls 
include…appropriate training for its employees in relation to money laundering” 
(FCA, n.d.) but it does not specify precisely what this training should include. In its 
additional guidance (FCA, 2015b) clear instruction is provided as to what information 
and clarification should be sought at various points from customers, but there is no 
indication or direction provided as to how staff might need to consider obtaining such 
detail. This is common with regulatory guidance, as it allows firms to tailor their 
approach to fit their specific needs, commensurate to the risks they face. However, 
the drawback to this is that attention is not drawn to the specific skills required to 
undertake tasks effectively. Furthermore, the absence of any acknowledgement of the 
complexities associated with effective questioning may lead to firms adopting a 
complacent approach, regarding their AML obligations simply as a tick box exercise 
(Molloy, 2016; Sofia de Oliveira et al., 2017), as evidenced by numerous 
unsatisfactory regulatory findings uncovered during the FCA’s thematic review 
(FCA, 2014b). 
 
The FCA has also published an Occasional Paper (FCA, 2015c) that refers 
specifically to vulnerable customers. This paper acknowledges the importance of 
frontline staff and although it is stated that training should be “sufficient to facilitate a 
proper conversation” (p. 11) it makes no specific mention of any evidence based 
communication tools. However, reference was made to letting “the conversation take 
a natural course” and encouraging disclosure. The paper also provided example good 
practice case studies, one of which highlighted a firm that was using speech analytics 
software to identify specific key words that might indicate vulnerability. The 
identified calls were then reviewed by managers who would provide feedback if 
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required. The issue here is that those managers may not necessarily have adequate 
interviewing experience themselves and consequently might not identify problematic 
areas. Another firm trained its staff on the use of emotional intelligence, encouraging 
the identification of subtle clues and indicators of vulnerability, through role-play and 
specialist training. The problem with the FCA paper is that as it has only focused on 
vulnerable customers, banks may not recognise the relevance of using any of the 
techniques indicated in other situations, such as whilst undertaking enquiries into 
suspicious activity. 
 
The UK is also home to the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), 
which is comprised of leading financial services Trade Associations. Its purpose is to 
promulgate good practice and give practical assistance in countering money 
laundering. This is achieved through the publication of industry guidance, which 
interprets the various UK Money Laundering Regulations and European legislation 
such as the Fourth Money Laundering Directive (JMLSG, n.d.). The guidance is 
submitted to HM Treasury for Ministerial approval prior to publication. 
 
The JMLSG guidance states that “Any approach to the customer or to the 
intermediary should be made sensitively” (JMLSG, 2014, p. 147) and that 
“Reasonable enquiries of a customer conducted in a tactful manner, regarding the 
background to a transaction or activity that is inconsistent with the normal pattern of 
activity is prudent practice, forms an integral part of CDD measures and should not 
give rise to the tipping off offence.” (p. 153). However, beyond this, no mention is 
made as to the techniques that should be employed in order to conduct such enquiries 
effectively.  
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As far as staff training is concerned, the guidance only mentions that relevant 
employees should be “trained in the firm’s procedures and in how to recognise and 
deal with potential money laundering or terrorist financing or activity” (JMLSG, 
2014, p. 160). The guidance does indeed recognise that alert and well-trained staff are 
“one of the most important controls over the prevention and detection of money 
laundering” and that the “effectiveness of the training will therefore be important to 
the success of the firm’s AML/CTF strategy”. Whilst the guidance extensively details 
the requirements for staff to have appropriate knowledge of suspicious activity and to 
understand the obligations set out under various legislative acts such as Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) no reference 
whatsoever is made to ensuring that staff possess adequate questioning skills or have 
access to investigation tools. 
 
Importantly, in 2016 the Home Office released their ‘Action Plan’ aimed at 
combatting money laundering and terrorist financing. Whilst they acknowledge the 
enormity of the problem, and admit that compliance functions are not always an 
effective measure against money laundering, there is still no comment on the 
questioning skills of front line banking staff. Disappointingly, this ‘Action Plan’ 
describes itself as “the most significant change to our anti-money laundering and 
terrorist finance regime in over a decade” (Home Office, 2016b, p. 3).  
 
US 
Broadly aligned with UK regulation is the US, although the country has taken a much 
more aggressive stance to AML measures. The US is a major international 
component of the financial services industry as a large proportion of global trade is 
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conducted using the dollar, which is purported in the media as being “the most 
powerful [currency] in the world” (Amadeo, 2016, para. 3).  
 
The key US AML legislation is codified in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), which in turn 
are enhanced by numerous federal laws. The USA PATRIOT Act was introduced 
following the events of 11 September 2001 and requires financial institutions to adopt 
comprehensive AML programmes. Violations of AML laws and regulations are 
assessed by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and are reported to 
five primary federal banking regulators, all of which have a slightly different remit. 
Additionally, FinCEN supports law enforcement through the collection, analysis and 
sharing of information. They also collaborate internationally to develop AML 
initiatives worldwide (Protiviti, 2014). Although FinCEN has produced an archive of 
guidance dating back to 1996, none of these reports examine interviewing practices or 
questioning skills (FinCEN, n.d.). 
 
FinCEN (2010) identified that some of the most common problems with the quality 
of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed in the US were empty narrative fields or 
inadequate narratives. As the narrative should explain precisely why the transaction is 
considered to be suspicious, the absence of such detail could be indicative of a poorly 
executed investigation, leading to a scarcity of reportable material. Such problems 
could also be attributable to lack of training on the SAR process requirements, failure 
to appreciate the consequences of inadequate detail, or simply indicative of defensive 
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filing. Whatever the underlying cause, there is clearly an issue that needs to be 
addressed. 
 
Comprehensive guidance issued by AML consulting firm Protiviti (2014) details a 
number of skills and experiences that are useful when selecting investigative 
personnel, such as product knowledge, system functions and fraud training. However, 
once again there is no reference made to interviewing or questioning techniques. 
Protiviti acknowledges that the US financial services industry continues to struggle to 
meet AML regulatory expectations, yet despite now being in its sixth edition, 
spanning an eleven year period, the complexities around asking difficult questions 
has not been addressed. It is possible that it is taken for granted that appropriate 
training will include conversation tools and investigation techniques. However, 
considering the poor execution of SAR filings and the hefty fines being applied 
globally to banks for failure to properly implement and manage AML controls, this 
does not necessarily appear to be happening in practice. 
 
Singapore 
In third position on the GFCI is Singapore. The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) oversees over 200 financial institutions in Singapore and is a member of both 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (MAS, 2017). Whilst the guidance it has issued outlines the requirements 
in terms of KYC and escalations, the only reference made to staff is that they should 
be screened when being hired. In terms of training, the only requirements placed upon 
banks are to ensure staff members are knowledgeable in respect of AML laws and 
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regulations, money laundering techniques, and the bank’s own internal policies and 
controls. 
 
Hong Kong 
From a financial services perspective, Hong Kong is balanced geographically with 
the US: the “New York of the East” (HKMA, 1995, para. 6). Hong Kong is a major 
international financial centre that provides a gateway to China. Like the UK, Hong 
Kong has a clear and predictable legal system, good accounting practices and an 
educated workforce. This serves to allow Hong Kong, which ranks in fourth position 
on the 2017 GFCI, to act as an influential contributor to the global reduction of 
financial crime. 
 
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) is responsible for banking stability in 
Hong Kong, which includes ensuring authorised firms’ compliance with legal and 
supervisory AML requirements. In this capacity, they have produced regulatory 
guidance (HKMA, 2015) affirming that staff training is an important element of an 
effective AML system. However, whilst it emphasises the fact that training must be 
frequent and appropriate, the content refers only to statutory and regulatory 
obligations, how to recognise unusual activity, and the importance of compliance 
with policies and procedures. Whilst reference is also made to monitoring the 
effectiveness of any training provided, which includes the quality and quantity of 
internal reports, no measure or means of assessment is provided, and at no point are 
the interviewing abilities or questioning skills of the staff brought into consideration. 
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International Bodies 
 
In addition to local country regulations, financial institutions are expected to follow 
the guidance that is produced by international associations that promote policies and 
best practice to improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world. A selection of the guidance issued by four of the world’s leading groups that 
aim to tackle financial crime through mutual co-operation and support is detailed 
below, presented in the order in which each body was established. 
 
Bank For International Settlements (BIS) 
BIS is the world’s oldest international financial organisation, having been established 
in 1930. Their mission is to promote monetary and financial stability amongst their 
60 member central banks through research and analysis. Overall, there is very little 
focus from this organisation relating to AML and in their 2001 Consultative 
Document they clearly state that it is not their intention to duplicate the efforts of 
similar organisations. However, this document does comment on the importance of 
staff training, noting that “Front-line staff members who deal directly with the public 
should be trained to verify the identity of new customers, to exercise due diligence in 
handling accounts of existing customers on an on-going basis and to detect patterns 
of suspicious activity” (BIS, 2001, p. 14). It does not go beyond this, although it does 
recognise that research, albeit dating back to 1999, revealed that many countries have 
not developed adequate practices and are looking for insight on the appropriate steps 
to take (BIS, 2001, p. 3). This indicates that many jurisdictions have sought support 
and assistance, although whether the guidance that has been delivered in response to 
this is sufficient is questionable. 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
The IMF was conceived in 1944 and is responsible for the stability of the 
international monetary system. It currently has 189 member countries and 
approximately 2600 staff. As money laundering can threaten a country’s financial 
stability the IMF takes an active interest in this area, providing strategic direction for 
its member countries. Although the IMF’s AML programme has evolved over the 
years, no attention has been paid to questioning techniques. One of the key areas of 
the IMF’s work within AML is the assessment of member countries’ compliance with 
the FAFT Recommendations. However, as these are also silent on questioning skills, 
any problems associated with this would not be identified during the assessment 
process (IMF, n.d.). 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
FATF is an independent inter-governmental body whose objective is to set standards 
and promote effective legal, regulatory and operational AML measures. Established 
in 1989, FATF published its first set of Recommendations in 1990, which are 
recognised as the international AML standards. These Recommendations were 
revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2012 to ensure they remained relevant (FATF, 
2015). FATF not only promotes the adoption and implementation of these 
Recommendations globally, it also monitors countries’ progress against them (FATF, 
2016). As a prominent international organisation, free from political agenda, FAFT is 
in a prime position to influence the means by which information is collected by firms 
to ensure it is comprehensive, ethical and fit for purpose. 
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Whilst the Recommendations provide a high level view as to the standard which 
should be adopted by each country, they stop short of detailing precisely how such 
measures should be implemented. Supplementary Guidance and Best Practice 
documents provide additional details, such as stating that information relating to the 
source of funds “should be substantive and establish a provenance or reason for 
having been acquired” (FAFT, 2013, p. 20). This will generally require a reasonably 
in-depth and rather personal conversation with the customer, but the manner in which 
such delicate matters are best approached is not mentioned. The Guidance states that 
a full overview of source of wealth is not always possible when information is not 
voluntarily disclosed, but that “Failure to voluntarily disclose this information could 
also be considered a red flag.” (p. 21). The Guidance goes on to describe some of the 
red flags as being that the customer “seems generally uncomfortable to provide 
information about source of wealth or source of funds”; that the information provided 
is inconsistent; that the customer “is unable or reluctant to explain the reason for 
doing business in the country of the financial institution” or “provides inaccurate or 
incomplete information” (p. 28). Whilst these are potentially causes for genuine 
concern, broader context could have been supplied here as there are copious reasons 
as to why such circumstances may have occurred, such as cultural differences, lack of 
education or communication issues. Essentially this Guidance provided the perfect 
opportunity to share best practice, advocating a holistic and considered approach, 
using empirically tested techniques. Nevertheless, no such direction was included. 
 
Egmont Group 
Formed in 1995, the Egmont Group is comprised of 152 Financial Intelligence Units 
from around the globe who meet regularly to exchange information and share training 
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and expertise. This is focused on high level matters such as implementing structures 
and processes for new members and none of their available literature refers to 
interviewing procedures or questioning skills (Egmont Group, 2017). 
 
Wolfsberg Group 
The Wolfsberg Group aims to develop frameworks, guidance and standards for the 
effective management of financial crime risks. It was formed in 2000 and is an 
association of thirteen global banks with a common goal of addressing money-
laundering risks (Wolfsberg, 2015). Despite having issued 14 sets of AML principles 
since their inception, none of these tackle the difficulties faced in obtaining accurate 
and truthful disclosures from customers, nor do they examine what an effective 
training programme for bank staff should consist of. 
 
Summary 
It was apparent that despite the longevity of influential regulators and key 
international bodies none had addressed the fundamental aspect that bank staff might 
not be effective in their questioning techniques, which in turn could be impacting the 
low level of success seen across banks in combatting money laundering risks. 
 
Accordingly, in order to understand whether improvements could be made to the 
current practices within banking the following research question was proposed: 
Are global banking staff maximising communication strategies to assist in AML 
investigations? 
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Aims 
The initial aim of the research was to ascertain whether bank staff undertaking AML 
investigations were adequately equipped to execute their roles effectively. In order to 
evaluate this the research involved a global assessment of opinions, views and 
perceptions of bank staff along with an examination of question types deployed in the 
field. The research also examined the challenges that faced individuals employed 
within banks, what communication barriers there might be when conducting 
investigations and what steps could be introduced to address these. Armed with such 
knowledge it was anticipated that it would be possible to determine whether 
improvements could be made to current AML questioning practices, which might 
enable staff to handle difficult situations with more confidence, whilst improving the 
quality of data captured from customers.  
 
Objectives 
The research involved an assessment of confidence, knowledge, perception and 
questioning skills of banking staff involved with AML investigations. This 
assessment was comprised of surveys and interviews, to understand beliefs and 
attitudes held, and case file analysis to observe the quality of the questioning skills 
employed in AML investigations in practice. Consideration as to how such problems 
had been addressed in other sectors, both public and private, was then used to 
determine an appropriate solution. 
  
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One has introduced the background to this thesis and has highlighted some of 
the apparent deficiencies within bank AML investigations and consequently the 
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importance of researching this under-addressed area. It also outlined the guidance that 
is both available to, and produced by, banks, regulators and other international bodies 
and demonstrated that despite extensive direction there is little to encourage banks to 
consider the skills and training that might be required to conduct effective AML 
investigations. 
 
Chapter Two, the literature review, examines the current practices within banking and 
the consequential impact on society if banks are unable to make fair and reasonable 
decisions. Consideration is then given to the use of different question types, along 
with the background and effectiveness of various questioning practices that are used 
within public and private sectors. The purpose of this was to understand how other 
organisations deal with difficult conversations and whether there are tools or 
techniques that could be adopted within banks.  
 
Chapter Three outlines the methodology and details the considerations for a mixed 
methods approach to the research. It also outlines the reasons for selecting three 
strands of research, which comprised; (i) a survey, (ii) semi-structured interviews, 
and (iii) case file analysis. This chapter includes detail as to how the participants and 
case files were selected and what ethical considerations had to be made. It also 
explains, in depth, the coding, scoring and thematic analysis that underpins the 
findings of this research. 
 
Chapter Four presents the results of the three strands of research, these being; (i) the 
survey, (ii) the semi-structured interviews, and (iii) the case file analysis. The 
findings are structured according to two key areas: 
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1. Opinions, Views and Perceptions - derived from both the surveys (Strand I) 
and the semi-structured interviews (Strand II). The results of these two strands 
of research have been blended together, and are presented as such, to facilitate 
an understanding of people’s beliefs and attitudes when conducting AML 
investigations. 
2. Questioning Observations - summarising the findings from the case file 
analysis (Strand III) and highlighting what people do in practice when 
conducting AML investigations. 
 
Chapter Five discusses the findings of the research and draws out the primary issues 
that have been identified across all three strands of research. These reveal five key 
issues: (i) Poor Quality SAR filings; (ii) Lack of Training and Feedback; (iii) Lack of 
Questioning Skills; (iv) Conflict of Interest; and (v) Lack of Consumer Awareness. 
Following assessment of these findings recommendations have been made, where 
feasible, to address some of the key issues identified. 
 
Chapter Six draws the conclusions from the above study, examines what this 
ultimately means for the banking sector, and what steps could to be taken to improve 
current matters.  
 
Chapter Seven is a short personal reflection on the work undertaken to complete this 
thesis and highlights how the results might be developed further. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Introduction 
This literature review seeks to identify the current practices within banking and to 
outline the responsibilities of the key actors. This will provide an understanding as to 
how and where problems arise within AML investigations. It then examines attitudes 
to discussions involving finances and explains the consequences and impact to 
society when banks do not complete thorough investigations. This provides some 
appreciation as to why this is such an important topic. This chapter then examines 
different question types and reviews some of the most common questioning 
techniques that have been developed across both public and private sectors. This 
examination aids comprehension as to which elements of these techniques could 
potentially be applied in bank AML investigations.  
 
Current Banking Processes 
Banks are obliged to conduct Customer Due Diligence (CDD) when establishing 
business relationships with new customers (Levi & Reuter, 2006). This ensures that 
they appreciate who the customer is (in the case of individuals), or who the 
customer’s beneficial owners are (in the case of corporate entities), and that they 
understand the intent and purpose of the business relationship. This process includes 
basic name and address identification and verification checks, usually evidenced by 
the production of formal documentation such as a passport, driving licence, or 
company formation documents, along with details of the anticipated account activity. 
Once this information is obtained a customer risk assessment will be conducted using 
key criteria such as; country risk, industry/occupation risk and product or services 
risk. The overall risk presented will then be managed through the application of 
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proportionate controls and oversight (JMLSG, 2014). If the relationship is deemed to 
be high risk, perhaps due to the occupation of the applicant or where the customer is a 
Politically Exposed Person (PEP), then additional Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) 
measures must be applied (FSA, 2011). This would include open source checks to 
identify any negative publicity connected to the applicant, such as allegations of 
bribery or corruption, which might cause reputational damage to the bank, or even 
legal action if they failed to prevent this (Bribery Act, 2010). The source of wealth 
will also need to be validated, which means that queries will be raised in order to 
satisfy the bank that the money being deposited into the account has been acquired 
through legitimate means. These initial assessments will then determine the regularity 
of the account activity scrutiny and appropriate financial thresholds will be set within 
the bank’s transaction monitoring system.  
 
Most large, modern banks have automated transaction monitoring systems set with 
certain scenarios and trigger thresholds which identify questionable activity such as 
the rapid movement of funds or unusually large credits and debits (Pramod, Li & 
Gao, 2012). If account activity exceeds these thresholds, alerts will be generated 
which will require further investigations to be undertaken to examine the purpose of 
transaction(s). This frequently involves contacting the customer to discuss the 
account activity in detail (JMLSG, 2014). Such investigations will naturally vary 
considerably in length and detail according to the concern raised and the initial 
explanation provided by the customer.  
 
Whilst money laundering is motivated by profit, terrorist financing, in contrast, is 
motivated by ideology. Consequently, the sources of funds are at odds (Mulligan, 
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2015). Indeed, terrorist financing is generally, although not exclusively, generated by 
legitimate activity (Reuter & Truman, 2004) such as employment, or the sale of 
assets. Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of terrorist financing, the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales (2012, p. 1) describes it as “the raising, 
moving, storing and using of financial resources for the purposes of terrorism” and 
goes on to elaborate that “the primary goal . . . is therefore usually not to conceal the 
sources of the money, but to conceal both the funding activity and the financial 
channels”. Due to its nature, terrorist financing is extremely hard to detect. Not just 
because it often involves smaller amounts than money laundering activity, but also 
because it involves transactions that are often indistinguishable from legitimate day-
to-day activities (Gilmour, Hicks & Dilloway, 2017). Banks therefore require 
intimate knowledge of the customer and any deviances from normal activity need to 
be questioned and understood in order to identify such transactions (FATF, 2002).  
 
Whatever the concern raised by the bank, it will generally be extremely difficult to 
identify any underlying predicate offence (Levi, 2002) or to determine the precise 
provenience of the funds (Unger, 2007). This is primarily because banks only have 
access to their own financial records and open source materials, as opposed to 
holding any criminal intelligence. Nevertheless, the laundering of proceeds from 
predicate offences is deemed to be particularly significant as it generally derives from 
high-harm offences, such as drug supply, fraud and modern slavery (Home Office, 
2015), facilitates further criminal activity, and has a detrimental impact on the 
integrity of all financial institutions (Levi, 2002). It is therefore imperative that banks 
understand how such activities are financed in order that they can identify similar 
behaviour in customer accounts. 
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Enquiries are generally undertaken by a relationship manager, who is frequently 
responsible for all customer contact, from the initial on-boarding processes, to 
conducting reviews, selling new products and services, and dealing with queries 
(Cox, 2014; Esoimeme, 2016). A member of the bank’s compliance team, or 
equivalent (hereinafter referred to as a ‘compliance analyst’) initially contacts the 
relationship manager, generally via email or through internal systems, expressing 
their concerns (which are frequently derived directly from the transaction monitoring 
process) and outlines the detail that is required in order to resolve the query. The 
relationship manager is then tasked with contacting the customer, which is often by 
telephone, understanding the nature of the transactional activity, considering whether 
this aligns with the information provided when the account was opened and reverting 
to the compliance analyst with an explanation. This process is generally applied 
irrespective of the fact that there are frequently conflicts of interest (Hayble-Gomes, 
2016). Relationship managers often have such close bonds of trust and confidentiality 
with their clients that they are unable to take an objective view of the situation or 
press the customer with intrusive questions (Ruce, 2011). This is further complicated 
by the fact that, historically, relationship managers have extended lavish hospitality 
and entertainment to their customers, often with personal interaction such as 
“boarding private planes to take clients skiing in Verbier for a weekend” (Tobin, 
2013, para. 10). This situation is exacerbated as many are primarily rewarded on their 
sales performance (FSA, 2011) and often receive large bonus payments, with some 
top executives reportedly having received up to $17 million each by way of bonus 
alone in 2017 (Hawkes, 2017). Bonus payments such as these, which can form 60-
80% of compensation, can drive inappropriate behaviours and activities (Arbogast, 
2017; FSA, 2012a) with many banks being unwilling to exit profitable relationships, 
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despite the unacceptable levels of risk (FSA, 2011). Furthermore, when incentives 
linked to sales are commonplace they can lead to corruption scandals (de Haldevang, 
2017), with profit overtaking ethical expectations (Carr & Jago, 2014; Middleton, 
2014). Such conflict of interests has been described as “an important issue that 
awkwardly seems to have not attracted the attention of professionals and academics 
in the extent it would be expected” (Demetriades, 2016, p. 85). Whilst lavish 
hospitality has been somewhat quelled with the introduction of the Bribery Act 
(2010), this does not appear to have been entirely successful (Blanchard, 2016; 
Dailyrecord, 2012; FSA, 2012b; Levy, 2014) and remuneration remains an issue, as 
demonstrated by the value of recent bonus payments. Whilst bonus caps were 
introduced by the European Union in 2014, these are only limited to 100% (or 200% 
if shareholders agree) of a banker’s salary (Wallace, 2015).  
 
Relationship managers are expected to develop strong personal relationships with 
their clients in order to understand their business and source of wealth, particularly as 
they are expected to sell appropriate products that meet customers’ needs. However, 
wealthy clients frequently have business affairs and lifestyles that can make it 
difficult to determine what constitutes unusual behaviour (JLMSG, n.d.). It is 
imperative that relationship managers ask questions in a sensitive manner, not only to 
avoid alerting the customer to any investigation, an offence known as ‘tipping off’ 
under Section 333 of POCA, but also to avoid putting themselves in personal danger.  
The closer you get to true criminal activity the more cautious you are 
required to be. Nobody is asking you to get killed for the bank. If you 
are reaching areas such as organised crime or drug trafficking, you 
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may be considering people whose moral code is different to yours. Be 
careful at all times. (Cox, 2014, p. 243) 
 
The role of the relationship manager is therefore pivotal in determining whether a 
SAR might be filed with the National Crime Agency (NCA) or equivalent law 
enforcement agency. However, the manner in which the compliance analyst raises 
their questions with the relationship manager is of equal importance. If a relationship 
manager receives a poorly constructed question they will not be in a position to 
provide a comprehensive response and indeed may convey an inaccurate or 
incomplete message to the customer. Likewise, it is important that the relationship 
manager is capable of conveying an accurate description of the customer’s response 
back to the compliance analyst. It is therefore essential that communication is 
effective throughout the entire process.  
 
It is crucial that the compliance analyst makes their concern or suspicion very clear 
for two key reasons. Firstly, the attitude and personal values of the relationship 
manager might not be the same as those held by the compliance analyst. One reason 
for this might be attributable to the fact that the relationship manager’s primary duties 
are to develop their customer base and meet sales targets. However, it may also result 
from their culture or background, particularly if they are employed in a jurisdiction 
such as China where bribery and kickbacks are deemed acceptable (Kwok, 2013). 
Secondly, suspicion is subjective and does not automatically transfer from one person 
to another, as demonstrated in Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2012] EWHC 
1283 where it was held that HSBC’s Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) 
was right to form their own view of the situation, rather than rely on the concerns 
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brought to them by another employee. It is therefore vital that any concerns that the 
compliance analyst holds are described in a clear and precise manner, as the 
relationship manager might not necessary believe there is anything unusual with the 
account activity. 
 
Most banks tend to adopt the widely known ‘three lines of defence’ model (Daisley, 
McGuire, Netherton & Abrahamson, 2015; Durniat, 2014; IIA, 2015; Sofia de 
Oliveira, Artingstall, Keen, Russell & Luddington, 2017). The relationship managers 
or branch frontline staff members form the first line of defence. They are ultimately 
accountable for the risk, along with the business’ processes and controls aimed at 
mitigating that risk. The compliance and risk management functions form the second 
line of defence and provide oversight of the first. Internal audit form the third line of 
defence and are responsible for providing independent, objective assurance on the 
effectiveness of the internal controls and governance conducted by first and second 
lines. Such a delineated approach ensures that there are relatively clear boundaries for 
each to operate within. This enables compliance staff to retain their independence by 
being remote from the operational business functions; a key point that regulators 
believe is fundamental to good governance (FSA, 2010; Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, 2014). However, whilst thought has clearly been given to the broad 
structure of the investigation processes, the same cannot be said of the underlying 
activities, notably the skill and ability of those who are ultimately faced with posing 
difficult questions to customers. 
 
A complication with the three lines of defence model is that the person with the 
suspicion (generally the compliance analyst) has no ability to directly question the 
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customer. Furthermore, however accurate and detailed the customer’s response might 
be, the compliance analyst will not receive this information direct and instead must 
rely upon the skills of the relationship manager in conveying an accurate reflection of 
the information provided. This will ultimately introduce an element of bias as the 
relationship manager will make the decision whether to record answers verbatim or 
simply note the key points (Malhotra, 2006). 
 
Money Talks 
A fundamental problem exists in that little examination appears to have been 
conducted to establish the level of discomfort experienced by bank staff when 
questioning a customer’s source of wealth and expenditure. Written policies only 
provide an outline as to precisely what it is that needs to be established, but they do 
not prescribe how an employee should approach such delicate matters. Money is often 
a taboo subject in most Western cultures (Adler & Adler, 2003; Bradford, 2010; 
Michie, 2011; Trachtman, 1999), with pro-money talk even being described as 
“vulgar, inappropriate and the manifestation of a lack of social conscience” (Furnham 
& Argyle, 1998, p. 6). Such discussions have been referred to in the media as being 
“impolite or gauche” (Driscoll, 2016, para. 7), with claims that “the British are seven 
times more likely to discuss their sex lives than their incomes” (O’Grady, 2016, para. 
1), and 64% feeling uncomfortable talking about money (The Times, 2018, para. 3). 
Often the subject of money is simply deemed to be too personal, causing confusion, 
embarrassment and discomfort (Goldberg & Lewis, 2000). Add to this the complexity 
of cultural norms and diversity across the globe (Almond & Verba, 1965; Baldock, 
2016; Krambia-Kapardis, 2016) and it can become extremely difficult and distasteful, 
if not entirely inappropriate to discuss finances, with many people feeling offended 
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by such questions (Webb, 2004). Furthermore, certain cultures, particularly Arab, are 
built on relationships (Gelles, McFadden, Borum & Vossekuil, 2006) and fear of 
upsetting this critical and delicate balance can often stand in the way of effective 
questioning. 
 
A further complexity is that members of bank staff who are obliged to conduct 
enquiries related to financial matters may feel intimidated by the customer, 
particularly so when questioning powerful heads of large multi-national 
organisations, celebrities, government officials, or political figureheads. Indeed, this 
was borne out during an investigation by the FCA into Barclays Bank whereby the 
bank admitted that it had failed to apply its usual standards of EDD that were 
required for PEPs as it “did not wish to inconvenience the clients” (FCA, 2015a, para. 
4). This exemplifies the point that bank staff may feel pressurised, embarrassed 
(Webb, 2004) or awkward when raising confidential matters regarding sources of 
wealth with powerful, affluent customers. This difficulty can, of course, be 
compounded in certain corrupt jurisdictions, such as Syria, South Sudan or Somalia 
(Transparency International, 2018), where fear factors and intimidation may 
potentially come into play.  
 
Details provided by customers are rarely challenged and answers are frequently 
accepted at face value. The UK regulator evidenced this in 2011, finding that over 
40% of the banks sampled had failed to take meaningful steps to establish the intent 
and purpose of the proposed business relationship. Furthermore, questions regarding 
the customers’ requests for services or products that did not make economic sense 
were frequently left unanswered, whereas in other cases, meaningless replies were not 
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challenged. Three quarters of the banks in the regulator’s sample failed to take 
adequate steps to establish the legitimacy of the source of wealth or funds. This was 
explicitly demonstrated by one relationship manager who stated “I don’t know where 
the funds are coming from as I didn’t know her at the time, but they are definitely 
hers”, a statement which was readily accepted by the compliance analyst who had 
initially raised the query (FSA, 2011, p. 28). Almost half of the banks visited stopped 
asking questions at the first obstacle. This included incidents such as the customer 
having poor command of the English language, or where cultural sensitivities 
rendered it unacceptable to ask probing questions regarding the source of wealth and 
funds.  
 
In its 2014 thematic review, the FCA stated that over a quarter of banks had failed to 
capture adequate information on the nature and intended purpose of the customer 
relationship, which was deemed to be an important part of the due diligence process, 
facilitating effective on-going monitoring. It also found that some banks were not 
willing to request information from prominent customers (FCA, 2014b). Indeed, the 
very requirement to even pose such questions was never welcomed by bankers (Levi, 
2010) as they were likely to seek ways to satisfy their clients in order to develop the 
business (Ruce, 2011), or worse still, willfully ignore any concerning behavior (Levi, 
2002).  
 
When recently imposing a large fine upon Deutsche Bank, the FCA cited the key 
significant deficiencies as including inadequate CDD and the failure of the front 
office (in which relationship managers are based) to take responsibility of their KYC 
obligations. The size of the Deutsche Bank fine, being the largest financial penalty 
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imposed by the FCA for AML controls failings, reflected the seriousness of the 
situation, with the FCA commenting “We have repeatedly told firms how to comply 
with our AML requirements and the failings of Deutsche Bank are simply 
unacceptable” (FCA, 2017, para. 3). These comments demonstrate that such problems 
continue, despite guidance and warnings having been provided. 
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting Processes 
Whilst billions of pounds have been spent on developing compliance functions 
(Home Office, 2016a), policies and procedures, and implementing new technology to 
identify suspicions transactions, scant attention seems to have been given to those 
tasked with analysing and investigating such transactions, nor to those staff involved 
in on-boarding and screening new customers, who are effectively the gate keepers for 
the banks. Furthermore, banks appear to be struggling to implement basic measures, 
whereas the very risks that they are trying to mitigate are constantly evolving 
(Simser, 2012), thereby indicating that a robust yet flexible approach is required. 
 
When UK banks identify suspicious behaviour they are obliged to report this to the 
NCA. During 2016 the NCA received 419,451 SARs, which are made under Part 7 of 
POCA and TACT, an increase of 9.84% on the previous year (NCA, 2017). 83.13% 
were from the banking sector, with building societies contributing a further 3.59%. 
 
Globally, it is not known what percentage of SARs are useful leads for law 
enforcement as there is no comprehensive data held on the number of prosecutions or 
convictions (Harvey, 2005; NCA, 2015; Viritha, Mariappan & Haq, 2015). To 
compound matters, there are numerous examples of so-called ‘defensive reporting’ 
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whereby banks file SARs relating to incomplete, or poorly executed investigations, 
merely to avoid criticism by the authorities for failing to act promptly (Axelrod, 
2013; Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy & Lascoumes, 2011; Grossey, 2016; Harvey, 
2005; Home Affairs Committee, 2016; Marron, 2008; Sofia de Oliveira et al., 2017; 
Wesseling, 2013). According to Section 330 of POCA, regulated entities (such as 
banks) have an obligation to act on the basis of a mere suspicion and as such, SARs 
may be filed based on inconclusive results. SARs are frequently being submitted with 
the reason for suspicion merely being provided as ‘not in client profile’, or simply 
providing a list of client names (Grossey, 2016). In a recent report from Transparency 
International, it was stated that 42% of the most serious type of SARs, on an 
international level, were assessed as being incomplete or of poor quality, whilst a 
third of banks dismissed serious allegations of money laundering without adequate 
review (Transparency International UK, 2015). Applying such findings to the number 
of SARs filed during 2016 in the UK by banks alone would suggest that 176,169 
(42% of the 419,451 recorded by the NCA in 2016 (NCA, 2017)) were inadequate to 
some degree. Clearly this is a significant issue, yet feedback from law enforcement 
does not systematically occur (Axelrod, 2017). 
 
Consequential Impact 
The impact of a deficient investigation not only fails to properly identify crime, it has 
repercussions for those who may be incorrectly associated with money laundering or 
terrorist activity. As Robin Booth, general counsel at BCL Burton Copeland and a 
veteran UK legal expert on money laundering commented:  
I can’t think of any other law which produces so much collateral 
damage . . . there are numerous instances where accounts have been 
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closed, banking references refused and innocent people have found 
their lives or their businesses disrupted or destroyed merely on the 
basis of a suspicion. (Money Laundering Bulletin, 2015, p. 24) 
 
The consequence of filing a SAR without sufficient grounds for suspicion is an 
important perspective that seems to have been given little consideration, particularly 
if banks tend to err on the side of caution and take a defensive approach, or submit 
reports based on ambiguous findings. This is comparable to various miscarriages of 
justice that have occurred due to reliance being placed on circumstantial evidence 
(Poyser & Milne, 2015). The chances of a court requesting disclosure of a SAR 
during criminal or civil proceedings are increasing (Fisher, 2014) and indeed this is 
borne out by numerous examples in recent case law, namely Iraj Parvizi v Barclays 
Bank [2014] EWHC B2 (QB), R v Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654 and Shah v 
HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd. In R v Da Silva it was established that any suspicion 
must be ‘more than fanciful’ and that a ‘vague feeling of unease’ would not constitute 
suspicion, whereas Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd established that it was for 
the bank to establish the primary fact of suspicion in order to justify not having 
followed the customers’ instructions. This helped to define a clear benchmark that 
banks would need to be able to articulate precisely what their suspicion was. In Iraj 
Parvizi v Barclays Bank, the bank’s SAR was criticised for its lack of logic and 
detail, and evidence from the compliance analyst responsible for raising the suspicion 
was relied upon instead. However, the court mentioned that it was difficult to 
understand why the compliance analyst had failed to make contact with the 
relationship manager in order to clarify the situation. Indeed, the judge stated “It may 
well not be for this court to make this observation but I am surprised that she did not 
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take the obvious step of making an enquiry to Mr Parvizi’s relationship manager” 
(para. 13). This serves to illustrate the importance of the relationship manager’s role 
in the investigation process. Those firms submitting SARs must be prepared to stand 
by the content of the reports they file and justify their decisions; something that may 
be difficult to do when inconclusive or incomplete investigations are conducted.  
 
The Impact of De-Risking 
The overall cost of any compliance programme should also be carefully considered. 
Most banks adopt a risk based approach, as advocated by the FATF, applying AML 
methods that are proportionate to the risks identified within their business (FATF, 
2015). However, if regulation and legislation become too expensive to implement 
efficiently, banks may choose to exit certain markets rather than innovate and find 
ways to make it work (Furst & Wagner, 2017), particularly as banks receive little or 
no recognition for proactive investigations (The Clearing House, 2017). Two large 
UK banks are closing 1000 personal and 600 corporate accounts each month between 
them due to the customer’s profile falling outside their risk appetite, whilst the UK 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) reports seeing around 1000 complaints each 
year connected to account closure (Artingstall et al., 2016).  
 
Needless to say, the media has picked up on this activity and has criticised banks, 
stating that the FOS receives “several hundred complaints relating to this each year” 
(Connington, 2016, para. 5). Another report suggests that “Over the past year 2,000 
people have complained to the FOS about bank accounts being closed – often 
seemingly without any cause” (Boyce, 2017) and that the FOS found in favour of the 
customer in a third of such cases. It is not clear from such reports precisely how many 
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complaints are closed without a clear explanation, nor indeed how many of those 
complaints are associated with suspicious activities. Furthermore, as the NCA is 
exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (NCA, n.d.) it is difficult to establish a 
connection between account closures and suspicious activity. However, what is clear 
is that if banks are not undertaking adequate investigations, customers may find their 
accounts are closed and they have no opportunity to understand the reasons. 
 
Whilst the FOS has dealt with many complaints from customers whose bank accounts 
have been closed without explanation, it is somewhat unusual for them to find in 
favour of the customers. As a recent Ombudsman decision states: 
I should first explain that it’s not for me or this service to tell the 
bank who it should offer accounts to. It’s also up to the bank if it 
decides to close any existing accounts, which is exactly what its 
done here. I would however expect the bank to give reasonable 
notice to a customer if it is intending to close an account. (FOS, 
2017, para. 6) 
So aside from ensuring that practical steps have been taken, such as sending adequate 
notification to the correct address, the FOS is not in a position to comment on 
whether the decision to close the account was appropriate or not. To a large degree 
this is to be expected, as they would only be able to opine on a situation if they were 
given full access to the details of any suspicion. As banks are under a legal obligation 
to report their suspicions, they should not later be criticised by another organisation 
for doing so, even if their suspicions were unfounded. Furthermore, to enable the 
FOS to explain the circumstances to the customer they would need to divulge the 
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nature of the bank’s concerns, which might constitute a tipping off offence (POCA, 
2002). The consequence of this rather complex situation is that customers who may 
have been unfairly treated have no genuine recourse through this service. The 
position is further complicated by the fact that even if a customer makes a Subject 
Access Request to the bank under the Data Protection Act an exemption would likely 
apply as the data held relates to the prevention or detection of crime (ICO, n.d.). 
 
As customers will not be advised of the reason for their account being closed if it is 
linked to suspicious activity, analysis of the FOS published cases reveals little to 
indicate whether such decisions were fair or reasonable. Of 50 recent decisions listed 
on the FOS website (FOS, 2017) that were identified using the search phrase “bank 
account closed” 12 clearly demonstrated that the complaint surrounded the fact that 
banks had closed the accounts without providing any explanation (see Appendix 1, 
Page 252). In all 12 cases, the FOS did not uphold the complaint as the bank was 
perfectly entitled to take such action and did not need to provide any explanation. It is 
notable, however, that in all of the remaining 38 cases descriptions were included 
relating to the reason for the account closure, such as dormancy or the breakdown of 
the relationship. Whilst it therefore remains unclear, it is possible that those cases that 
do not have explanations associated with them are those where the bank has detected 
some degree of unusual activity, or perhaps where the customer simply fell outside of 
the bank’s risk appetite. Whether any suspicions were reasonable and fairly 
investigated is another matter. 
 
This de-risking approach can have potentially serious consequences, impacting 
financial inclusion, consumer protection, competition and profitability (Darby, 2015). 
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By way of illustration, several banks that are struggling to make returns by providing 
correspondent banking services (the provision of banking services by one bank to 
another) in certain jurisdictions have decided to leave these markets. Whilst on the 
surface this may seem like an innocuous decision, the global impact can be 
significant. This is particularly so as correspondent banking services provide the key 
element of cross-border transactions and therefore any reduction can result in 
geographical imbalances, with smaller banks in particular being affected, isolating 
them from international markets (BIS, 2015). Similarly, high-risk clients, such as 
money service businesses and charities have made headline news when their banking 
services have been withdrawn (Fisher, 2016). Of note was the case involving money 
transfer service Dahabshiil, where an injunction was granted to prevent Barclays 
Bank from closing their accounts. It was argued that such closures could have 
catastrophic human consequences due to the reliance of Somali people on receiving 
remittances from the UK, totaling more than £100 million per year, and the lack of 
any conventional banking system (Darby, 2015; Lane, 2013). Likewise, HSBC 
implemented an extensive de-risking programme in which all accounts held by 
money service businesses were exited with just 30 days’ notice (ACAMS, 2014).  
 
Financial inclusion is regarded as a key enabler to the reduction of poverty. It is 
therefore important that all adults, many in some of the poorest areas in the world, 
have access to banking services (GPFI, 2016; Leong, 2007; World Bank, 2016). 
Electing not to provide such services in these regions due to the difficulties of 
implementing an effective AML programme is therefore not a suitable solution. 
Furthermore, the Payments Account Directive (2014) ensures that EU residents are 
entitled to open and use a basic bank account, thereby limiting the extent to which 
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banks can impose selective criteria against undesirable customers. It is therefore vital 
that banks have a credible and effective AML program that does not discriminate 
arbitrarily, but facilitates fair and reasoned decisions. 
 
Incomplete or inadequate AML investigations not only allow criminal activity to 
continue unreported, but can also have a detrimental effect on those wrongly accused. 
This is comparable to the impact of poor investigations within the police that can 
result in dangerous offenders walking free and the innocent being wrongly convicted 
(Gross & Shaffer, 2012). Understanding what tools might be available to assist when 
undertaking the difficult conversations that surround AML investigations is therefore 
imperative when considering how banks might improve.  
 
For many years now, the police have used two key interviewing techniques to help 
with their enquiries; the Cognitive Interview (CI), which is designed to enhance 
memory and recall with cooperative witnesses and suspects (Clarke & Milne, 2016; 
Kebbell, Milne & Wagstaff, 1999) and Conversation Management (CM), which 
assists when dealing with difficult interviewees (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Milne & 
Bull, 1999; Schollum, 2005; Shepherd & Griffiths, 2013). The objective of these 
procedures is to view the investigation as a search for a reliable account as opposed to 
merely obtaining a confession that could ultimately lead to a conviction (Williamson, 
Newburn & Wright, 2007). 
 
The effectiveness of both the CI and CM has been extensively examined (see 
Meissner et al., 2014 for a meta-analysis). There is also academic writing that 
examines the application and implementation of the CI and CM when applied within 
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the public sector (Shawyer & Milne, 2015; Walsh & Bull, 2011; Walsh & Bull, 
2015). However, there is little available literature concerning the use of either the CI 
or CM within the private sector (Walsh & Milne, 2007). The lack of academic 
literature in this area means that it is an extremely poorly examined field, with scant 
supporting evidence to determine whether there are any elements that might be 
suitable for implementation within banking. Furthermore, much of the available 
literature relating to the private sector refers to the application of interviewing 
practices within fraud investigation whereas this thesis is concerned specifically with 
AML investigations. That is not to say of course that fraud is not also a major issue 
for banks to contend with; it is merely that this was not the nucleus of this research. 
Nevertheless, international best practice guidelines have a common underlying tenet 
that the use of non-leading, open-ended questions maximises the accuracy of the 
information obtained and minimises confusion or mis-understanding (Milne & 
Powell, 2010). 
 
Social skills are comprised of behaviours that can be learned and developed and as 
such, it should be possible to train individuals to undertake interviewing tasks in a 
more structured, appropriate manner using open questions that encourage respondents 
to talk freely (Hargie, Saunders & Dickson, 1994). Indeed, the superiority of asking 
open questions to obtain accurate and complete information has been overwhelming 
demonstrated amongst academic researchers (Bull, 2010; Lamb, Sternberg & Esplin, 
1998; Myklebust & Bjørklund, 2006; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010b; Poole & 
Lamb, 1998). Both the CI and CM encourage the appropriate use of different 
question types, hence this important topic is examined further in the next section. 
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Question Types 
 
The categorisation of question types can vary significantly between different 
academic researchers, although the majority agree that open questions produce longer 
and more detailed, accurate responses (Oxburgh et al., 2010b) as there is less undue 
influence of the interviewer over the interviewee (Milne & Bull, 2016) and 
subsequently less contamination of the detail provided (Fisher, Geiselman & 
Raymond 1987; Meissner, 2002). Griffiths and Milne (2006) argue for a more 
functional definition of question types, which they term productive and un-
productive. The productive category should be used when obtaining an initial account 
from the interviewee and includes both open questions (those tending to start with 
‘Tell’ or ‘Describe’) and probing questions (those requiring a substantive response, 
usually commencing with ‘Who’, ‘What’, ‘Why’, ‘Where’, ‘When’ or ‘How’). The 
unproductive category, which is associated with poor questioning, includes closed 
questions (those that would prompt a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, or a single word reply), 
leading questions (those that suggest an answer), multiple questions (those which 
contain a number of different questions, all asked at once), forced choice questions 
(those that only offer a limited number of responses) and opinions or statements 
(instances where no actual question is posed yet a response is expected). Research has 
shown that the use of unproductive question types can affect the quality of the 
information supplied, or can contaminate details of the event being recalled, 
according to the conditions at the point of retrieval (Fisher, Milne & Bull, 2011). This 
is because such question types encourage the interviewee to withhold information, 
particularly that which they are unsure of, to provide brief responses, and to withhold 
unsolicited information (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010). Interviewer-driven questioning 
styles and the use of unproductive question types can cause a decrease in the accuracy 
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of memory and further contamination upon subsequent interview attempts (Meissner, 
2002). 
 
Memory involves three distinct processes; that of encoding, storage and retrieval, and 
if any one of these stages fails, the information may be lost (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, 
Kingma & Guttentag, 1990). Numerous factors can affect the encoding of complex 
events, such as the level of alcohol consumption (Read, Yuille & Tollestrup, 1992), 
stress (Yuille, Davies, Gibling, Marxsen & Porter, 1994), or the level of violence 
associated with an incident (McLeod & Shepherd, 1986). In order to reduce 
contamination or interference with memory, particularly with those who may be 
deemed vulnerable, such as those with learning disabilities, certain practices, such as 
asking leading or forced choice questions, should be avoided (Powell, Fisher & 
Wright, 2005). Open questions such as ‘Tell me what happened’ have been shown to 
elicit the most accurate recollection of events (Lipton, 1977; Snook, Luther, Quinlan 
& Milne, 2012). Conversely, leading or misleading questions such as ‘You did see 
him pull out the knife, didn’t you?’ are likely to result in inaccurate responses 
(Griffiths & Milne, 2006). Multiple questions such as ‘How did you get there and 
what did you do inside?’ are particularly confusing as it is not clear which part the 
interviewee is responding to (Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Milne & Bull, 1999). 
Although there are instances where closed questions are deemed appropriate, these 
are generally used at the conclusion of a discussion topic and follow open and 
probing questions to confirm or clarify information already supplied, or to establish a 
legal point. Using closed questions at an inappropriate stage of an interview, for 
example during the initial opening stages, renders them unproductive and can 
encourage the interviewee to expect short-answer questions throughout (Milne & 
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Bull, 1999). It is therefore important to consider not only what type of question is 
used, but also the point at which it is posed within an interview (see Griffiths 
Question Map (GQM) in Griffiths & Milne, 2006 for a detailed discussion on 
question types and the importance of context). The GQM plotted eight codified 
question types across a time sequence to show at which point they were asked during 
an interview. Griffiths and Milne (2006) thereby identified that a skilled questioning 
strategy should commence with open questions to help encourage a free recall, 
followed by probing questions that would provide finer details, with closed questions 
only being used to verify or validate previously supplied information. Such 
appropriate questioning helps to reduce the risk of false confessions or the production 
of unreliable information and avoids interference with information that has been 
encoded by the individual (Shawyer, 2009). Accordingly, the question types used in 
AML investigations, and the effect these have on the level of information obtained, 
warrants consideration. 
 
Inadequate or inappropriate questioning, such as the use of leading, complex or 
forced choice questions, can result in events being recalled incorrectly (Griffiths & 
Milne, 2006; Milne & Bull, 1999), which is a key concern within banking. If an 
applicant is asked to disclose their source of wealth and they provide an ambiguous or 
unreliable explanation, this would likely be regarded as an indication of deception, 
potentially to disguise the true origin of their finances. However, the reality may 
simply be that the interviewer is not using the appropriate strategy to help the 
customer tap into the correct memory type in order to recall the detail of an event to 
the standard required (Milne, 2004). Episodic memory holds information relating to 
specific, context bound events, such as getting married, and retrieval of these events 
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is generally thorough and detailed, whereas semantic memory holds general 
knowledge, such as the name of the Prime Minister, and information about what to 
expect and how to behave in various situations, for example, what routinely happens 
when visiting a restaurant (Tulving, 1972). Consequently, semantic memory is less 
detailed and precise. When questioning customers about their banking activities, 
consideration has to be given to the fact that for the vast majority of customers, they 
will be relying on their semantic memory to recall everyday events. As such, vague 
responses should not necessarily be considered as an indication of deceit. However, 
when questioning an exceptionally large transaction, which is out of character with 
the general account activity, it is likely that these funds will be associated with a 
specific event, such as the sale of a house. Accordingly, the information should be far 
more detailed as it will have been stored in episodic memory. Open questions are 
preferable as they encourage the respondent to provide as much detail as they 
remember, this being associated with more accurate and full accounts. Conversely, 
closed questions engage recognition memory processes, which tend to narrow the 
retrieval of information and are prone to error (Oxburg, Ost & Cherryman, 2010a; 
Sternberg, Lamb, Esplin, Orbach & Hershkowitz, 2002). 
 
When examining question types, particularly when limited to written formats, such as 
those in AML investigations, it is useful to establish the open-closed ratio (OCR), as 
originally formulated by Fisher, Geiselman and Raymond (1987). They considered 
that a high proportion of open questions would enhance the overall quality of 
information received. Their initial study reported an OCR of 1:9, meaning that for 
every open question raised, there were nine closed questions. More recent research 
indicated that almost half of the interview questions analysed were closed questions 
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(MacDonald et al., 2016) indicating the continuing prevalence of this issue. However, 
there are discrepancies over the definitions and categorisation of open and closed 
questions amongst academic researchers (Oxburgh, 2011; Oxburgh et al., 2010a). 
This means that conducting such analysis in isolation cannot provide conclusive 
results. Instead, such findings should be considered as part of a package of analysis 
(as has been conducted for this thesis), with a clear framework of question types 
being pre-determined.  
 
Whilst open questions may elicit longer and more accurate responses, this does not 
necessarily equate to the information being relevant to an investigation (Phillips, 
Oxburgh, Gavin & Myklebust, 2012). The ‘ingredients’ of such quality information, 
termed as investigation relevant information (IRI), can be used to code the responses 
provided by interviewees using certain category headings such as Person, Action, 
Location, Item and Temporal details (Oxburgh et al., 2010a, p. 263-264). The 
presence of these ‘ingredients’ establishes who was involved, what happened, where 
it happened, what items (if any) were involved, and when each aspect of an incident 
took place. Comparing the amount of IRI received in response to appropriate 
questions versus inappropriate questions can demonstrate which question types are 
most suitable in different settings. This can be a particularly useful measure when 
assessing the level of detail provided by customers that are the subject of AML 
investigations. 
 
Stokoe and Edwards (2008) studied the use of ‘silly questions’ in police interviews; 
these being questions that have an obvious ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer and, to a large degree, 
are self-incriminating. The purpose of such questions is often to obtain and confirm 
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evidence of criminal intent for later use in court, an example being ‘Did you know it 
was wrong to smash your neighbour’s window?’. Such questions are generally 
presented after the suspect has already confessed to the allegations. Whilst such 
questions may well have a suitable place in a police environment, they are less 
appropriate in other settings, particularly those that are intended to gather initial 
information. To illustrate, it would generally not be advisable for a compliance 
analyst to ask a relationship manager ‘Are you happy with your customer’s account 
activity?’ as a negative response could raise the question as to why they had not 
already taken action to mitigate the risk identified (potentially filing a report with law 
enforcement), and hence this could be self-incriminating. Such questions not only 
prompt a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ reply, but also are far too vague and ambiguous for the 
relationship manager to provide any meaningful response (Bryman, 2012). 
Furthermore, it unclear as to whether the relationship manager should be commenting 
on the value or the volume of transactions, or perhaps the specific counter-parties 
with whom the customer is dealing. If the account is generating a healthy profit for 
the relationship manager, they are likely to be delighted with the activity, irrespective 
of any financial crime risks. The problem with such questions is that some recipients, 
despite finding them meaningless, may still attempt to answer them, providing 
responses that they believe will be satisfactory (Payne, 1950). 
 
Whilst the use of open or appropriate questions forms the foundation of a good 
quality investigation, it is also important to understand precisely how those questions 
are asked (Clifton, 2006). Conversation analysis is a highly sophisticated way of 
studying talk in interaction, including the utterances themselves, pauses, emphases 
and sounds (Bryman, 2012) and is examined is the following section. 
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Conversation Analysis 
There are three contributing factors that are regularly deployed when questioning 
across languages: grammar, prosody and epistemic asymmetry. Polar (yes / no) 
questions can be asked in different formats, such as the inverted interrogative (e.g. 
Did she attend the meeting?), a negative interrogative (e.g. Didn’t she attend the 
meeting?) or phrased as a tag question (e.g. She attended the meeting, didn’t she?) 
(Hayano, 2013). Interrogative prosody is commonly deployed with such questions, 
for example, rising intonation (Hedberg, Sosa & Görgülü, 2014). However, 
intonation does not necessarily denote a polar question and it is “recipient-tilted 
epistemic asymmetry that contributes to hearing an utterance as a question” (Hayano, 
2013, p. 397). This means that a declarative sentence, without rising intonation, might 
be treated by the respondent as a polar question based on shared understandings as to 
who is expected to have the knowledge to confirm or disconfirm the statement. This 
could certainly apply to most communications between compliance analysts and 
relationship managers as the very purpose of making contact would be to obtain 
clarification, even if the utterance was not phrased as an actual question. However, 
there are significant differences of intonation between native and non-native English 
speakers (Verdugo & Trillo, 2005) and as bank communications are frequently 
conducted on an international basis, this presents opportunity for misunderstanding, 
particularly where cultural differences are also present. Furthermore, as many bank 
communications take place in writing, precisely what implied intonation might be 
applied is subject to the recipient’s own interpretation. Understanding precisely how 
questions are constructed is therefore an important element when examining the 
reasons why poor quality answers might be provided. 
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The act of raising a question suggests that the questioner has the social right to ask, 
and the recipient has a corresponding social obligation to respond (Heritage & 
Raymond, 2012). However, as outlined earlier, many bank customers may not wish to 
discuss their personal wealth and relationship managers are not necessarily 
comfortable asking potentially intrusive questions, so this social norm is perhaps 
missing in AML enquiries. Furthermore, different question designs can adjust the 
epistemic gradient between the questioner and the respondent, suggesting different 
levels of knowledge already held and different levels of information required by 
response. By way of illustration, ‘Who did you pay?’ (a content question) or ‘Did you 
pay Jane?’ (an interrogative question) or ‘You paid Jane, didn’t you?’ (a tag question) 
suggest that the level of information already held by the questioner is different in 
each instance (Hayano, 2013). The first of these utterances invites elaboration, 
whereas the second and third seek to confirm information already held (Heritage, 
2012). Consequently, each will illicit different quantities of information from the 
respondent. Individuals’ understanding of any utterance will often unfold only as the 
conversation sequence itself unfolds, as opposed to being directed by their existing 
views and beliefs (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008), with each speaker displaying an 
understanding of turn-taking, with one party talking at a time (Bryman, 2012; Hargie, 
2011; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). It is therefore important that if a limited 
response is obtained, the construction of the question itself should be examined. 
 
In addition to understanding how questions can impact upon the level of detail 
provided, individuals employed in commercial industries such as banks need to 
maintain an appropriate relationship with the customer, which naturally means 
observing certain norms of politeness and deference. Requesting information from a 
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customer is inherently an imposition (Hultgren & Cameron, 2010) and as such, the 
questions used require careful negotiation. The relationship between the relationship 
manager and the compliance analyst is also one that requires scrutiny as different 
identities and hierarchy may be apparent through the discourse (Gee, 2014). Whilst 
the relationship manager brings business into the bank, the compliance analyst can 
report customers to law enforcement and ultimately close the account. Hence both 
warrant respect for their respective duties and it is therefore important that the 
language used in any discourse reflects this. 
 
As illustrated earlier in the literature review, AML investigations generally have 
several parties involved in the conversation: the compliance analyst, the relationship 
manager and the customer. That being the case, the relationship manager will usually 
be in a position of ‘brokering’ the conversation. This means that the questions 
ultimately presented to the customer will not necessarily be those originally raised, 
but will instead reflect the relationship manager’s interpretation of what needs to be 
asked. This will naturally impact upon the grammar, prosody and epistemic 
asymmetry factors, particularly the latter as the relationship manager, by virtue of 
their job, should possess far more knowledge about the customer than the 
independent compliance analyst. Consequently, this may mean that the epistemic 
gradient shifts and the question format may vary, which in turn could produce very 
limited amounts of detail from the customer. The compliance analyst could 
subsequently interpret this as the customer being obstructive. Conversely, the 
relationship manager may actually assist the course of the enquiry by facilitating the 
customer’s understanding of the compliance analyst’s requirements, particularly if the 
enquiries are being translated across different languages. As Raymond (2014) 
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observed in studies of epistemic brokering in interpreter-mediated medical visits, co-
participants to the conversations (in this case language interpreters) were often noted 
to bridge the knowledge gap between doctor and patient, thereby improving the 
understanding of both parties.  
 
There are no known studies that examine the effect that relationship managers may 
have on the course of enquiries when in brokering positions and this is an area in 
which further research is warranted. There has been relatively little research that 
specifically examines the communications that take place in a commercial business 
environment (Clifton, 2016; Forey, 2004; Hayano, 2013), yet alone one which is also 
tasked with undertaking enquiries related to matters of financial crime, despite the 
fact that the relevance of conversation analysis within business is obvious 
(Greatbatch & Clark, 2017). Many of the studies over the years have used general, 
everyday conversations, such as those between family members (Hedberg et al., 
2014; Heritage, 2012; Jefferson, 2004; Stivers & Rosano, 2010), or those involving 
sales and marketing (Woodside, 2016). Although Woodside’s study covered the 
somewhat delicate topic of life insurance, the conversations did not appear to include 
difficult or personal questions and did not broach awkward matters such as mortality. 
The interactions between doctor and patient have been more extensively analysed 
(Beach, 2013). However, most patients are likely to understand the purpose and 
benefit of personal questioning, unlike bank enquiries, which may appear 
inappropriate and intrusive. Defining institutional discourse can be problematic, 
although interactions between doctor and patients or the police and the public are 
perhaps more obvious examples (Haworth, 2006). However, the discourse (and 
associated power, control and hierarchy) between a relationship manager and their 
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customer could vary significantly depending on the length and intimacy of that 
relationship. One of the most comprehensive collections of studies (Wooffitt, 2005) 
was drawn together by Drew and Heritage in 1992. They set out to examine 
conversations across a wide variety of different institutions and although their 
research included court proceedings, job interviews, news interviews and health 
consultations, dialogue between an organisation and its paying customers was not 
included.  
 
Recognition should also be given to the linguistic argument that the phrasing of a 
question alone does not determine its function and that “the meaning of an utterance 
is mostly determined by contextual influences” (Oxburgh et al., 2010b, p. 55). Even 
when questions or utterances are poorly constructed the intention can often be clearly 
understood, dependent on the social, legal and physical context, along with the 
background knowledge of the participants and shared assumptions, resources and 
jargon (Holmes & Stubbs, 2015). Of course, where such questions occur during a 
spoken or ‘live’ conversation any inappropriate response can immediately be clarified 
or rectified, whereas such opportunity does not exist in protracted written 
communications. Hence the correct phrasing of questions is considerably more 
important when the ‘conversation’ is not being conducted in real-time. 
 
Written Communications & Linguistic Analysis 
In a commercial environment there are likely to be many instances where 
conversations cannot take place face-to-face, perhaps due to geographical restraints or 
where internal systems or email are preferred in order to retain an audit trail. People 
seek to accomplish things when they write and will use different strategies to create 
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different effects (Bryman, 2012). Choices are made in the way the language used is 
constructed, which will reflect the disposition or opinion of the person drafting it.  
 
In 1999 Gains demonstrated that 92% of the 62 commercial emails that were sampled 
contained no opening greeting at the beginning of the message, which was interpreted 
as a convention for use of the system. Furthermore, 42% of email senders provided 
only their name to close the message and 40% employed some variation of ‘thank 
you'. In general the writing style within the emails was largely consistent, 
grammatically correct, and could be “characterised as using the semi-formal tone of 
co-operative business colleagues” (Gains, 1999, p. 86). Subsequent studies into 
language used on the internet (Crystal, 2001; Gimenez, 2000; Li, 2000) commented 
on the emergence of a universal email language, characterised by the absence of 
grammatical rules (in contrast to Gains’ earlier findings), the adoption of 
abbreviations, and an informal style. However, such comments were subsequently 
contradicted due to the enormous diversity and purposes for which email might be 
used, with language variation being attributed to age, gender and region 
(Androutsopoulos, 2006). Moreover, greater formality of opening and closing 
formulae can be expected in situations where there is a degree of social distance 
(McKeown & Zhang, 2015) such as a student-teacher relationship.  
 
In addition to email related studies, several researchers have conducted text analyses 
using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) tool. LIWC is a transparent text 
analysis software program that tabulates the number of words that fall into 
psychology-relevant categories or ‘dimensions’, providing a ‘fingerprint’ of the 
language used (Lin, Lin, Wen & Chu, 2016; Pennebaker & Graybeal, 2001). The 
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majority of LIWC output is expressed as a percentage of total words used. The 
program codes each individual word into appropriate categories and where words fall 
into multiple categories, all categories are incremented. LIWC then calculates the 
percentage that each category was used in the given text (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 
2010). There are six exceptions to this process: the overall Word Count; the number 
of Words per Sentence; and four Summary Variables, which are based on algorithms 
that reflect a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The Summary Variables are: Analytical 
thinking – with higher numbers indicating more formal, logical and hierarchical 
thinking; Clout – with higher numbers suggesting more expertise and confidence; 
Authentic – with higher numbers suggesting a more honest, personal and disclosing 
text; and Emotional tone – with higher numbers being associated with a more 
positive, upbeat style (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd & Francis, 2015). Each of the 
Summary Variables are standardised composites based on previously published 
research (LIWC, 2015). However, one of the limitations associated with these 
Summary Variables is that they are not transparent (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan & 
Blackburn, 2015) as the precise algorithms are not available due to commercial 
agreements (Pennebaker et al., 2015). Hence it is not possible to fully comprehend 
how the scores for the four Summary Variables are calculated, meaning that their 
application is somewhat restricted. A further limitation of LIWC is that it is rather 
crude in that context, irony, sarcasm and idioms are ignored (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 
2010).  
 
Using LIWC, Simmons, Chambless and Gordon (2008) observed that the use of first-
person plurals (we, our, us) and second-person pronouns (you, your, thou) had a 
negative effect on close relationships, with increased levels of hostility and criticism. 
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Conversely, the use of first-person singular words (I, me, mine) were shown to have 
positive effects. However, the usage of particular words is highly contextual and 
findings may differ across various settings, such as under laboratory conditions or in 
the workplace, or across different groups of people (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 
Nonetheless, it remains interesting to establish whether the use of particular pronouns 
can have an impact upon the output of specific conversations and communications. 
 
A study by Sexton and Helmreich (2000) examined critical communications that took 
place within flight cockpits and analysed the links between the language used and the 
performance achieved, again using LIWC. When considering the difference in 
language used as a function of position and workload within flight cockpits, they 
found that first-person plurals (we, our, us) were used most frequently by Captains, 
possibly to encourage team building and co-operation. Unlike the findings of 
Simmons et al. (2008), the use of first-person plurals (we, our, us) were positively 
correlated with performance and communication. There was also a positive 
correlation between the number of words used and the overall team performance, in 
line with previous research (Foushee & Manos, 1981; Ruffell Smith, 1979; Siskel & 
Flexman, 1962). Conversely, words with more than six letters tended to have a 
negative impact, indicating that concise vocabulary was preferable. Their use of 
LIWC was, however, limited to just four categories (Word count, Sixltr, We and 
Achieve) and only a small sample size was used. Notwithstanding the limitations, the 
output from this study applies not only to flight cockpits, but to many areas where 
communication is key to success and formation of relationships can be driven by the 
language used.  
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Similarly, Burcu Bayram and Ta (2018) evaluated diplomats’ linguistic style using 
LIWC. Their aim was to measure the extent to which international diplomats matched 
each other’s speaking style, particularly in terms of the function words used. Their 
research indicated that the style of language influenced the outcome of negotiations 
by allowing the establishment of common ground and mutual understanding. LIWC 
was deemed an important component of their research as it facilitated analysis of 
crucial constructs that were essential to international negotiation, such as trust and 
intention to compromise. Whilst a key strength of their research was that their data 
came from actual diplomats discussing real political issues, the negotiations were not 
dyadic. Instead, negotiators each had one speaking turn, thus the ebb and flow of 
language was limited. Their study concluded that future researchers may wish to 
analyse whether linguistic styles influenced negotiation success. The knowledge 
gained from this study and the other studies cited indicated that a similar approach, 
using LIWC to complement additional research, could be valuable when examining 
the communications that take place within AML investigations. 
 
Irrespective of the quality of the relationship between two parties, a well-written 
email is considered more credible than one that is poorly constructed and is 
consequently more likely to achieve its aim (Ofulue, 2010). Furthermore, it is 
imperative that communications are polite, as treating colleagues with consideration 
is more likely to result in cooperation, which in turn will achieve the workplace goals 
(Eelen, 2014; Holmes & Stubbe, 2015). Accordingly, studies set within the 
workplace should consider the tone, courtesy and politeness of any relevant 
communications. 
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With considerable divergence over the basic language adopted in email, it seems that 
certain social skills and pleasantries that may often be employed during face-to-face 
conversations or in more formal forms of writing are likely to be absent, or of 
variable quality. Likewise question formats and styles may differ to those raised 
verbally and subsequently may be interpreted differently, particularly due to the 
absence of prosody and the lack of understanding that develops through turn-taking in 
spoken dialogue. How an utterance is interpreted often only unfolds as the 
conversation sequence itself unfolds (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008) and in the case of 
written communication this opportunity is lost. In order for any communication to be 
fully understood it needs to be clear both who is saying it and what the person saying 
it is trying to achieve (Gee, 2014). In the case of email exchanges between a 
compliance analyst and a relationship manager, this would require a degree of 
introduction and background information relating to the concerns. 
 
Written narratives may also be problematic in terms of relaying accurate detail as the 
writer (which could be either the relationship manager or the compliance analyst 
depending on the stage of the process) is in complete control of what is reported. 
How the story is constructed and edited by the relationship manager is subject to his 
or her own frame of reference, attitude and motivation (Shepherd & Mortimer, 1999). 
This means that they will reproduce what is deemed to be appropriate from their 
perspective, based on their aims and ideologies, with dialogue gaps or overlaps being 
omitted (Caldas-Coulthard, 2008). Negative inferences are often drawn when there 
are gaps in the conversation (Wooffitt, 2005) and if these gaps are not reported, any 
difficulties encountered in obtaining the information will not necessarily be apparent. 
It is therefore not possible for the compliance analyst to know whether the customer’s 
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explanation was delivered spontaneously, or whether the relationship manager has 
directed or prompted the customer in some way. The accuracy of the detail provided 
is therefore difficult to measure. Whilst it is acknowledged that in many instances the 
basic story does not change, the associated circumstances and details often do (De 
Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012). Additionally, if elements of the story are poorly 
understood or are unfamiliar they may be inferred when the story is being 
reconstructed (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1978). This could therefore present a problem to 
the compliance analyst who is attempting to ascertain the veracity of the explanation 
provided. 
 
Research by Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) suggests that when collecting qualitative 
data, as would generally be the case in an AML investigation, the quality of that data 
remains consistent, irrespective of the medium used (either face-to-face or over the 
telephone). However, this was somewhat contradicted by Irvine, Drew and Sainsbury 
(2012), who observed a number of key differences between the two mediums. This 
latter study drew upon conversation analysis techniques and concepts (such as turn-
taking and overlapping speech) to ensure a detailed and systematic approach to the 
research. From an investigation perspective, the most positive findings from Irvine, 
Drew and Sainsbury’s 2012 research were that the use of the telephone increased 
requests for clarification and checks by the interviewee on the adequacy of the 
responses provided. Whilst the telephone interviews were slighter shorter than the 
face-to-face interviews, the important aspect in an AML investigation is that the 
detail captured is accurate. The assumption that telephone interviews are inferior to 
face-to-face interviews may emanate from concern that a lack of visual cues could 
lead to data loss or interpretation difficulties. However, there is little evidence of this 
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occurring in practice (Bryman, 2012; Novick, 2008; Stephens, 2007), although there 
are few studies that compare the two mediums in practical, non-research settings 
(Shuy, 2003). Nevertheless, it is considered that talking to someone face-to-face 
provides a greater richness of social cues and consequently it is the medium most 
preferred by organisations (Hargie, 2011). 
 
Some of the advantages that may be obtained when conducting either a telephone or 
face-to-face interview are lost when the questions are raised in writing (Marshall, 
2016). Written communications, whilst often well suited to quantitative research such 
as a questionnaire with a finite list of response options, are less appropriate when 
conducting qualitative interviews in which the possibility remains that the emerging 
details might be very different to those predicted (Britten, 1995). Furthermore, when 
the written format is used during the course of an investigation, the opportunity to 
introduce unexpected questions, that generate descriptive and spontaneous responses 
from those telling the truth (Vrij et al., 2018), is also removed as the respondent has 
plenty of time to contemplate their reply (Hartwig, Granhag & Strömwall, 2007). In 
the context of an AML investigation, it would therefore seem pertinent that written 
enquiries are only directed to customers as a last resort, despite the potential time and 
cost benefits associated with doing so (Akbayrak, 2000; Opdenakker, 2006). 
 
In order to appreciate how some of these different questioning techniques and 
considerations might be applied within banking the following section examines the 
steps have been introduced across public and private sectors and the extent of their 
success. Although much of the available academic literature relates to public sector 
fraud, this still provides a useful comparison. There is less published material 
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available for the private sector and consequently the benefit of applying various 
questioning techniques in this field is rather more difficult to assess. 
 
Public and Private Sectors  
The CI first appeared in training materials for the Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP) in 1999 (Walsh & Milne, 2007). Other public sector counter fraud specialists, 
such as those in the National Health Service (NHS) (Frimpong, 2013) and Inland 
Revenue (now HMRC) also adopted similar techniques during the late 1990s as 
standard (Shawyer & Walsh, 2007). However, it was noted within the Butterworth 
Report that whilst enhanced interview techniques training was compulsory, normally 
being delivered to HM Customs and Excise investigators during their first two years, 
regular formal training ceased after this period. This deficiency was clearly identified, 
although a prescriptive solution was not provided (HM Treasury, 2003). 
 
The Scampion Report (2000) and the Grabiner Report on The Informal Economy 
(2000) both called for high degrees of professionalism within counter fraud 
investigations, which led to improvements and the development of a training package 
for investigators, part of which incorporates interviewing practices (Button, Johnston, 
Frimpong & Smith, 2007; Shawyer, 2009). Both the DWP and the NHS introduced 
means to create professional counter fraud infrastructures through the implementation 
of accredited training packages, developing counter fraud specialists with 
interviewing skills being pivotal to their role (Doig, 2006; Shawyer & Milne, 2015). 
This evolved further to include other government departments and the private sector 
and the creation of the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board (CFPAB). 
However, there was a distinct absence of empirical data analysing these measures 
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(Button et al., 2007), yet alone examining the interviewing abilities of the staff 
employed. Nevertheless, the foundations of disciplined interviewing practices had 
been implemented, upon which developments and improvements could be made. The 
approach adopted by both the DWP and the NHS is one that could act as a basis for 
the development of appropriate questioning skills within the banking industry. 
 
In their 2007 study Walsh and Milne detected that 68% of benefit fraud investigators 
had already prejudged the suspect as being guilty prior to the interview taking place. 
They noted that interviewing fraud suspects was an important task and it was 
therefore surprising that such little analysis of this had been conducted. This is 
particularly significant when considering the fact that recent meta-analysis of both 
field and laboratory studies revealed that an information-gathering approach was 
found to be far more effective in eliciting accurate responses than accusatorial 
methods (Meissner et al., 2014). Confirmation bias can lead those conducting 
interviews to only seek evidence that supports their expectations or hypotheses, 
whilst simultaneously disregarding details that contradict their beliefs (Hill, Memon 
& McGeorge, 2008). This is exacerbated by the fact that many DWP interviews are 
conducted under caution and are recorded, with a large amount of evidence having 
already been collected by the time the interview takes place (Walsh & Milne, 2008). 
Interviews within banks tend to take place either at account opening stage or 
following unusual account activity. Whilst the latter might prompt some form of 
concern, suspicion at the account opening stage would generally only develop if the 
customer presented incomplete or incomprehensible responses to the initial questions 
posed.  
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Walsh and Milne (2008) also examined the interviewing abilities of benefit fraud 
investigators working in the public sector. The study determined that interviews were 
conducted on a professional and ethical basis whether the interviewer was trained or 
not. The study concluded that the majority of investigators still needed to develop 
their skills further. Shawyer (2009) revealed through her research that whilst there 
were some mixed views, notably regarding timescales, 61% stated that the training 
had positively influenced their interviewing style. These findings broadly reflect 
those of Walsh and Milne (2007) and Clarke and Milne (2001). Shawyer’s results 
also indicated that as the DWP interviews were generally much shorter than those of 
the police a basic format should be adapted to suit different types of interview.  
 
Walsh and Bull (2010) analysed a sample of 142 DWP interviews, the findings of 
which indicated that the interviewing techniques displayed were mediocre. The 
reasons for this apparent low quality included the seemingly trivial nature of the 
offences in question, when compared to the police, combined with the lack of 
external scrutiny. Additionally, the cases examined were frequently concluded 
outside of the criminal justice system, with the quantity of sanctions imposed being 
the measures of success. This was deemed to be misleading as it was suggestive of 
high quality interviewing skills when this was not necessarily the case.  
 
Naturally, the skill of the individual interviewer also comes into play, with Walsh and 
Bull (2010) observing that inferior DWP fraud investigators would lose confidence 
and struggle when presented with complex fraud cases or denials of guilt and adopt a 
submissive approach. Indeed, this incompetence was exacerbated by attempts to 
complete the interview quickly as soon as any vague acknowledgement of 
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wrongdoing was proffered. Reinforcement and expert instruction are essential 
components of skilled behaviour and feedback is crucial to effective performance, 
otherwise such skills will not improve or may even deteriorate (Collins & Collins, 
1992; Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Powell, Hughes-Scholes, Smith & 
Sharman, 2014). This supports the concept that follow up supervision must be 
provided to those who undertake any form of interview training to ensure that the 
learned skills are developed and maintained (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Clarke & Milne, 
2016; Davies, Bull & Milne, 2016; Milne & Bull, 2003a; Stockdale, 1993; Walsh & 
Bull, 2011). The infrequency of self-evaluation and examination of interviews was 
something that Milne and Bull (2003a) considered to be quite bewildering.  
 
Gee, Button and Cook (2010, p. 3) created the “most extensive and most 
comprehensive report yet undertaken into the resilience of UK public sector bodies to 
fraud”, evidencing that overall, public sector bodies were better protected than the 
private sector or charities. Their research revealed that specialist counter fraud 
training varied widely from just 49% of professionally trained staff within central 
government to 94% within the NHS, although the majority of participants did not 
ensure that such training was updated or refreshed regularly. The interviewing 
process itself was not examined as part of this study, which could perhaps be an 
interesting area for further development. Nevertheless, this research serves to again 
demonstrate that even within public bodies, such as the NHS, where training is 
extensive, this is still not being appropriately refreshed, despite the clear need to do 
so.  
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Walsh and Bull (2012) reviewed 85 interviews with suspects of benefit fraud in order 
to examine interviewer skill levels. Their research found that confessions were more 
likely when a skilful interviewer displayed certain tactics such as disclosing evidence 
or summarising regularly. Shawyer and Milne’s later study (2015) sought to identify 
the beliefs and attitudes of those interviewing within the police (n=35) and the DWP 
(n=76). Of some concern was that 97% of the police and 92% of DWP investigators 
believed that the suspect was guilty prior to the interview taking place. Furthermore, 
they held common, but distorted, beliefs that deception could be detected from body 
language. All found the interviewing skills they had learnt useful and whilst each had 
reservations regarding suitability, these were for different reasons. The police cases 
were long and complex, which created difficulty, whereas the DWP found the 
processes too cumbersome for their interviews, which were much shorter in 
comparison. These findings indicate the importance of the flexibility of the format to 
suit the requirements, something that would certainly need to be factored in if used 
within the private sector due to the commercial considerations. 
 
There is an abundance of research into the implementation, development and success 
of the CI, albeit predominately within the laboratory (see Köhnken, Milne, Memon, 
& Bull, 1999; Meissner et al., 2014; Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010 for meta-
analyses). Whilst this is informative, it does not directly relate to financial services, 
nor does it apply in a customer service scenario, which must also cater for genuine 
cases in an effective manner. It has recently been estimated that each bank customer 
costs between £10 and £140 to investigate, rising beyond this where senior experts 
are involved (Artingstall et al., 2016). It is therefore vital that investigations can be 
conducted in a commercially viable manner and that associated regulation is able to 
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“minimise the illegitimate exploitation without wrecking the economic dynamism” 
(Levi, 1996, p. 3).  
 
There are numerous similarities between banking and insurance in terms of 
preventing, investigating and resolving matters, and the forensic skills required in one 
field apply equally to the other (Silverstone, Sheetz, Pedneault & Rudewicz, 2012). 
As such, successes observed within the insurance sector should be capable of being 
transferred into the banking sector. However, there was limited evidence found of 
insurance related academic research that could offer insight into the value of applying 
different questioning techniques. 
 
Morley, Ball and Ormerod (2006) conducted research into insurance fraud detection 
methods. Even though this was limited to assessment within two companies and 
explored various attitudes, training and practices, rather than being specifically 
focused on questioning techniques, their findings demonstrated a general deficiency 
in training, experience and resource, with much reliance being placed upon 
procedure. These conclusions broadly mirrored those noted several years earlier by 
Doig, Jones and Wait (1999) who had observed that high-volume, low cost practices 
were resulting in many frauds simply going unreported. Later studies indicated that 
the problems observed as inherent within the industry did not appear to have 
improved in over a decade (Ormerod, Ball & Morley, 2010). 
 
One of the complications identified by Ormerod et al., (2010) was that insurance 
companies were not only looking to increase the number of fraudulent claims 
detected, but were actively seeking measures to improve the processing speed of 
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legitimate claims. These are perhaps objectives that are at odds with each other 
considering that any form of thorough analysis of information and validation of data 
can be time consuming. They indicated that many claims handlers processed over 40 
cases each day, leaving little opportunity to plan or reflect upon suspicious scenarios. 
They submit that specialist fraud investigation units within insurance companies 
show a large return on investment, yet despite this, insufficient attention is given to 
understanding the nature of fraud detection and investigation expertise itself. Banks 
face similar issues in that they are trying to identify small pockets of concern amongst 
a vast customer base that demands first class service. 
 
Referring specifically to insurance fraud, Dobie (2012) outlined that not only do 
insurance companies have technical complexities to contend with, they have to 
balance robust investigation procedures against good customer care, whilst operating 
in a competitive market place, very much like banking. Whilst an insurance 
investigation needs to be conducted as quickly and economically as possible, the 
investigator needs to bear in mind that the case could ultimately proceed to 
prosecution, so the enquiries must be conducted as close to the evidential 
requirements for a criminal investigation as possible (Dobie, 2012). Various 
investigative tools can be used, such as open-source enquiries and screening against a 
variety of insurance fraud databases to validate information provided. Only when 
such investigations are complete does Dobie (2012) advocate engaging with the 
claimants themselves.  
 
There appears to be very little documented research into the employment or 
effectiveness of the CI, CM, or the use of different question types to identify 
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customer fraud within the private sector, with the majority of available literature 
being predominately focused on the investigation and prevention of corporate fraud 
(Coenen, 2008; Kovacich, 2007; O’Gara, 2004; Pedneault, 2010; Vona, 2008; Wells, 
2011) or simply avoiding the topic of questioning practices altogether (Busch, 2008; 
Gottschalk, 2010; Ryder, 2011). As such, it has not been possible to determine any 
current accepted views on best practice. Many companies are hesitant to admit the 
extent of fraud within their business to shareholders and customers and indicate a 
general reluctance to share information (Doig et al., 1999).  
 
When Crawford and Company (2009) published their fraud investigation results, they 
claimed that their personal research had revealed that up to 35% of customers elected 
to withdraw their claims as a result of applying CM techniques. Likewise, Absolute 
Customer Management reported a saving of £37,000 for every 100 insurance claims 
they dealt with using the CI, whereas Churchill confirmed the technique was used for 
certain types of claim, producing good results. Others remained sceptical regarding 
the use of the CI or CM and were seeking “to balance the twin goals of enhanced 
fraud savings with minimum impact on our genuine customers” (Challiner, n.d., para. 
11). Several firms reportedly applied CI techniques to detect insurance fraud, such as 
Absolute Fraud Management (BBC, 2009), Esure (n.d.), and Agria (2014), although 
none quoted any analysis that would suggest how this has enhanced their fraud 
detection rates or improved cost savings. Kuhnt, Lorenz and Müssig (2014, para. 8) 
reported that CI techniques were already being utilised to “great economic success in 
the UK and southern Europe, but are rarely used elsewhere in Europe”. However, no 
evidence to support this statement was provided. 
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Button, Pakes and Blackbourn (2014) conducted a study examining a dataset of 
dishonest insurance claims that were processed by VFM Ltd, a company that used 
CM to identify higher risk claims. This research was intended to profile insurance 
fraudsters rather than assess the benefits of CM itself. The researchers were confident 
that the process would have identified the vast majority of fraudulent or non-plausible 
claims. However, as an additional piece of research, it would be advantageous to 
compare these results against another company that did not use CM in order to 
measure its impact. It would also be interesting to assess how effectively VFM Ltd 
was employing CM techniques, perhaps by analysing the calls themselves. 
 
The results from several studies indicate that the absence of appropriately trained 
employees has been an on-going issue for a number of years, with emphasis 
frequently being fixed on quantity rather than quality (Doig et al., 1999; Morley et al., 
2006; Ormerod et al., 2010). Whilst processing figures remain of paramount 
importance and staff members continue to be assessed on the basis of their 
productivity, it appears that the quality of investigations will suffer. If firms are to 
improve, sufficient to meet regulatory objectives, as well as substantially reduce 
reported fraud losses, additional investment in staff will be required (Crawford & 
Company, 2009). Many companies may be reluctant to develop questioning skills as 
standard practice until the benefits are clearly defined or the relevant industry 
regulators advocate the approach. Whilst there is plenty of fraud analysis available to 
firms, there is little information from influential sources regarding effective counter-
fraud solutions. At present, details of the benefits are absent in the private sector and 
firms are reluctant to share methods and results with their competitors due to 
commercial sensitivity. 
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Whilst improved questioning skills will certainly not eradicate financial crime, they 
could go some way in identifying those cases that require further attention. There will 
always be a large number of processes and procedures that require human interaction 
and it is here that firms should perhaps direct their attention. Training is of utmost 
importance and whilst there is evidence that both the public sector and insurance 
companies have embraced elements of the CI and CM, banks appear to have been 
much slower to acknowledge the value of appropriate questioning methods, as 
indicated in the following section. 
 
Data Within the Banking Sector 
Banks often hold little, if any, detail about the customer beyond their name, address 
and date of birth. Whilst steps are being taken to improve the extent of information 
held on bank records, the remediation exercise is extensive. For example, HSBC 
serves around 38 million customers globally (HSBC, 2018) and reviewing and 
updating this number of records is both a costly and extensive exercise. It was only 
with the introduction of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive in 2007 that a 
standard approach for customer identification and verification was implemented 
across Europe (CPA Audit, 2008; JMLSG, 2014) and banks appear to have been slow 
to respond to this guidance, as evidenced by the numerous recent regulatory fines 
imposed. With such scant customer detail being held, it will be difficult to recognise 
those individuals or businesses that may pose an increased risk, perhaps due to a 
history of crime, or who may perhaps be vulnerable and require additional support.  
 
Many cash intensive businesses are extremely vulnerable to money laundering 
exploitation, particularly if they are struggling (Gilmour & Ridley, 2015) 
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as fronts, co-mingling laundered money along with their genuine takings. Likewise, 
individual victims of human trafficking or modern slavery, which are extremely 
profitable forms of transnational crime (Dando, Walsh & Brierley, 2016) may find 
themselves at the mercy of criminal networks and be forced to pay their wages into 
bank accounts which are controlled by their exploiters and to which they have either 
limited or no access (NCA, 2015b; NCA, 2016). Customers may also become victims 
of the banks themselves if they fail to provide adequate responses to the questions 
posed, perhaps due to their vulnerability, and subsequently find their banks accounts 
closed. As discussed earlier, banks do not need to provide the customer or FOS with 
any explicit reason as to why an account has been closed and the NCA is exempt 
from the Freedom of Information Act. As such, assessing the extent to which 
customers may have become victims of an inappropriate process is extremely 
difficult. Nevertheless, this is perhaps an area that banks themselves should look to 
examine in order to be satisfied that they are protecting their vulnerable customers. 
 
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 defines vulnerable witnesses as: 
children aged under 17; or those whose quality of evidence might be diminished due 
to a mental disorder (as defined within the Mental Health Act 1983), significant 
impairment of intelligence and social functioning, or a physical disability or disorder. 
Gudjonsson (1995) proffers that police officers and forensic medical experts should 
be provided with specific training as to how to identify vulnerable interviewees, such 
as those with mental health issues, and subsequently ensure they are interviewed 
appropriately. No such considerations or distinctions are made within banking. 
Indeed there is no industry guidance to suggest that the reliability of responses 
obtained from customers who might be considered vulnerable should be taken into 
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account. Although the FCA has started to make some recommendations in respect of 
vulnerable customers (FCA, 2015c) this places no specific obligations or 
requirements on firms at the moment. This is further complicated by the fact that 
there is no fixed definition of a ‘vulnerable customer’ and that vulnerability itself 
should be viewed as a fluid state, requiring a flexible and tailored response. In order 
for banks to identify and deal with vulnerable customers appropriately throughout 
any relationship with them, it would appear that guidance and training is required. 
 
Research has demonstrated that the use of appropriate question types not only 
improves the quality and quantity of information obtained, but it also ensures that 
interviewees are not unduly influenced. Ensuring that appropriate question types are 
used within AML investigations could therefore be an initial step towards fair and 
justified outcomes for all customers. Accordingly, the level of training, research and 
knowledge across the banking sector is of paramount importance and this is further 
examined in the following section. 
 
Training Within the Banking Sector 
The extent of published research covering training within the banking sector is 
somewhat restricted and those studies that were identified were both outdated and 
narrow. Simwayi and Wang (2011) examined the effectiveness of the role of the 
MLRO within banks in Zambia, however, their research was limited to just 14 
responses. Whilst this touched on the subject of training, noting that it was generally 
inadequate, it did not examine investigation or questioning techniques specifically. 
This is particularly disappointing as the findings make reference to the large extent of 
corruption and forgery prevalent across the country, which may have revealed 
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additional complexities when undertaking enquiries. Analysis as to precisely how 
regulations and guidance have been implemented within the banking sector appears to 
have eluded academic research. 
 
Webb (2004) examined the approach and attitude of 30 London based MLROs and 
specifically raised the question of training. Whilst the majority of MLROs had been 
trained, this was generally comprised of short courses, meetings or conferences. None 
made reference to specialist training that related to investigations and the academic 
literature surrounding this subject was described as “neglected” (Webb, 2004, p. 367). 
 
Research by Bosworth-Davies (1998) does little to enrich the scarce information 
available regarding the quality of investigations. As with Webb’s subsequent study, 
questions were raised relating to training, which revealed that 34% of the MLROs 
questioned had not received appropriate training for their roles. One of the 
conclusions from Bosworth-Davies’ research related to the participants’ own 
perception of training needs, as all 34% considered that they had received enough 
training. Furthermore, in many cases, MLROs who had received no training 
whatsoever were themselves responsible for training others. 
 
All three of the above studies indicated that the training available within banks, 
notably at a senior level, appeared to be deficient, despite the MLRO having ultimate 
accountability for reporting all money laundering offences or suspicious activity. The 
consequence of this is that poor practices might percolate throughout the entire 
hierarchy of the organisation. Furthermore, if those who are ultimately in control are 
oblivious to the problems that they themselves are perpetuating, then the issues are 
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unlikely to be recognised and rectified. It is clear from the limited studies available 
that further research is required to ascertain whether such problems continue today. 
More recently, Sofia de Oliveira et al. (2017) specifically examined the obstacles that 
precluded the implementation of an effective AML programme in the UK. They 
identified that the most common challenges encountered were: “lack of clarity over 
laws; fear of penalties; misguided investments and lack of resources; conflict between 
business priorities and regulatory obligations to implement AML systems and 
controls; and poor implementation of a culture of compliance” (Sofia de Oliveira et 
al., 2017, p. VI). One of their key recommendations was that the hiring and training 
of efficient compliance staff was vital; but what form and shape should this training 
look like? This paper, which is crucial in understanding the range of issues currently 
faced by the banking sector, did not seek to examine any aspect of the investigation 
process itself. Hence it did not identify whether the questioning techniques were 
flawed. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, there seems to be little in the way of guidance to help banks conduct 
effective AML investigations, with no regard to the difficulties that might be faced 
when raising difficult questions. Whilst problems in conducting investigations have 
been identified and addressed, at least to some degree, in public bodies and several 
insurers, the very concept that effective questioning is an acquired skill that generally 
requires specific training seems to have escaped the attention of both banks and 
regulators alike. Despite significant evidence that appropriate question types elicit 
more accurate information from interviewees (Bull, 2010; Fisher, Geiselman & 
Raymond, 1987; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Fisher et al., 2011; Griffiths & Milne, 
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2006; Lamb, Sternberg & Esplin, 1998; Lipton, 1977, Milne & Bull, 1999; Milne & 
Bull, 2016; Myklebust & Bjørklund, 2006; Oxburgh et al., 2010b; Oxburgh, 
Myklebust & Grant, 2010; Oxburgh, Ost & Cherryman, 2010a; Poole & Lamb, 1998; 
Shawyer, 2009; Sternberg, Lamb, Esplin, Orbach & Hershkowitz, 2002) this does not 
appear to have been recognised within banking. Little published material was 
available for review that examined the questioning abilities of bank staff, and the few 
studies that were located accentuated poor internal practices and inadequate skills. 
None of the regulatory frameworks or guidance reviewed suggested that the 
questioning process itself should be examined, despite the failings that have been 
identified and called out through various thematic reviews (FCA, 2014b; FCA, 
2015a; FCA, 2015b) and regulatory fines (FCA, 2013; FCA, 2014a; FCA, 2015a; 
FCA, 2016; FCA, 2017: Henry, 2015; Peston, 2012). Extensive legislation and 
regulation is in place on an international scale, alongside global guidance that has 
existed since the 1930s; however, despite this longevity, there appears to be little 
consideration of the specific problems that are encountered with AML investigations.   
 
Whilst some of the techniques advocated by the CI and CM, notably the use of open 
questions, could perhaps be beneficial within AML investigations, the position is 
complicated by the situation that exists between relationship manager, compliance 
analyst and customer. There are numerous factors at play, including the fact that the 
relationship manager may not actually want to pose any questions at all to their 
customer for fear of losing the business and ultimately impacting their own 
remuneration. In addition, there may be a perceived imbalance of power or 
knowledge between the parties which may affect the way the questions are 
constructed and the amount of detail subsequently supplied, complicated by the lack 
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of direct interaction between the compliance analyst and the customer. The position 
becomes even more problematic where communications are conducted in writing as 
limited introduction and background may be supplied, intonation is absent, and the 
ability for clarity to be obtained is diminished. 
 
This literature review has created an understanding as to: i) some of the problems 
faced by banks when undertaking AML investigations; ii) the consequences of poor 
quality questioning within banks; iii) the importance of both written and spoken 
discourse and how language can be interpreted differently; iv) the limitations when 
brokering or relaying conversations; and v) the attempts that have been introduced to 
improve investigations in other fields.  
 
The research for this thesis therefore set out to examine whether there were problems 
with the existing questioning techniques employed by bank staff and whether they 
were comfortable when raising difficult questions. This was achieved through 
surveys and interviews with those involved in AML investigations and case file 
analysis in which the questions that were posed by compliance analysts to 
relationship managers were examined, along with the responses these questions 
generated. The following chapter outlines the methodology that was used in these 
assessments. 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
 
A mixed methods form of research was adopted as it allowed for analysis of both 
quantitative and qualitative information, combining the best aspects of both 
paradigms (Bryman, 1988; Howe, 1988) within a single study (Burke Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It also permitted corroboration and triangulation of the data 
collected (Bryman, 2012; Noaks & Wincup, 2004; Wisker, 2001). Qualitative 
research was deemed to be an essential component as it allowed an understanding of 
intangibles, such as ideas, values, descriptions and beliefs (Wisker, 2001). However, 
quantitative research was also considered vital to the project in order to provide 
statistical, objective data (Robson, 2013) to demonstrate the extent of any problems 
identified. It was anticipated that by approaching individuals employed across 
numerous organisations the data would reveal a global picture of questioning skills 
and training within AML investigations. It was hoped that this could be achieved by 
adopting three strands of research, as follows: Strand I - Survey - To gather the 
opinions, views and perceptions of bank staff involved in AML investigations; Strand 
II - Semi-Structured Interviews and; Strand III - Case File Analysis. Each will now be 
considered in turn. 
 
Strand I - Survey - To gather the opinions, views and perceptions of bank staff 
involved in AML investigations 
Firstly, a survey strategy was initiated using a questionnaire to collect primary data 
(Appendix 2, Page 255). This provided empirical quantitative statistics as well as 
qualitative data in the form of views and opinions. A survey strategy allowed a large 
number of individuals across the globe to be contacted quickly and simply, ensuring a 
reasonable selection of data, with a broad geographical spread, was made available 
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(Denscombe, 2010). An electronic questionnaire was used as this format was 
practical, inexpensive to produce, and quick to distribute via email. However, it was 
acknowledged that the response rate might be disappointing. The questionnaire was 
produced using Qualtrics, which resulted in a document that was simple for 
participants to access and complete. One of the additional benefits of using Qualtrics 
was that the questionnaires were straightforward to design and could be easily 
manipulated and customised to suit the specific requirements of the research. This 
facilitated a mixture of question formats, with each response being automatically 
validated before allowing progression to the next, which guaranteed that questions 
would not be omitted in error, and ensured that each question was answered, at least 
to some degree, in accordance with the instruction provided. This was particularly 
important with multiple-choice questions that demanded only a single response. 
Whilst these features helped to limit spoilt and incomplete questionnaires there was 
no means of ensuring that appropriate responses were entered into free text fields.  
 
Demographic data was collected to allow for some basic analysis. Additionally, 
individual experiences and perceptions were captured, in order to gain some insight 
into current practices. The questions were carefully structured to avoid any need to 
divulge specific processes or procedures and many of the questions were multiple-
choice, or required Likert scale responses, thereby ensuring that generic, rather than 
company-specific information was revealed. At no point was the name of any 
employer requested.  
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Sample Population 
The aim was to contact a large number of people, globally, who were involved in 
AML investigations. By approaching individuals who were employed in a variety of 
organisations, spanning numerous countries, a broad spectrum of data could be 
obtained, which helped mitigate the risk of any skewed or biased opinions. A 
snowball sampling approach was adopted whereby each individual that was initially 
contacted was asked to forward the survey to at least one colleague. The snowball 
sample was initially comprised of individuals who were identified and carefully 
selected through the social media site, LinkedIn. Social media provides an efficient 
and cost effective means of obtaining high-quality responses from participants across 
an extensive geographical reach (Allsworth, 2015; Maloney et al., 2015) and as such, 
this method was deemed to be suitable. The email addresses that were used to make 
contact were all publicised personal email addresses and no contact was made via 
LinkedIn ‘Inmail’ addresses or similar messaging services. Such individuals were 
identified through a general search using terms such as ‘KYC’ or ‘AML’ and could 
subsequently be contacted by anyone subscribing to the free LinkedIn service. The 
researcher had no special rights or access to privileged information.  
 
Individuals were individually selected by the researcher based on their job title, their 
job description and the name of their employer, all of which were displayed on 
LinkedIn. This manual process was deemed necessary to ensure that the responses 
contained relevant data (Denscombe, 2014). Due to the geographical distribution of 
the participants, it was not possible to deliver the questionnaires in person and 
accordingly, reliance was placed solely on electronic methods of communication. All 
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those identified were sent a personal email with the appropriate information and 
consent forms, along with a link to the survey itself. 
 
Participants were requested to email the survey link and accompanying participant 
information details to at least one colleague who undertook a similar role within 
banking. As such, not all of the potential participants were recruited through 
LinkedIn, which helped to eliminate bias. In order to measure responses from across 
the industry, as opposed to only analysing how one or two organisations operated, 
contact was made with employees from as many different banks across the globe as 
possible. However, due to the anonymity involved, it was not possible to measure 
how many different banks were represented in the responses. It was acknowledged 
that, as with most surveys, there was no obligation for the participant to respond and 
that many may be reluctant to do so (Iarossi, 2006). Hence it was hoped that a 
personalised email from a professional employed in the same field would enhance the 
response rate (Rugg & Petre, 2007).  
 
In total 628 individual emails were sent. As the survey responses were anonymous, it 
was not possible to determine which individuals had responded. This meant that 
follow up emails had to be carefully worded and could only be sent to the original 
distribution list, rather than those to whom the link may have been subsequently 
forwarded. 131 responses were received representing a response rate (against the 
original distribution) of 20.8%, which was considered reasonable. Cook, Heath and 
Thompson (2000) reported that the mean response rate for 68 electronic surveys 
across 49 studies was 39.6%. According to some popular online survey tools the 
average response rate for email surveys is reported as 24.8% (FluidSurveys, 2014), 
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25% (SurveyMonkey, 2011) or 10-15% for external surveys (Surveygizmo, 2015). 
The number of replies received would therefore appear to be acceptable. Indeed, 
Denscombe (2014) believes there is no benchmark figure as to what is an adequate 
response rate as this will depend entirely on the circumstances.  
 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire itself was simple to complete and was deliberately kept fairly short 
in order to preserve the engagement of participants. In designing the questionnaire, 
care was taken to ensure that questions were positioned sensitively, so as not to deter 
participants from completing the majority of the survey. Certain individuals may be 
reluctant to provide descriptive, free text responses, preferring instead to select from 
multiple-choice questions or Likert scale responses. Asking complex questions at the 
very start of the survey may deter some participants from continuing. As such, 
questions that required considerable input and thought were positioned towards the 
end.  
 
The questionnaire was divided into four main themes: 
 
1. About You - which captured basic demographic details. The eight multiple 
choice and free text response questions within this section covered gender, 
age, country of employment, years of banking experience, current role, and 
professional qualifications held. Questions were also posed to establish 
whether the participants dealt directly with customers and/or raised concerns 
relating to account activity through third parties, such as relationship 
managers. 
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2. Suspicious Activity Reporting & Escalation Processes - which queried the 
extent of direct interaction with the authorities and the degree of comfort felt 
when escalating or closing cases. The questions within this section were a 
mixture of two Likert scale questions (each with five options), three multiple-
choice questions, and two free-text response questions which allowed 
additional information to be provided if appropriate. 
 
3. Culture & Behaviour - which examined the extent that bank staff felt 
protected by their employer and questioned the manner in which a customer’s 
background might influence the investigation process. This section also 
queried whether participants had encountered situations where their questions 
had not been properly addressed. This section was comprised of two Likert 
scale questions (each with five options), two multiple choice questions, and 
four free-text response questions.  
4. Enquiries & Investigations - which sought to establish the degree of comfort 
felt when raising difficult questions and queried the level of training provided. 
The questions within this section were a mixture of five Likert scale questions 
(each with five options), six multiple choice questions, and five free-text 
response questions.  
 
The full version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2 (Page 255). 
 
Aside from the simplicity of completion and overall length of the survey, 
consideration was given to the structure of each of the questions. The questions 
allowed for a range of answers from individuals to demonstrate their level of 
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knowledge, to determine any specific level of training, and to draw out both facts and 
opinions. These details were obtained through multiple-choice questions, which 
helped to limit illegible, incoherent, or out of context answers (Rugg & Petre, 2007). 
This was particularly important considering the anticipated language barriers. 
Additionally, Likert scale response format questions were included which presented 
the participant with a range of options that allowed for attitudes to be measured 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000). Questions were designed to flow in a logical 
order and were clearly worded to ensure comprehension at all levels (Iarossi, 2006) 
with different response styles being incorporated throughout in order to maintain the 
interest of the participants (Warwick & Lininger, 1975). The questionnaire design 
also incorporated an element of logic to ensure that questions were only raised when 
relevant, based on responses already provided. As such, not all questions were 
presented to all participants. Although each question raised required a response, the 
option of ‘prefer not to say’ was available as an option throughout, with ‘not 
applicable’ and ‘don’t know’ also included, where appropriate. This allowed 
participants to continue with the survey even when confronted with a question that 
they could not answer, or simply did not wish to. 
 
Pilot 
Prior to distribution, the questionnaire was piloted with five colleagues to ensure it 
was grammatically correct, operational and quick to complete (Denscombe, 2010), as 
well as to check the email link and website functioned well (Bryman, 2012). These 
responses were not included in the final analysis. All feedback received was positive 
and as such, no adjustments were required.  
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Ethics 
The link to the questionnaire was accompanied by a personalised email that explained 
the purpose of the study and included contact details of those involved with the 
research. Along with a request for completion, a clear explanation was provided that 
participation was voluntary and completely anonymous. Participants were supplied 
with an information sheet providing full details of the research so that they were 
appropriately informed and they were able to provide their consent by electing to take 
part in the survey. It was made clear that the research was being conducted as part of 
a Professional Doctorate. The purpose of the research was fully explained which 
allowed each participant to have informed consent. The questionnaire did not require 
the participant to provide any identifiable information and by assuring confidentiality 
and anonymity it was hoped that honest responses would be provided (Denscombe, 
2010). All responses were coded and any reference to individual comments within the 
research was made using ‘Participant 1’ or ‘Participant 2’ and so on, in order to retain 
anonymity. For those that were willing to take part in semi-structured follow-up 
interviews an optional field was provided whereby participants could provide their 
email address. It was made explicitly clear that this was only to be completed where 
further participation was proffered. It was also explained to those offering to take part 
in the interviews that whilst their anonymity would be compromised with the research 
team, coding arrangements (as described above) would be implemented to ensure that 
they could not be identified within any published material. Ethical consent was 
obtained from the University to undertake this research (Appendix 3, Page 264). 
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Reliability and Validity of Questionnaire  
Once the survey responses were received, attempts were made to test the reliability 
and validity of seven of the Likert scale questions that endeavored to measure 
confidence and ability. Whilst there were nine Likert scale questions included within 
the survey, one related to levels of employment protection and the other asked about a 
customer’s cultural background. These were not necessarily associated with levels of 
confidence / comfort, which was a common thread across the remainder of the Likert 
scale questions. As such, these two questions were excluded from the reliability and 
validity testing. Despite attempting to align the overall theme of the survey questions, 
the fact remained that they related to different items and variables and there was a 
lack of coherence across the scales used. Furthermore, there was not necessarily an 
expectation for there to be any specific correlation between the various questions. For 
example, the fact that someone might have sufficient time to complete their enquiries 
thoroughly would not necessary mean that they felt comfortable in raising difficult 
questions. Additionally, there were three subsets of individuals acting as participants: 
those who contacted customers directly (38.2% / n = 50); those who directed 
questions only to third parties, such as relationship managers (81.7% / n = 107); and 
those who did both (29% / n = 38). Consequently the questions that were capable of 
comparison were limited. Nevertheless, analysis was completed using Cronbach’s 
Alpha and the results are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 - Cronbach’s Alpha Results 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
 N % 
Cases Valid 24 18.3 
Excludeda 107 81.7 
Total 131 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
 
Cronbach's Alpha Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
N of Items 
.702 .718 7 
 
Whilst this result is considered to be a sufficient measure of reliability (Taber, 2017), 
in this instance it is not deemed to be dependable due to the limited number of valid 
cases included, combined with the above-mentioned factors. 
 
A similar problem arose when considering the application Guttman’s lambda in that 
there were insufficient parallel measures to make the exercise worthwhile. Instead, 
triangulation of quantitative data was performed from the qualitative data within the 
free text responses in the survey itself, along with the information supplied from the 
semi-structured interviews. These qualitative aspects served to support the fact that 
the quantitative data made sense.  
 
Coding and Scoring 
Following the closure of the survey, the responses were collated and data analysis 
was performed. Initially this was conducted using the tools within Qualtrics that 
automated part of the process, allowing a basic level of analysis. This initial analysis 
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helped to quickly identify trends and patterns as each set of results clearly displayed 
vital information, such as the number of participants that had completed each 
question and the percentage each answer option received. It was also possible to view 
and download each individual response in full, which was essential when validating 
the detail provided to obtain a complete picture of each person who took part in the 
survey.  
 
The responses were subsequently downloaded and detailed quantitative analysis was 
conducted using SPSS, in addition to the results being sifted and sorted manually. 
Frequency distribution was calculated for both multiple-choice questions and Likert-
style questions. Some limited coding was required to support this, for example, 
applying numeric codes to the free text responses related to professional 
qualifications. The tools available within SPSS enabled tables to be created which 
helped to visually demonstrate the results (Appendix 4, Page 269). The software also 
facilitated statistical analysis, allowing percentages and standard deviations to be 
easily identified and t-tests to be conducted. This information was then formulated 
into frequency charts, which in turn assisted with the subsequent qualitative analysis. 
The data was also downloaded into Excel in order to create various pivot tables to 
assist with the easy manipulation of data and facilitate additional quantitative 
analysis. 
 
There is no clear and universally accepted means of analysing qualitative data 
(Robson, 2013). Thematic analysis was selected as it not only offers the systemic 
element characteristics of content analysis but also combines both the frequency and 
context of codes (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). The context of the qualitative data was 
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considered critical to the study as it was not only the number of times that an issue 
was raised (for example ‘training’), but also the circumstances in which this was 
discussed. For instance, whether a participant was explaining that adequate training 
had been provided, or whether there was a complete absence of training would 
indicate two entirely different situations.  
 
In order to conduct the thematic analysis of the free text comments that were 
provided by the survey participants, a matrix was created for each question that 
contained free text responses. Each free text response was listed (verbatim) down the 
left hand side and was then coded as a theme that was noted across the top of the 
matrix. As each individual response was reviewed a notation was made under the 
appropriate cell (if a suitable theme already existed) and new themes were added 
across the top of the matrix as they emerged. For example, “Making contact with 
clients can sometimes be difficult” was noted under a newly created theme of 
‘Contact difficulty’. The next comment of “Clients sometimes feel this is not any of 
our business and refuse to co-operate” was not directly related to ‘Contact difficulty’ 
and so a new theme of ‘Client refusal’ was created. This process of allowing themes 
to evolve continued until each response was examined and coded. The number of 
notations under each theme was then counted, although prevalence was not 
considered crucial for inclusion in the results (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
 
This approach was effectively a form of thematic coding analysis, with the matrix 
forming the analytical framework (see Appendix 4, Page 289 for an example). This 
allowed key views, opinions and themes to be extracted from the data. There is a 
tendency for people to perceive what they want to perceive (Heuer, 1999), which can 
98 
 
  
influence the analysis and interpretation of information. Adding this level of 
structure, and capturing every single comment, ensured that the logic behind the 
analysis was transparent (Wheaton & Chido, 2006) and helped to limit confirmation 
bias and improve objectivity. The number of themes that were identified varied for 
each question depending on the content and type of comments received. 
 
Strand II – Semi-Structured Interviews  
In addition to the survey, it was deemed necessary to gain more in-depth views from 
the participants. This was intended to capture supplementary, detailed information 
and allow participants the freedom to articulate their views without the constraints of 
the electronic written format. Interviews also allowed for additional probing, 
triangulation and clarification that were not possible within the survey itself.  
 
Question Design 
Each of the survey responses provided by those who agreed to be interviewed was 
reviewed to ensure there was an appropriate framework for the interview. The 
questions raised during the interviews were dependent on the responses each of the 
individuals supplied in their survey and were tailored to draw out more specific detail 
and examples of various situations they had encountered. For example, if the 
participant had indicated in their survey responses that they had never felt threatened 
or intimidated, this topic would not warrant discussion. This ensured best use of the 
limited time available and ensured that participants were not asked questions 
concerning scenarios to which they had previously confirmed they had not been 
exposed. The key topics for discussion remained focused, as in the Strand I survey: 1. 
About You; 2. Suspicious Activity & Escalation Processes; 3. Culture & Behaviour; 
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and 4. Enquiries and Investigations. An interview guide was prepared outlining the 
pre-determined issues that were to be explored to ensure that the same basic lines of 
enquiry were pursued with each participant. As some of the questioning relied upon 
the researcher’s reactions to the information provided during the interview, exact 
replication of this part of the study would be difficult, although the precise questions 
raised were transcribed. This is a known limitation of qualitative research (Bryman, 
2012); however, the pre-determined agenda ensured that all necessary topics were 
discussed in each interview (Stephens, 2007). 
 
Sample Population 
The population for Strand II was derived from all of the Strand I survey participants 
who volunteered to take part. Thus it was a convenience sample. Any participant who 
volunteered their email address was contacted and asked to complete a consent form, 
giving their express permission for the interview to proceed.  
 
Mutually convenient times and places were then agreed for the interviews to take 
place. As it was only possible to meet with three of the individuals face-to-face, two 
of interviews, which lasted around 20 minutes, were conducted using Skype and two 
were conducted over the telephone. All participants were reminded that their identity 
would not be disclosed.  
 
All interviews were recorded electronically and then transcribed verbatim. Personally 
transcribing the data allowed the development of clear and thorough understanding of 
the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013). A fellow 
student then independently validated three of the transcriptions for accuracy to add 
100 
 
  
dependency and credibility to the findings (Harper & Cole, 2012). The data and 
recordings were then stored on secure password protected devices, in accordance with 
Data Protection Act obligations. 
 
As all participants were originally identified from the survey, the naming convention 
used in Strand I was maintained. This allowed for easy identification and analysis 
across both survey and interview responses. Thus, Participants 5, 12, 15, 38, 43, 54 
and 80, who took part in the interviews, all retained their Strand I identities.  
 
Ethics 
For those who volunteered their email addresses, a full explanation of the purpose of 
the research was provided in writing and potential participants were asked to 
complete a consent form prior to any interviews taking place. Where participants 
inadvertently revealed the name of their employer, this was redacted during the 
transcription process. As all volunteers were assured of anonymity, no ethical 
concerns were identified. Ethical consent was obtained from the University to 
undertake this research (Appendix 3, Page 264). 
 
Thematic Analysis 
Each interview took a slightly different path as each conversation was unique. The 
questions were also adapted to the interviewees’ specific roles, and as such, the same 
questions were not necessarily raised with each participant. Although the initial aim 
was to follow the Strand I survey topics: 1. About You; 2. Suspicious Activity & 
Escalation Processes; 3. Culture & Behaviour; and 4. Enquiries and Investigations, 
once the participant had described their role and duties (About You), the subsequent 
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questions were tailored to suit them. However, the pre-determined topics for 
discussion were adhered to. As the conversations were permitted to follow a natural 
path, rather than being scripted and ordered, this allowed more detail to be provided. 
Where the participants introduced new topics, these were explored in order to 
ascertain their relevance to the study.  
 
Manual qualitative thematic analysis was undertaken, this being the preferred 
approach due to it offering an accessible form of analysis that was both flexible and 
detailed (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This began with reading and re-reading the 
interview transcripts and noting down different topics as they appeared in the data 
(Taylor & Ussher, 2001). For example, when a participant mentioned difficulty 
raising questions with customers, this was noted as ‘Questions - Difficulty’. From this 
initial detailed analysis the themes were blended into wider thematic categories that 
represented the overall segments of conversations from the interviews. Five key 
themes were ultimately identified, these being: 1. Irrelevant / Background Material 
(including introductions, pleasantries and so on); 2. Training; 3. Question Style; 4. 
Culture, Language and Background; and 5. Communication Difficulties. The 
interview transcripts were then colour-coded (see Appendix 5, Page 340 for an 
example) to provide a visual means of identifying the different themes within the data 
(Fox, 2004). This manual approach was considered to be the most accurate and 
complete method of analysis relative to the small number of interview transcripts. 
Such an approach had the added benefit of ensuring that the researcher was fully 
immersed in the responses. These key themes were then used to shape the results 
formulation and were linked with the survey responses. As the questions for both the 
surveys and the interviews followed the same specific pre-defined topics (as 
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previously outlined), identifying the commonalities between the two strands of 
research and blending the results was a straightforward process. 
 
When transcribing the final results from both the surveys and the interviews 
numerous quotations were included to enable the reader to reach their own 
conclusions concerning the fairness and accuracy of the analysis (Corden & 
Sainsbury, 2006).  
 
Strand III – Case File Analysis 
The first two strands of the research examined the opinions, views and perceptions of 
the participants in relation to their ability to undertake effective AML investigations. 
However, what people say they do and what they actually do in practice are not 
necessarily one and the same (Johnson & Fendrich, 2002; King & Bruner, 2000; 
O’Neill & Milne, 2014; Walsh, Milne & Bull, 2015). Hence, the views stated in the 
surveys and interviews might not necessarily be replicated in real life situations. An 
analysis of case files was therefore undertaken in order to examine the questioning 
practices that were displayed in the workplace.  
 
Sample Selection 
This final part of the research involved the evaluation of recent case files within a 
large, international banking group situated in the UK. It is acknowledged that access 
to such information was likely only to have been possible due to the fact that the 
researcher was employed by the host organisation. Despite this, it was made clear that 
the study was for independent research purposes and appropriate consent was 
obtained. The host organisation made no requests to view the results of the analysis, 
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nor was any attempt made to influence the direction of the research. The only 
constraint imposed was that all identifiable customer data should be redacted. As the 
focus of this section of the research related to the question types used and the 
information generated, such a restriction did not impede the analysis. The cases 
themselves were all originally derived from automated transaction monitoring alerts 
and as such, only one aspect of client interaction was capable of being examined, that 
being the investigations that followed these alerts. Hence only one element of the 
questioning process could be examined, that being the questions raised by the 
compliance analyst and the information subsequently collected. All of the cases 
related to existing customers of the host organisation. The research did not seek to 
review the questions that could have been raised when opening or reviewing an 
account, but instead concerned only the questions and responses surrounding unusual 
account activity.  
 
Discussions were held with the AML investigations department of the host 
organisation to establish what data could be extracted from their systems with relative 
ease (in an attempt to limit any administrative difficulties this request might place 
upon them). A demonstration was provided by the host organisation outlining what 
information was readily available and highlighting the limitations. It was noted that 
whilst the original verbatim questions raised by the compliance analyst were formally 
recorded on the AML investigation system (as the system itself was capable of 
sending the message), the responses from the relationship managers could be received 
by various means, sometimes by email (outside of the specific system being 
interrogated), sometimes verbally, and sometimes through an internal instant 
messaging service. As such, there was generally no verbatim record of the 
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relationship manager’s response. Instead, the compliance analyst would make a note 
of the information supplied by the relationship manager and this would support their 
rationale as to whether they would be closing or escalating the case.  
 
The original request was made for at least 40 recent cases to be provided, with each 
containing the verbatim questions raised by the compliance analyst along with the 
rationale and justification for the decision that was made following the response from 
the relationship manager. It was also requested that each case be marked as to 
whether or not a SAR had been filed. Subsequently, 56 case files were provided, 
having been selected at random by a third party gatekeeper from the AML 
investigations department. The shared characteristic of the group being that a 
‘Request For Information’ had been made at some point during the review of the 
automated transaction monitoring alert. This meant that the compliance analyst 
looking at the case had needed to make enquiries with the relationship manager or 
branch staff in order to better understand the customer’s account activity or 
behaviour. The only other selection criterion specified was that the cases should 
include a mixture of those that had resulted in a SAR being filed and those that had 
been closed without further escalation (see Figure 1). This was required in order to 
assess the quality of both those cases that warranted referral to the NCA and those 
that did not. No specific guidance was provided as to how many cases should fall into 
each category. This was due to the fact that the ratio of SAR filing to non-SAR filing 
was not known. Furthermore, the system used by the host organisation was quite 
antiquated and it was rather difficult for the third party gatekeeper to identify and 
extract cases based on the final outcome. Instead cases handled by the organisation 
during the previous month were reviewed to see if they met the simple selection 
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criteria. These cases were noted in a list that was then passed to a second gatekeeper 
(a business analyst employed in the financial crime compliance department who had 
unrestricted access to all of the organisation’s AML data) for data extraction. In view 
of the fact this was a manual process, it was not practical to implement a probability 
sampling approach. The same limitation also meant that it was not possible to identify 
the sample size in proportion to the wider population. As all of the samples were 
selected from cases that had been handled in the preceding month, confidence was 
obtained that the observations noted would be reflective of recent practice. 
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Figure 1 - Description of the Referral and Response Process 
 
*  If the query has not been entirely resolved, the compliance analyst can refer again 
to the relationship manager for further detail, if required. However, such activity was 
not indicated in the case files that were analysed. 
 
The second gatekeeper then extracted all of the relevant components for the analysis 
from the host organisation’s AML investigation system. In preparing this data, care 
was taken to ensure that all customer details were redacted, thereby complying with 
the requirements of the host organisation and avoiding any data privacy issues. The 
redactions included the names and account numbers of all customers and 
counterparties, the amounts and currency of the transactions, the bank branch details, 
details of any companies or employers, and the details of any countries involved. 
Compliance analyst receives automated transaction query. 
If the compliance analyst requires more information a Request For 
Information is sent to the relationship manager. 
Relationship manager receives the request and contacts the customer 
to question the transaction. 
Relationship manager sends response back to compliance analyst. 
Compliance analyst determines whether the query has been resolved 
satisfactorily*. If so, the case is closed. If suspicion remains, a SAR 
is raised. 
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During the subsequent analysis it was noted that none of these data points remained 
in error, thereby providing assurance that the second gatekeeper had performed the 
exercise efficiently.  
 
One of the limitations with this approach was that the process involved data being 
copied from the host organisation’s system and transferred into a Word document, 
before being heavily redacted. This introduced a potential risk of contamination, 
exclusion of information and human error. The data was also subject to the second 
gatekeeper’s own interpretation of relevance, although clear instructions to provide 
all of the case details were supplied, these being redacted, as previously outlined, but 
not edited in any other way. The redacted data was then compiled into a large table 
for further analysis, meaning that it was not necessary for the researcher to access the 
original customer records. The final document presented included a column with the 
case reference number; a column with the verbatim, redacted copy of the Request For 
Information (including the exact questions) that had been sent to the relationship 
manager or branch; a column with the verbatim, redacted copy of the background to 
the query, the concerns identified, an outline of the response received and the 
rationale for the decision; and a column with the final outcome as to whether a SAR 
was raised. Having reviewed the data presented, it appeared that the details provided 
were complete as they provided a logical chronology of events. 
 
The cases were inspected with a view to examining the nature of the enquiries that 
were undertaken, the types of questions asked, and the quality of the responses 
obtained. The review was limited to these documented records only. Whilst this 
restricted the assessment scope, the host organisation confirmed that their AML 
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investigations were normally conducted in a written format, as with many other 
organisations, as this provided a clear audit trail. Written communication also helps to 
overcome language problems and time-zone differences, both of which can be 
problematic when attempting to conduct global investigations, hence it is frequently 
the preferred method. The particular sample obtained related entirely to UK cases, 
although the researcher was informed that the same approach was adopted 
internationally across the host organisation. 
 
Ethics 
As the case files only involved historical reviews of cases, there were no individual 
participants to consider. The consent of both the host organisation and its data 
protection officer was obtained, once the research objectives had been explained. All 
data was heavily redacted prior to being released by the host organisation and as such, 
there were no ethical concerns raised. Ethical consent was provided by the University 
to undertake this research (Appendix 3, Page 264). 
 
Data Analysis 
The research that was conducted as part of the literature review did not identify any 
single analytical methodology that would suit the requirements of this rather specific 
data set. Accordingly, elements of three different approaches (Question Type 
Analysis, IRI Analysis and Linguistic Analysis) were adopted which, when blended 
together, provided a holistic view of the available data.  
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Question Type Analysis 
As the literature review had indicated that open questions were fundamental to 
effective investigations, it was believed that assessing the number of open and closed 
questions raised would hold value for the analysis. To complement the benefits 
associated with open questions a series of inappropriate, unproductive questions was 
also identified, which included leading, forced-choice and multiple questions (Milne 
& Bull, 1999; Oxburgh et al., 2010a). Whilst it was acknowledged that most prior 
research referred specifically to questioning styles during spoken conversations, it 
was considered that many of the same principles would apply to questions posed in 
writing. One of the clear limitations and differences being that during a conversation 
it is possible to vary question types in order to clarify responses, whereas this is not 
possible in written format. Nevertheless, it was considered that the use of open 
questions should still elicit more comprehensive, productive responses than 
inappropriate questions. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the questions were divided into productive and non-
productive categories, based on the criterion developed in 2006 by Griffiths and 
Milne. The productive category included: 
1. open questions - defined as those that required more than a few words as a 
response, such as ‘Tell me about the customer’s business’ or ‘Explain the 
transaction to me’. This did not include questions such as ‘Can you confirm 
the reason for the transaction?’ as such questions were likely to prompt 
limited or one-word responses, such as ‘car purchase’, which would not 
provide the compliance analyst with sufficient information to assess whether 
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the transaction was reasonable. Such questions could possibly even provoke a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.  
2. probing questions - defined as those requiring a substantive response, usually 
commencing with who, what, why, where, when, which or how. 
Non-productive questions included: 
3. closed questions - defined as those that would prompt a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, 
or a single word reply.  
4. leading questions - defined as those that suggest an answer (e.g. ‘I assume 
you inherited this exceptionally large sum of money?’). 
5. multiple questions - defined as those which contain a number of different 
questions, all asked within one sentence. It was accepted that as the data for 
this research was in written format that numerous different questions might 
need to be asked. Hence only those instances where different questions were 
posed within the same sentence were included in this category. 
6. forced choice questions - defined as those that only offer a limited number of 
responses (e.g. ‘Does the payment relate to income or inheritance?’). 
7. opinions - defined as instances where no actual question is posed yet a 
response is expected (e.g. ‘I think this is drug related money’). 
 
Whilst it was acknowledged that there are many opportunities where appropriate 
closed questions might be used, these tend to follow open and probing questions and 
are best used when confirming information previously supplied (Griffiths & Milne, 
2006). The data available for this exercise was rather limited and the questions were 
brief and in written format. Furthermore, the questions were sent to the relationship 
manager in a single electronic communication as opposed to being part of a back and 
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forth written or real-time ‘conversation’. Accordingly it was not considered that there 
would be many (if indeed any) situations where the use of closed questions could be 
deemed as appropriate as the responses to any preceding open or probing questions 
would not have been known at the point of construction. 
 
An additional question type was included under the non-productive category, which 
was labelled meaningless (Payne, 1950). This was added as a sub-category of closed. 
The reason for this inclusion was that the initial analysis had noted a number of 
extremely vague closed questions such as ‘Are you happy with the overall activity on 
the account?’. In this example it is unclear what type of account activity is under 
scrutiny. As highlighted in the literature review, such questions prompt only a ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ answer and, as evidenced by Stokoe and Edwards (2008), can be self-
incriminating, potentially calling into question the lack of appropriate action from any 
relationship manager who might confirm that they were not ‘happy’ with their 
customer’s activity. 
 
The distribution of question types was also analysed to establish the OCR. Whilst it 
was acknowledged that there are discrepancies over the definitions and categorisation 
of open and closed questions amongst academic researchers (Oxburgh, 2011; 
Oxburgh et al., 2010b), it was considered that the above definitions should provide 
sufficient analysis of the somewhat limited data available for this research. It was 
believed that the use of open questions should prompt more detailed, informative 
responses from the relationship managers, which in turn would assist with the 
assessment of the case. As such, calculating the OCR was deemed to be a useful piece 
of analysis to include.  
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The details that were available for review were limited only to the written AML 
investigation records held by the host organisation. As such it was not possible to 
examine the prosody of any conversation, or the relevance and impact of any turn-
taking. Analysis was therefore restricted to examining only the grammatical 
construction of the questions in terms of whether they were polar questions, requiring 
a yes / no response, and if so, whether the question type was an inverted interrogative 
(polar), such as ‘Did he make the payment?’ or a negative interrogative (polar), such 
as ‘Didn’t he make the payment?’, or a tag (polar) question, such as ‘He made the 
payment, didn’t he?’. Additional analysis was then conducted to determine whether 
any measurement of epistemic gradient could be undertaken by examining whether 
the questions raised were content questions, such as ‘What was the payment for?’, 
interrogative questions, such as ‘Was the payment for a house?’, or tag questions, 
such as ‘The payment was for a house, wasn’t it?’. For the purpose of this exercise 
statements that were not entirely clear but appeared to be seeking content, such as 
“Also the reason for electronic transfers totalling CCY received from PERSON and 
PERSON at BANK?” were treated as content questions. 
 
Investigative Relevant Information (IRI) Analysis 
In the process of any investigation it is vital that good quality information is elicited. 
This provides the opportunity to establish what happened and to ascertain who did 
what (Milne & Bull, 2006). Additionally, this particular research set out to establish 
the purpose, the why, of the activity. This was fundamental to the study as it is the 
rationale for the transactional activity that is key as to whether suspicion will be 
formed or not. 
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The response to each case file was coded for the presence of IRI items. However, one 
of the limitations of the case file analysis was that the compliance analyst conducting 
the review was responsible for summarising the responses received, rather than the 
case record holding the verbatim response from the relationship manager. As such, 
the actual phraseology employed by the relationship manager was not available for 
analysis. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, this introduces an element of 
bias as the compliance analyst is likely to record only the noteworthy points.  
 
The approach taken to tabulate the number of IRI items was loosely based on Yuille 
and Cutshall’s (1986) research, which has been emulated in several other studies 
(Milne & Bull, 2003b; Oxburgh, 2011; Oxburgh et al., 2010a). Findings were divided 
into five categories: Person, Action, Location, Item and Temporal. The Person being 
the parties involved in both making and receiving the payments in question, 
including, where necessary, details of their occupation, salary or source of wealth or 
funds; the Action being the means by which the transaction was made, such as cash or 
cheque, and the amount involved; the Location being the country or address of those 
involved in the transaction; the Item being the underlying purpose or rationale for the 
payment, such as making a payment to purchase a house; and Temporal being the 
timing or date of the payment(s). At least one IRI item under each of these categories 
was regarded as being essential in order to provide the compliance analyst with the 
minimum information required to make a justified disposition, outlining whether the 
circumstances were suspicious or not. However, it was not possible to determine 
whether more IRI items were absolutely necessary under each category as this would 
depend entirely on the nature of the concern and the type of activity being described. 
Nevertheless, the more IRI items that were included, the more comprehensive the 
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response was deemed to be as the compliance analyst would be in a better position to 
assess the activity if provided with sufficient detail. The following example details 
the coding scheme: ‘£5000 cash (1 x Action) was paid into the Edgeware Road 
branch (1 x Location) on 12 January 2017 (1 x Temporal) by the primary account 
holder, Mr Smith (1 x Person). This payment resulted from the sale of his car, a 2015 
Vauxhall Astra’ (1 x Item). 
 
Linguistic Analysis 
Linguistic analysis was undertaken to assess whether the type of language used had 
any impact on the quantity of IRI items obtained. The literature review outlined 
several studies (Burcu Bayram & Ta, 2018; Sexton & Helmreich, 2000; Simmons et 
al., 2008) where linguistic style had been evaluated using LIWC. Thus this tool was 
deemed appropriate to use as part of the research for this thesis. By using LIWC 
(2015 version) and examining which questions or cases generated the largest number 
of IRI items it was possible to assess whether the language used had any bearing on 
the responses provided. 
 
Each of the default categories within LIWC is composed of a list of dictionary words. 
Table 2 provides a list of the default dictionary categories in LIWC 2015. 
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Table 2 - LIWC 2015 Output Variable Information 
 
Category Abbreviations Examples 
Word count WC - 
Summary Language 
Variables 
  
Analytical thinking Analytic - 
Clout Clout - 
Authentic Authentic - 
Emotional tone Tone - 
Words per sentence WPS - 
Words > 6 letters Sixltr - 
Dictionary words Dic - 
Linguistic Dimensions   
Total function words Funct It, to, no, very 
  Total pronouns Pronoun I, them, itself 
    Personal pronouns Ppron I, them, her 
    First person singular I I, me, mine 
    First person plural We We, us, our 
    Second person You You, your, thou 
    Third person singular Shehe She, her, him 
    Third person plural They They, their they’d 
  Impersonal pronouns ipron It, it’s those 
  Articles Article A, an, the 
  Prepositions Prep To, with, above 
  Auxiliary verbs Auxverb Am, will, have 
  Common adverbs Adverb Very, really 
  Conjunctions Conj And, but, whereas 
  Negations Negate No, not, never 
Other Grammar   
  Common verbs Verb Eat, come, carry 
  Common adjectives Adj Free, happy, long 
  Comparisons Compare Greater, best, after 
  Interrogatives Interrog How, when, what 
  Numbers Number Second, thousand 
  Quantifiers Quant Few, many, much 
Psychological Processes   
Affective processes Affect Happy, cried 
  Positive emotion Posemo Love, nice, sweet 
  Negative emotion Negemo Hurt, ugly, nasty 
  Anxiety Anx Worried, fearful 
  Anger Anger Hate, kill, annoyed 
  Sadness Sad Crying, grief, sad 
Social processes Social Mate, talk, they 
  Family Family Daughter, dad, aunt 
  Friends Friend Buddy, neighbour 
  Female references Female Girl, her, mom 
  Male references Male Boy, his, dad 
Cognitive processes Cogproc Cause, know, ought 
  Insight Insight Think, know 
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  Causation Cause Because, effect 
  Discrepancy Discrep Should, would 
  Tentative Tentat Maybe, perhaps 
  Certainty Certain Always, never 
  Differentiation Differ Hasn’t, but, else 
Perceptual processes Percept Look, heard, feeling 
  See See View, saw, seen 
  Hear Hear Listen, hearing 
  Feel Feel Feels, touch 
Biological processes Bio Eat, blood, pain 
  Body Body Cheek, hands, spit 
  Health Health Clinic, flu, pill 
  Sexual Sexual Horny, love, incest 
  Ingestion Ingest Dish, eat, pizza 
Drives Drives  
  Affiliation Affiliation Ally, friend, social 
  Achievement Achieve Win, success, better 
  Power Power Superior, bully 
  Reward Reward Take, prize, benefit 
  Risk Risk Danger, doubt 
Time orientations TimeOrient  
  Past focus Focuspast Ago, did, talked 
  Present focus Focuspresent Today, is, now 
  Future focus Focusfuture May, will, soon 
Relativity Relativ Area, bend, exit 
  Motion Motion Arrive, car, go 
  Space Space Down, in, thin 
  Time Time End, until, season 
Personal concerns   
  Work Work Job, majors, Xerox 
  Leisure Leisure Cook, chat, movie 
  Home Home Kitchen, landlord 
  Money Money Audit, cash, owe 
  Religion Relig Altar, church 
  Death Death Bury, coffin, kill 
Informal language Informal  
  Swear words Swear Fuck, damn, shit 
  Netspeak Netspeak Btw, lol, thx 
  Assent Assent Agree, OK, yes 
  Nonfluencies Nonflu Er, hm, umm 
  Fillers Filler Imean, youknow 
 
Note: Adapted from The Development and Psychometric Properties of LIWC2015 by  
Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan and Blackburn, retrieved from  
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/31333/LIWC2015_Languag
eManual.pdf 
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All data variables were checked to ensure they were correct. To illustrate, the phrase 
“second hand car dealer” created a match with the Feel dimension, and “above said 
accounts” created a match with the Hear dimension. Such automated interpretations 
were inappropriate and therefore the associated output was deleted. This process took 
the form of a line-by-line manual review to ensure that where LIWC output was 
recorded, each category indicated was relevant to the text.  
 
Upon initial analysis of the LIWC output it was noted that 21 of the available 
dimensions did not produce any matches with the data. Consequently, these 
dimensions (SheHe, They, Negemo, Anx, Anger, Sad, Family, Female, Male, Bio, 
Body, Health, Sexual, Ingest, Focusfuture, Home, Relig, Death, Swear, Assent, and 
Filler) were filtered from subsequent analysis to allow focus to remain on the relevant 
areas. The results were then exported to Excel for further scrutiny. Additional 
columns were added to include the case reference number, the number of IRI items 
generated in each case, the number of questions raised in each case, and the total 
LIWC output score for each individual question. The results were then examined, 
using filters within Excel, to determine whether there was any correlation between the 
number of IRI items obtained and the number of words used within the questions. 
This was then repeated to identify any correlation between the number of IRI items 
obtained and questions that contained words with more than six letters.  
 
Analysis was then undertaken to ascertain whether the use of any particular pronouns 
had influenced the quantity of IRI items obtained. Previous research had indicated 
that the use of first-person plurals (we, our, us) could have either a negative effect 
(Simmons et al., 2008), or a positive effect (Sexton & Helmreich, 2000) on 
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relationships. As such, this warranted closer examination within the data. This 
analysis was undertaken by comparing the LIWC scores for the various categories of 
pronouns against the number of IRI items obtained for each case. 
 
Additionally, the questions were analysed line-by-line to establish whether they 
contained any opening salutations such as ‘Hello’ or ‘I hope you are well’, or closing 
valedictions such as ‘thank you’ or ‘kind regards’, along a similar vein to the research 
conducted by Gains (1999). This established whether there were any particular 
conventions adopted by the bank and if so, what impact these had on the on the 
number of IRI items received. 
 
Further line-by-line analysis of the questions established whether they contained any 
courteous or polite words such as ‘please’, ‘grateful’ or ‘kindly’. This was conducted 
in order to ascertain whether such language had any positive correlation on the 
number of IRI items received, which would be in line with previous research that 
suggested politeness strategies resulted in improved levels of cooperation (Eelen, 
2014; Holmes & Stubbe, 2015). 
 
Finally, the results were examined, again using filters within Excel, to determine 
whether there were any particular dimensions that correlated with higher levels of IRI 
items being received. 
 
Inter-Rater Reliability 
In order to assess reliability, the researcher initially reviewed all of the cases and a 
similarly experienced professional practitioner (employed as a senior compliance 
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manager within a large global bank), possessing academic research experience 
(Professional Doctorate in Criminal Justice), received training from the researcher on 
the rating scale and then independently examined an arbitrary blind sample of just 
over 10%. This included both the classification of the question types (six cases), as 
well as the amount of IRI obtained (a different set of six cases). As the second rater 
was also an employee of the host organisation, no additional access issues were 
anticipated and none were encountered. In any event, the data available to both raters 
was heavily redacted so as to retain total anonymity. To analyse the data effectively 
and ensure that inter-rater reliability could be tested, a comparison table was 
incorporated into the analysis (see Appendix 6, Page 351). It was necessary to keep 
this table simple and brief due to the short length of each of the case files. To 
examine the question types, the second rater selected six cases, without having prior 
sight of the case details, and reviewed all of the questions within each case. Each 
question was then marked as either open, probing, closed, meaningless, leading, 
multiple, or forced choice (or a combination thereof) as defined earlier. These results 
were then compared against the first rater’s view. This process was then repeated for 
the question types of polar, inverted interrogative (polar), negative interrogative 
(polar), tag (polar), content, interrogative and tag, as defined earlier. To examine the 
quantity of IRI, the second rater selected six cases, without having prior sight of the 
case details, and identified the various IRI items under the categories of Person, 
Action, Location, Item and Temporal as defined earlier. These results were then 
compared against the first rater’s view. 
 
Due to the limited amount of data, there was little scope for subjective analysis and 
the assessments were therefore primarily factual observations as opposed to matters 
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of opinion. Cohen’s kappa was run to determine if there was agreement between 
both raters in relation to both question types and the number of IRI items. Due to the 
nature of the available data, for both question types and the number of IRI items, 
there was complete agreement between the two raters, with κ = 1.000, p < .001. 
Additionally, a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between the number of IRI items identified by Rater 1 and the 
number of IRI items identified by Rater 2. There was a strong positive correlation 
between the two variables; r = 1.00, n = 6, p < .001. 
 
In one case, although both raters had indicated that the question type used was closed 
this led to subsequent discussion as the grammar used was unclear. It was agreed that 
the intention of the question was apparent, hence both raters had previously 
confirmed the same question type. The full results, along with the output of Cohen’s 
kappa can be found in Appendix 6, Page 351. 
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Chapter Four – Results 
 
Results Structure 
 
This chapter presents the data from all three strands of research and outlines the 
major themes that were identified. A more detailed discussion of the findings will be 
reserved for the subsequent chapter. Firstly, the demographic findings from both the 
survey and the semi-structured interviews are presented. The remaining responses are 
then examined and grouped into two over-arching areas: Opinions, Views & 
Perceptions, developed from the responses provided in both the survey (Strand I) 
and the semi-structured interviews (Strand II), and Questioning Observations, 
derived from the question types observed in the case file analysis (Strand III). The 
responses from the survey and the semi-structured interviews have been blended 
together to provide an overview as to what people say and the findings are presented 
together. These findings can then be compared and contrasted with the case file 
analysis, which outlines what people do in practice when raising AML related 
questions. 
 
Strand I & Strand II Demographics 
Response Rate 
Strand I 
131 responses to the survey were received, representing a response rate of around 
20.8%. 107 of these questionnaires were fully completed. The 24 partially completed 
questionnaires were not disregarded as they still contained some useful information. 
The percentage of progress through the survey is broken down in Table 3. 
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Table 3 - Percentage Amount of the Questionnaire that was Completed  
 
 
Percentage Complete 
 
Number of Responses 
< 20 2 
20 7 
28 2 
38 2 
43 2 
48 4 
55 1 
57 2 
80 1 
90 1 
100 107 
 
 
Unless otherwise specified all percentages stated throughout this paper have been 
calculated based on the number of valid responses to each particular question, thereby 
allowing the incomplete questionnaires to be included. Full details of the number of 
responses received for each question can be found in Appendix 4, Page 269. 
 
Strand II 
 
Contact was initially made with all 25 participants who volunteered their email 
address when completing the survey. This was reduced to just eight, as interviews 
could only proceed with those who signed and returned the consent form and 17 
failed to do so. This subsequently reduced to seven as one of the participants failed to 
attend the interview and stopped responding to emails. 
 
Gender, Age & Experience 
 
Strand I 
 
Of those who took part 60.3% (n = 79) were male and 35.1% (n = 46) were female, 
with 4.6% (n = 6) preferring not to say. 56.5% (n = 74) of the participants were aged 
between 25 and 34 years, with a further 28.2% (n = 37) aged between 35 and 44 
123 
 
  
years. Only two participants over the age of 55 years participated in the survey. The 
mean age of participants was 33.91 years, with the mode being 32.34 years and the 
median being 29.19 years (SD = 8.02) and a range of 59 years. The length of 
employment within the banking sector spanned a range of 36.5 years, with the mean 
being 8.3 years, the median being 6 years, and the mode being 5 years (SD = 7.01). 
Full details of the gender, age and experience of the survey participants are shown in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Table 4 - Participants’ Gender 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 79 60.3 60.3 60.3 
 Female 46 35.1 35.1 95.4 
 Prefer not to say 6 4.6 4.6 100.0 
 Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 5 - Participants’ Age 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Prefer not to say 1 .8 .8 .8 
16 to 24 years 7 5.3 5.3 6.1 
25 to 34 years 74 56.5 56.5 62.6 
35 to 44 years 37 28.2 28.2 90.8 
45 to 54 years 10 7.6 7.6 98.5 
55 to 64 years 1 .8 .8 99.2 
65 to 74 years 1 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
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Table 6 - Banking Experience of Participants (in years) 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0.5 1 .8 .8 .8 
1 2 1.5 1.7 2.5 
1.5 4 3.1 3.4 5.9 
2 14 10.7 11.9 17.8 
3 11 8.4 9.3 27.1 
4 10 7.6 8.5 35.6 
5 16 12.2 13.6 49.2 
6 3 2.3 2.5 51.7 
7 3 2.3 2.5 54.2 
8 8 6.1 6.8 61.0 
9 5 3.8 4.2 65.3 
10 10 7.6 8.5 73.7 
11 3 2.3 2.5 76.3 
12 4 3.1 3.4 79.7 
13 3 2.3 2.5 82.2 
14 1 .8 .8 83.1 
15 8 6.1 6.8 89.8 
16 2 1.5 1.7 91.5 
17 2 1.5 1.7 93.2 
20 1 .8 .8 94.1 
21 1 .8 .8 94.9 
25 2 1.5 1.7 96.6 
26 1 .8 .8 97.5 
33 1 .8 .8 98.3 
35 1 .8 .8 99.2 
37 1 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
 Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Strand II  
 
Of the seven interviews that were conducted all except one of the participants were 
male. Two were aged between 25 and 34 years, three were aged between 35 and 44 
years, one was aged between 45 and 54 years and one was aged between 65 and 74 
years. The mean length of employment was 13.14 years, with the median being 12 
125 
 
  
years and the mode being 4 years (SD = 9.21). There was a range of 22 years of 
employment.  
 
Location of Participants 
Strand I 
58% (n = 76) of those who took part were employed within the UK. 17 countries 
were represented in total, with Poland forming the second largest population of 
participants at 12.2% (n = 16). The global nature of the research was important in 
establishing whether or not any issues identified were confined to certain countries. 
17 countries were represented in the results and the geographical spread of the survey 
participants is set out in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 - Country of Employment of the Survey Participants 
 
  Frequency Percent 
 United Kingdom 76 58 
Poland 16 12.2 
Pakistan 9 6.9 
United States 8 6.1 
India 5 3.8 
Austria 2 1.5 
China 2 1.5 
Other 2 1.5 
Singapore 2 1.5 
Belgium 1 0.8 
Cote d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast 1 0.8 
France 1 0.8 
Ireland 1 0.8 
Lebanon 1 0.8 
Qatar 1 0.8 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.8 
Turkey 1 0.8 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.8 
Total 131 100 
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Strand II 
 
Of the seven interviews that took place two were conducted over the telephone (one 
participant was in the UK, the other in the US), two were conducted over Skype (one 
participant was in Ireland on secondment from Poland, the other was in Pakistan), 
and three were conducted face-to-face in the UK. There were some technical 
difficulties during the Skype call to Pakistan, causing a loss of connection and 
subsequently stifling the flow of conversation. There were also some minor language 
difficulties. Whilst all the participants spoke English, in two cases this was not their 
native language. 
 
 
Professional Qualifications 
 
Strand I 
 
50.4% (n = 66) of the survey participants held professional qualifications in 
connection with their role in banking (for the purposes of this research those who 
were progressing towards qualifications, or who cited non-professional qualifications 
were not included). 18.3% (n = 24) were noted to hold internationally recognised 
certification through the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists 
(ACAMS). A full description of all qualifications held can be found in Appendix 4, 
Page 273. 
 
Initial analysis was undertaken to examine whether the holding of professional 
qualifications had any discernible effect on the responses provided. It was considered 
that if professional qualifications significantly increased the participants’ levels of 
confidence, knowledge and comfort when raising difficult questions, then a simple 
solution to the problems identified within the literature review relating to AML 
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investigations might be to ensure that all staff involved with such enquiries were 
professionally qualified. 
 
In order to examine whether those with professional qualifications felt differently to 
those without, t-tests were conducted on nine questions that were extracted from the 
survey, as shown in Table 8. The questions selected for this exercise were all of the 
survey Likert scale questions, hence suitable for this analysis. For the t-tests the 
independent variable used was whether the participants were professionally qualified 
(qualified / not qualified) and the dependent variable was the response to each of the 
nine questions shown in Table 8.  
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Table 8 - T-Test Results For Survey Questions In Conjunction With Professional 
Qualifications 
 
 
 Group Statistics     
 Please list any 
professional 
qualifications 
you hold that 
are directly 
relevant to 
your role 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
Q9 - When 
escalating 
suspicious cases, do 
you generally find 
that your opinion is 
supported by clear 
and conclusive 
information? 
 
 
Qualified 
 
59 
 
2.02 
 
.731 
 
.095 
 
.125 
 
114 
 
.901 
Not Qualified 57 2.00 .732 .097    
Q10 - When closing 
cases without further 
escalation, or 
allowing 
transactions / 
business activity to 
proceed, do you 
generally find that 
your opinion is 
supported by clear 
and conclusive 
information? 
 
Qualified 58 1.66 .849 .112 -.677 113 .499 
Not Qualified 57 1.75 .714 .095    
Q14 - Do you feel 
sufficiently 
protected by your 
employer to conduct 
your enquiries 
effectively? 
 
Qualified 60 1.85 1.071 .138 -.615 116 .540 
Not Qualified 58 2.00 1.545 .203    
Q15 - Does a 
customer's 
background 
(religion, political 
position, social 
standing, age etc.) 
influence the way 
you deal with them? 
 
Qualified 60 3.53 1.512 .195 -1.472 116 .144 
Not Qualified 58 3.95 1.549 .203    
Q19 - Speaking 
generally, do you 
have enough time to 
complete enquiries 
thoroughly and to 
the best of your 
ability? 
 
Qualified 57 2.09 .872 .115 -.977 107 .331 
Not Qualified 52 2.25 .860 .119    
Q21 - When raising 
AML / KYC queries 
with customers, how 
important is it for 
you to build rapport 
with the person you 
are dealing with? 
 
Qualified 18 1.44 .616 .145 -.980 36 .333 
Not Qualified 20 1.65 .671 .150    
  
129 
 
  
Q22 - When raising 
AML / KYC queries 
with third parties 
(such as 
Relationship 
Managers), how 
important is it for 
you to build rapport 
with the person you 
are dealing with? 
 
Qualified 46 1.72 .720 .106 .697 84 .487 
Not Qualified 40 1.60 .841 .133    
Q23 - When asking 
customers awkward 
or difficult 
questions, how 
comfortable do you 
feel?  
 
Qualified 17 2.18 .951 .231 -1.212 35 .234 
Not Qualified 20 2.60 1.142 .255    
Q24 - When asking 
third parties (such as 
Relationship 
Managers) awkward 
or difficult 
questions, how 
comfortable do you 
feel? 
 
Qualified 48 1.90 .778 .112 -.604 85 .548 
Not Qualified 39 2.00 .827 .132    
 
 
Non-significant statistical differences were noted, hence it was concluded that 
professional qualifications were not beneficial in terms of raising difficult questions 
with customers. The full results are contained in Appendix 7, Page 357. 
 
 
Strand II 
 
Of the seven interviewees 57% (n = 4) held professional qualifications related to their 
employment. One was currently in the process of becoming qualified at the time of 
interview. 
 
Job Role 
Strand I  
91.6% (n = 120) of the survey participants stated that they were actively engaged in 
AML or KYC related work on a daily basis, directly on-boarding customers or 
refreshing customer data, monitoring banking transactions, or conducting AML 
investigations. 8.4% (n = 11) reported their employment as ‘Other’, one of which 
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described their role as both client on-boarding and refreshing client data, and two 
were Nominated Officers (effectively Deputy MLRO positions with ultimate 
responsibility for filing SARs). The remaining eight had roles that were linked to 
AML or KYC, although their extent of customer or third party contact was less 
obvious. Only one of these eight held a role that involved neither direct nor indirect 
customer contact. Table 9 outlines the full set of employment roles. 
 
Table 9 - Job Title / Position of Survey Participants 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative  
Percent 
 
Valid 
Relationship 
Management / Wealth 
Management 
9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Client On-boarding - 
KYC / CDD / EDD 
36 27.5 27.5 34.4 
Client Refresh - 
Renewal KYC / CDD 
/ EDD 
33 25.2 25.2 59.5 
AML Transaction 
Monitoring / Analysis 
19 14.5 14.5 74.0 
AML Investigations 18 13.7 13.7 87.8 
MLRO / Deputy 
MLRO 
5 3.8 3.8 91.6 
Other - please specify: 11 8.4 8.4 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  Other	-	please	specify:	
Client On-boarding & Client Refresh - KYC/CDD/EDD 
QA 
Business Analyst/MiFID Analyst 
Compliance And AML/CTF 
Director of AML/BSA/OFAC 
Compliance Liaison Officer 
Nominated Officer 
Internal investigations manager 
Business Analyst - KYC Projects for Utilities 
FATCA/KYC 
Nominated Officer 
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Strand II  
 
All of those who were interviewed were actively engaged in AML or KYC related 
roles. Participants 5, 38 and 54 all selected their job category as being AML 
Transaction Monitoring / Analysis, Participants 43 and 80 both selected Client 
Refresh – Renewal KYC / CDD / EDD, Participant 12 selected AML Investigations 
and Participant 15 selected Relationship Management / Wealth Management. For 
ease of reference the following codes have been used alongside each Strand II 
participant throughout this research to indicate their various roles: 
AML Transaction Monitoring / Analysis – ‘AMLTM’ 
Client Refresh – Renewal KYC / CDD / EDD – ‘CR’ 
AML Investigations – ‘AMLI’ 
Relationship Management / Wealth Management – ‘RM’ 
 
 
Customer Contact 
 
Strand I  
 
Of the overall survey population 38.2% (n = 50) stated that they had direct customer 
contact, whilst 81.7% (n = 107) confirmed they made contact with customers through 
a third party such as a relationship manager, with 29% (n = 38) stating that they did 
both. 8.4% (n = 11) claimed they did neither (although one of these responses was 
subsequently found to be incorrect when the participant was interviewed). Tables10 
and 11 outline the responses. 
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Table 10 - Number of Participants Whose Role Involved Direct Contact With 
Customers 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Yes 50 38.2 38.2 38.2 
No 79 60.3 60.3 98.5 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 11 - Number of Participants Whose Role Involved Directing Questions 
Through a Third Party (such as a Relationship Manager) 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Yes 107 81.7 81.7 81.7 
No 22 16.8 16.8 98.5 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
Strand II  
 
Of the seven interviewees two had direct contact with both customers and third 
parties (Participants 15 (RM) and 43 (CR)). The others raised their enquiries through 
third parties, such as relationship managers. These details correlated with the 
information previously supplied in the survey, with the exception of Participant 12 
(AMLI), who had initially indicated that he had no customer contact whatsoever, 
either directly or indirectly. It transpired that his original response in the survey was 
incorrect and that he did, in fact, contact customers indirectly through the appropriate 
relationship manager.  
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Time to Complete Enquiries 
 
Strand I 
 
74.3% (n = 81) of participants confirmed that they had sufficient time to complete 
their enquiries to the best of their ability either all or most of the time. 18.3% (n = 20) 
confirmed that they sometimes had enough time available and only 6.4% (n = 7) felt 
that this was rarely the case. The full details of the responses are shown in Table 12. 
This meant that time pressure was not generally perceived as being a major 
contributing factor to any investigation deficiencies. 
 
Table 12 - Results To The Question “Speaking generally, do you have enough time 
to complete enquiries thoroughly and to the best of your ability?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 20 15.3 18.3 18.3 
Most of the 
time 
61 46.6 56.0 74.3 
Sometimes 20 15.3 18.3 92.7 
Rarely 7 5.3 6.4 99.1 
Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 109 83.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 22 16.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Strand II 
 
As 74.3% (n = 81) of the survey responses confirmed that they generally had 
sufficient time to complete their enquiries to the best of their ability, time pressure 
was not specifically explored further in the interviews. 
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Strand I & Strand II - Opinions, Views & Perceptions 
Thematic analysis was performed on the survey responses (see Appendix 4, Page 289 
for an example) and colour-coded thematic analysis was conducted on the interview 
transcripts (Appendix 5, Page 340). This allowed for key themes to be identified 
based on the topics that were mentioned. This approach also ensured that subjects that 
were less frequently discussed were still captured and documented. The results 
structure is visualised in Figure 2 below and each category and theme is subsequently 
detailed and discussed in more detail below. 11 themes emerged from these analyses, 
which were firstly grouped into three broad categories: (i) Barriers; (ii) Training; and 
(iii) Commercial. The 11 themes were identified as: (A) Lack of Understanding; (B) 
Customer Privacy; (C) Conflict of Interest; (D) Local Culture; (E) No Issue; (F) 
Personal Safety & Protection; (G) Training Provision; (H) Quality of 
Investigations; (I) Question Type; (J) Competition; and (K) Internal Friction. These 
themes emerged by examining the frequency with which each topic was mentioned, 
both within the survey responses (including the free text) and the semi-structured 
interviews and blending these topics together. The tables produced within SPSS 
indicated which questions received the highest number of positive or negative views 
and the thematic analysis allowed for a ‘count’ of comments, which were then formed 
into common themes. The thematic analysis of the interviews involved colour-coding 
the interview transcripts into different topics, which were again derived from the 
comments provided rather than being pre-determined. These were then compared and 
aligned to the themes already identified from the surveys. Where new topics were 
introduced that were not mentioned within the surveys, these were given a theme of 
their own, for example, Local Culture (discussed further below). 
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Whilst presented together, each theme description indicates which results were 
derived from Strand I, the survey, and which were derived from Strand II, the 
interviews. 
Figure 2 - Results Structure, Strand I & Strand II - Opinions, Views & Perceptions 
 
 
Key: Red – Area Heading; Purple – Category Title; Blue – Theme Title 
 
 
Category (i) – Barriers 
 
A pivotal question for this research related to the specific barriers that were 
encountered when raising questions regarding a customer’s source of wealth/funds or 
their transactions. This question was important because if participants had not 
experienced any barriers then this would imply that effective communications 
strategies were already in place. 88.4% (n = 99) of those still completing the survey at 
Opinions, Views & 
Perceptions 
(i)  
Barriers 
Theme F 
Personal Safety 
& Protection 
Theme A 
Lack of 
Understanding Theme B  
Customer 
Privacy 
Theme C  
Conflict of 
Interest Theme D 
Local Culture Theme	E	
No	Issue	
(ii) 
Training 
Theme G 
Training 
Provision 
Theme H 
Quality of 
Investigations 
Theme I 
Question Type 
(iii) 
Commercial 
Theme J 
Competition 
Theme K 
Internal 
Friction 
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the point when this question was posed provided comments. 14.5% (n = 19) of 
participants had stopped completing the survey by this point and 9.9% (n = 13) 
simply failed to provide any response to this question. 21.2% (n = 21) of those who 
provided comments gave details that fell into more than one category of the thematic 
analysis (see Appendix 4, Page 289). As illustrated in Table 13, 20.2% (n = 20) of 
survey responses were excluded from any detailed analysis as the free text responses 
provided were either not relevant to the question posed or did not provide sufficient 
clarity to understand the point being made.  
 
Table 13 - Barriers Encountered When Questioning Customers 
 
Issue Frequency 
(n=x) 
  
Incomplete details 18 
Lack of understanding 16 
Customer unhappy to supply information 12 
RM not happy to ask 12 
No issue 10 
Client refusal 9 
Fear of losing/annoying client 6 
Discomfort posing questions 5 
No response 4 
Incorrect information 4 
Contact difficulty 2 
Cultural issues 2 
Complaints 1  
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The 20 responses that were excluded from the above analysis were: 
  
1. Account balance 
2. Barriers only come into play normally (on the rare occasion) when trying to 
seek out the true UBO when all evidence suggests that the public face of 
ownership is a nominee or defacto representative 
3. blocked by bank manager and soe employee 
4. Difficult to obtain for well known and public individuals 
5. Direct response from client. 
6. it is a part of KYC to disclose the source of fund/proof of Income. 
7. n/a 
8. N/a 
9. No idea 
10. Not applicable to my role 
11. Often we are asked to question transactions when details are already held on the 
bank's systems. 
12. Only bond customers have privacy issues in disclosing info 
13. Our customers know they won't be able to maintain a relationship with the Bank 
if they are unwilling to answer the above questions. 
14. Prefer to not say 
15. Privacy issues 
16. Proof of source of funds 
17. RM's having a very different mindset to Compliance personnel. 
18. Source of funds relates to transactions. Source of wealth is not about 
transactions. It is how the individual obtained their wealth. Eg: inheritance. 
SOW should be provided every time. We need to verify it. We just push back 
and insist on it. 
19. Time pressures from internal stakeholders 
20. Work in commercial banking no individuals 
 
 
Each of the issues identified in Table 13 is presented below, along with relevant 
comments that were extracted from the interviews and remaining survey questions. 
The percentages shown in relation to this question have been calculated against the 79 
individuals who provided valid responses. The issues have been grouped into six 
themes based on the commonality between the comments made: (A) Lack of 
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Understanding; (B) Customer Privacy; (C) Conflict of Interest; (D) Local Culture; 
(E) No Issue; and (F) Personal Safety & Protection. Each theme has been 
supplemented by additional detail that was provided in response to the connected 
survey questions and covers some of the key areas that were identified during the 
interviews. 
 
Incomplete details (n = 18 / 22.8%), lack of understanding (n = 16 / 20.3%), 
incorrect information (n = 4 / 5.1%) and no response (n = 4 / 5.1%) were grouped 
together as theme (A) Lack of Understanding on the proviso that had complete 
comprehension of the original request occurred, the full, correct details requested 
might have been supplied. The issues of client refusal (n = 9 / 11.4%), customer 
unhappy to supply information (n = 12 / 15.2%) and complaints (n = 1 / 1.3%) have 
also been grouped together as the comments for each were broadly similar and related 
to the customer being unhappy to discuss their personal financial affairs. All have 
been brought together as theme (B) Customer Privacy. Likewise, relationship 
manager not happy to ask (n = 12 / 15.2%), discomfort posing questions (n = 5 / 
6.3%), and fear of losing/annoying client (n = 6 / 8.9%) have been considered as a 
group as the commentary for each was similar and all referred to the reluctance of the 
relationship manager to question the customer. These are detailed under theme (C) 
Conflict of Interest along with similar issues that were apparent from other areas of 
the survey responses and interviews. Cultural issues (n = 2 / 2.5%), whilst not widely 
represented in Table 13, warranted its own theme heading of (D) Local Culture due 
to the comments made within the interviews. For example, Participant 54  (AMLTM) 
mentioned that customers in Pakistan were not familiar with bank confidentiality and 
were concerned that their personal details might be disclosed. Theme (E) No Issue (n 
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= 10 / 12.7%), whilst not technically an actual barrier, has been included due to the 
number of participants who indicated that they had not encountered any problems 
when raising questions. Finally, theme (F) Personal Safety and Protection has been 
added as a sixth category despite the fact that it does not feature in Table 13. 
Although survey participants did not specifically cite this as being a barrier when 
raising questions, the comments received in response to other survey questions 
indicated that this was an issue for some. Hence it warranted inclusion as fear for 
personal safety could potentially influence the probing nature of questions that might 
be asked. 
 
Theme A - Lack of Understanding  
 
Strand I 
 
20.3% (n = 16) of the participants made reference to a lack of understanding when 
enquiring about a customer’s finances, either on the part of the bank or the client 
direct. However, incomplete information was the most frequently mentioned issue, 
with 22.8% (n = 18) stating this was a problem. 5.1% (n = 4) made reference to no 
response being received and a further 5.1% (n = 4) referred to incorrect information 
being supplied.  
 
The subsequent survey question received 112 valid responses, with 71.4% (n = 80) of 
participants confirming that they had experienced a situation where the questions they 
had raised had not been properly addressed. Table 14 outlines the full set of responses 
to this question. 
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Table 14 - Results To The Question “Have you ever experienced a situation where 
the questions you've asked have not been properly addressed?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 80 61.1 71.4 71.4 
No 22 16.8 19.6 91.1 
Don't know 9 6.9 8.0 99.1 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 112 85.5 100.0  
Missing Blank 19 14.5   
Total 131 100.0   
 
T-tests were conducted for the Yes and No responses provided to this question in 
order to determine whether there were any specific factors, such as lack of training or 
employer protection, that might be contributing to the inadequate responses 
participants had received. Identifying key reasons as to why the participants might 
find that their questions were not being properly addressed was deemed to be 
beneficial in helping to identify potential solutions. The questions selected for this 
exercise were once again centred on all of the survey Likert scale questions that were 
suitable for this analysis. For the t-tests the independent variable used was whether 
the participants had experienced a situation in which their questions had not been 
properly addressed (yes / no) and the dependent variable was the response to each of 
the nine questions shown in Table 15.  
 
These tests revealed non-significant effects, with just one exception, this being the 
level of comfort felt when raising difficult or awkward questions direct with 
customers (shown as Q23 in Table 15). Those who confirmed they had encountered 
instances where their questions were not properly addressed (M = 2.46, SD = 1.02) 
indicated that they felt less comfortable raising awkward questions with customers 
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than those that had not (M = 1.57, SD = 0.79), t (29) = 2.11, p=.043. The details of 
the t-tests are shown in Table 15 and the full results can be found in Appendix 7, 
Page 357.  
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Table 15 - T-Test Results For Survey Questions In Conjunction With Instances Of 
Questions Not Being Properly Addressed 
 
 Group 
Statistics 
      
 Have you 
ever 
experienced 
a situation 
where the 
questions 
you’ve 
asked have 
not been 
properly 
addressed? 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
Q9 - When escalating suspicious 
cases, do you generally find that your 
opinion is supported by clear and 
conclusive information? 
 
 
Yes 
 
76 
 
2.08 
 
.762 
 
.087 
 
.419 
 
95 
 
.676 
No 21 2.00 .775 .169    
Q10 - When closing cases without 
further escalation, or allowing 
transactions / business activity to 
proceed, do you generally find that 
your opinion is supported by clear and 
conclusive information? 
 
Yes 76 1.72 .810 .093 .196 93 .845 
No 19 1.68 .671 .154    
Q14 - Do you feel sufficiently 
protected by your employer to 
conduct your enquiries effectively? 
 
Yes 80 1.81 1.137 .127 -1.199 25.338 .242 
No 22 2.32 1.887 .402    
Q15 - Does a customer's background 
(religion, political position, social 
standing, age etc.) influence the way 
you deal with them? 
 
Yes 80 3.75 1.579 .177 -1.187 100 .238 
No 22 4.18 1.220 .260    
Q19 - Speaking generally, do you 
have enough time to complete 
enquiries thoroughly and to the best of 
your ability? 
 
Yes 79 2.19 .863 .097 .880 97 .381 
No 20 2.00 .858 .192    
Q21 - When raising AML / KYC 
queries with customers, how 
important is it for you to build rapport 
with the person you are dealing with? 
 
Yes 25 1.52 .653 .131 -.191 30 .850 
No 7 1.57 .535 .202    
Q22 - When raising AML / KYC 
queries with third parties (such as 
Relationship Managers), how 
important is it for you to build rapport 
with the person you are dealing with? 
 
Yes 66 1.61 .677 .083 -1.291 76 .201 
No 12 1.92 1.165 .336    
Q23 - When asking customers 
awkward or difficult questions, how 
comfortable do you feel?  
 
Yes 24 2.46 1.021 .208 2.114 29 .043 
No 7 1.57 .787 .297    
Q24 - When asking third parties (such 
as Relationship Managers) awkward 
or difficult questions, how 
comfortable do you feel? 
 
Yes 65 1.92 .777 .096 .288 77 .774 
No 14 1.86 .770 .206    
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When asked to describe what happened in situations where questions were not 
properly addressed only 2.7% (n = 3) of the participants articulated the specific 
details of the conversations itself. Instead, 55.4% (n = 62) described the procedures 
they followed, such as escalating the case to senior management. Of those that spoke 
about the actual scenarios they had encountered there were some concerning 
comments raised, notably “People assuming what the client meant, not clarifying 
what the person actually meant, or simply not understanding the question or the 
response” (Participant 38 (AMLTM)); “Questions around beneficial ownership 
structure are rarely answered in a way which are easily understandable” (Participant 
78); “RM’s [sic] rephrased questions to suit themselves when asking the client . . . 
and did not resolve the AML concerns” (Participant 104); “The third party asked 
questions raised by myself, but the answers given posed further questions, which 
were not asked (a lack of common sense)” (Participant 82); “Sometimes there is a 
communication gap” (Participant 81); and “Questions have been misinterpreted, or 
the full story has not been given” (Participant 63). 4.46% (n = 5) of the participants 
specifically stated that they would just rephrase the questions or simply ask them 
again.  
 
78.9% (n = 86) of the participants stated that email was their primary means of 
communication when raising queries, with only one participant conducting regular 
face-to-face enquiries. Table 16 outlines the full set of responses. 
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Table 16 - Primary Method of Communication When Raising AML / KYC Queries 
With Customers or Third Parties? 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Telephone 8 6.1 7.3 7.3 
Email 86 65.6 78.9 86.2 
Face-to-face 1 .8 .9 87.2 
Other (please 
specify) 
6 4.6 5.5 92.7 
Not applicable 7 5.3 6.4 99.1 
Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 109 83.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 22 16.8   
Total 131 100.0 
 
  
 
When asked about the importance of building rapport with customers when raising 
queries 92.1% (n = 35) considered this to be either important or extremely important. 
Table 17 outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 17 - Results To The Question “When raising AML / KYC queries with 
customers, how important is it for you to build rapport with the person you are 
dealing with?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Extremely 
important 
20 15.3 52.6 52.6 
Important 15 11.5 39.5 92.1 
Neither 
important nor 
unimportant 
3 2.3 7.9 100.0 
Total 38 29.0 100.0  
Missing Blank 93 71.0   
Total 131 100.0   
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Likewise, 87.2% (n = 75) believed that the building of rapport with third parties 
through whom questions might be directed was either important or extremely 
important. Only one participant felt that this was not at all important. Table 18 
outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 18 - Results To The Question “When raising AML / KYC queries with third 
parties (such as Relationship Managers), how important is it for you to build rapport 
with the person you are dealing with?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Extremely 
important 
42 32.1 48.8 48.8 
Important 33 25.2 38.4 87.2 
Neither 
important nor 
unimportant 
10 7.6 11.6 98.8 
Not at all 
important 
1 .8 1.2 100.0 
Total 86 65.6 100.0  
Missing Not applicable 3 2.3   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 45 34.4   
Total 131 100.0   
 
As it was generally acknowledged that building rapport was an important feature 
when raising queries, this was not explored further in the research. Instead, focus was 
directed at the questioning techniques themselves. 
 
Strand II 
 
Lack of understanding was expanded upon during the interviews, in which Participant 
38 (AMLTM) stated “with some of the relationship managers . . . potentially their 
understanding of AML in itself may not be the forefront of their focus. They’re 
thinking more of a customer service aspect”. She later elaborated that if the 
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relationship managers “understand the reason that they’re asking” it would assist 
them with their line of questioning.  
 
Three of the interview participants made reference to the fact that customers did not 
fully appreciate the reasons for the questions being raised, which in turn made matters 
more difficult. Participant 15 (RM) made it very clear that “we could do so much 
more to educate clients”, citing his own learning experience of the process as an 
example. He explained “when I was first asked to do this, I felt really awkward ‘cause 
I didn’t understand why the bank was asking for it. And it was only once I was 
educated that I thought ‘My goodness, right, that completely makes sense’.”. He 
further provided an analogy as to how the public have been educated not to simply 
accept the first insurance quote obtained, when they should speak to a financial 
advisor and how to check that they were qualified. He concluded that “actually if we 
were all more transparent around the source of wealth and source of funds, actually 
when you think about it, why would you ever have a problem with somebody 
knowing where your monies came from?”. Participant 38 (AMLTM) also considered 
that explaining the background to the situation was an important step that was 
frequently overlooked, leading to customer confusion.  
 
The significance of rapport was demonstrated during the interview with Participant 
15 (RM) who repeatedly made reference to the importance of engaging with 
customers and making them feel at ease. Likewise Participant 43 (CR) used 
“reflecting techniques” to gain the confidence and understanding of customers, 
indicating that he valued the relationship building element of conversation. 
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Theme B - Customer Privacy 
Strand I 
27.8% (n = 22) of the survey participants commented that the barriers lay with the 
clients’ belief that the bank was not entitled to ask such intrusive questions. Such 
opinions included: “Clients sometimes feel this is not any of our business and refuse 
to co-operate” (Participant 83); “Clients have issues with talking about their money” 
(Participant 21); “Clients do not want to tell you this information . . . some clients 
have point blank refused” (Participant 15 (RM)); “Clients have raised complaints for 
us asking too much information” (Participant 102); “Customers commenting that this 
type of information is none of the banks [sic] business and is certainly not required” 
(Participant 78); “Clients . . . feel the questions we ask are too intrusive” (Participant 
16); and “Most of the PEP customers are not willing to provide such information” 
(Participant 6). 
 
13.1% (n = 16) of the survey participants confirmed that they had either closed an 
enquiry or allowed transactional / business activity to proceed despite knowing that 
the details of their review were incomplete. Table 19 outlines the full set of 
responses. The reasons for doing so included comments such as: “Client refused to 
provide information due to secrecy law of that country” (Participant 30); “No further 
information can be obtained due to privacy issues. Not enough information is 
available on the parties involved in the public domain” (Participant 5 (AMLTM)) and 
“Sensitive client and high revenue from the transaction” (Participant 79). 
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Table 19 - Results To The Question “Have you ever closed an enquiry, or allowed 
transactions / business activity to proceed knowing that the details were incomplete?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 16 12.2 13.1 13.1 
No 96 73.3 78.7 91.8 
Don't know 5 3.8 4.1 95.9 
Prefer not to say 5 3.8 4.1 100.0 
Total 122 93.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 9 6.9   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Strand II 
 
One of the key messages from the interview with Participant 15 (RM) was that 
customers should be made more aware of the reasons for banks wanting to know 
personal information and for increased transparency around procedures. Participant 
54 (AMLTM) commented during his interview in that “in Pakistan the customer isn’t 
aware of confidentiality. They think that the bank is going to disclose the purpose and 
this is why they are . . . reluctant in providing that information”. However, he 
believed that this issue did not extend beyond Pakistan.  
 
Theme C - Conflict of Interest 
Strand I 
When considering the barriers faced 29.1% (n = 23) of the participants indicated 
difficulty or hesitation in staff communicating effectively with customers. These 
included statements such as: “Relationship managers…don’t know the customer very 
well and don’t want to ask the client” (Participant 102); “Front line staff who contact 
the customer may be reluctant to “annoy” their client” (Participant 93); “Front line 
staff . . . may not wish to offend the client by asking personal questions” (Participant 
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24); “Front line staff u[n]willing to go [to] the client for such information” 
(Participant 1); “RMs reluctant to reach out to clients so as not to disrupt 
relationships” (Participant 5 (AMLTM)); “Relationship manager’s fear of loosing 
[sic] the deal” (Participant 28); “RM didin’t [sic] know how to ask a customer” 
(Participant 80 (CR)); and “The party required to ask the questions feel [sic] 
uncomfortable doing so as feels they are being intrusive . . . and not further 
questioning or corroborating the information provided” (Participant 38 (AMLTM)).  
 
Strand II 
 
Participant 80 (CR) commented that “RMs don’t know how to address the question to 
the client” and attributed many of the issues faced by the bank to the fact that some of 
their questions touch “sensitive transactions or sensitive relationships” and that the 
“size of the client or reputation . . . could be the problem”. These comments reflected 
the findings from the survey.  
 
Participant 38 (AMLTM) also mirrored these views, stating that relationship 
managers “don’t feel comfortable asking the questions because some of them can be 
quite difficult and obtrusive. So they feel that if they ask the questions they may upset 
the relationship they have with their client”. Likewise, she considered that there was a 
conflict of interest with relationship managers being asked to question customers’ 
activity, when they were reliant on those same customers to generate income. When 
asked how this was tackled within her own organisation she stated “Quite badly at 
times. I think it can cause some very heated discussions . . . they’re there to drive 
revenue not to answer these sorts of questions”. 
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Theme D - Local Culture 
Strand I 
11% (n = 13) of survey participants stated that a customer’s background would 
always influence the way in which they deal with them, whereas 38.1% (n = 45) said 
this would never be the case. Table 20 outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 20 - Results To The Question “Does a customer's background (religion, 
political position, social standing, age etc.) influence the way you deal with them?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 13 9.9 11.0 11.0 
Most of the Time 13 9.9 11.0 22.0 
Sometimes 29 22.1 24.6 46.6 
Rarely 10 7.6 8.5 55.1 
Never 45 34.4 38.1 93.2 
Don't know 6 4.6 5.1 98.3 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Whilst 11.1% (n = 13) of the survey participants made reference to the fact that an 
individual holding a PEP status would result in EDD being conducted, this related 
only to the standard processes adopted by the bank. Only 1.7% (n = 2) mentioned that 
a customer’s age should be taken into account. Another stated that “age, religion and 
social standing has nothing to do with the way clients are treated” (Participant 36). 
Although 3.4% (n = 4) indicated that customers should be treated as individuals and 
the investigation approach adapted accordingly, none provided any indication as to 
what such adaptations should be.  
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Strand II 
 
A slightly different view was presented during the interviews. Although having stated 
in the survey that a customer’s background would “never” influence the way they 
were dealt with, Participant 54  (AMLTM) acknowledged that “in Pakistan the people 
are not that well educated” and that whilst he worked for a international bank, 
customers treated them like a local bank, where trust and confidentiality were 
frequently betrayed. This in turn made it problematic to extract detailed information 
from their clients. Participant 15 (RM) stated that he recognised that individual 
customers would have been through different experiences and as such, needed an 
approach tailored to their own specific needs, stating that in certain cases “they’ve 
never been through this before, they might actually find this quite daunting and 
intrusive, so you have to be able to treat them with kid gloves and explain it”. 
 
Participant 5 (AMLTM) confirmed that there were frequently problems with answers 
received to the questions raised and stated that “Sometimes they don’t really put their 
wordings right. Sometimes they ask the questions in a very roundabout way”. He 
cited that one of the reasons for this included language barriers, giving the example 
that the initial queries were raised in the transaction monitoring hub in Poland, in 
English, and then perhaps sent to Nigeria, again where the response was produced in 
English, but as both sides of the communication were taking place in second 
languages there was “a lot of misunderstanding” and “very vague responses”.  
 
Participant 38 (AMLTM) also intimated that language barriers were a problem 
“because again we deal across different geographies and different types of clientele”. 
She echoed the fact that information provided was “frequently” incomplete. This was 
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perhaps due to the fact that when queries were raised “they will just ask the question - 
no background to the situation”. Participant 43 (CR) recognised the language barriers 
and attempted to overcome these by ensuring his communications were translated 
into the relevant language, stating that it would be “presumptuous on our part if 
we’ve got a French customer who’s based in France that we would expect them to 
interact with us in our native tongue rather than theirs”. As Participant 43 (CR) was 
not fluent in French himself, this process relied on him using Google Translate, or 
referring to a colleague who was a native speaker. 
 
Participant 54 (AMLTM) commented on market practice and specifically as to how 
the cash based economy in his country (Pakistan) made it difficult to fully investigate 
transactions. He advised that “sometimes the customer is reluctant to provide the 
purpose [of the transaction]”, so they would make a decision based simply on 
whether the relationship manager was comfortable with the transaction. This meant 
that the independence of the compliance function was compromised in that reliance 
was placed not on its own enquiries, but on the judgement of the first line of defence, 
the relationship manager, who was directly remunerated by the business brought into 
the bank. 
 
Participant 54 (AMLTM) also confirmed that there was a problem with customers not 
actually answering the questions posed. However, he attributed this, at least to some 
degree, to the fact that local banks have less stringent requirements, which can lead to 
customers feeling annoyed with the controls which are simply not part of local 
banking culture. Emphasis was placed on the fact that Pakistan had a cash based 
economy and that local banks were “not very focused on sanctions and AML”. This 
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raised the question as to how international banks can integrate with local banking 
expectations and requirements and could be an area for future research. As found 
with other interviewees, quality checks were in place. However, these were designed 
to check accuracy rather than examining the questioning approach itself, with no 
feedback related to such matters ever having been received. 
 
Theme E - No Issue 
 
Strand I 
 
12.7% (n = 10) of the survey participants specifically stated that they had not 
encountered any barriers when raising questions about a customer’s source of wealth 
or funds. This was in contrast to the details that were provided by other participants. 
Only 2.5% (n = 2) of these participants went on to provide examples of questions 
they might use, all of which were closed questions. Hence there was no clear reason 
as to why these individuals had not encountered any issues. 2.5% (n = 2) of the 
remaining participants mentioned that they did not personally ask customers for 
information; hence they would have been unlikely to encounter any barriers. 
 
Strand II 
 
All of those who were interviewed provided multiple examples of difficulties and 
barriers they had encountered when questioning customers, which are detailed under 
the appropriate themes. These examples were provided both in their initial survey 
responses and were further described during the interviews. Accordingly, the No 
Issue theme was not a feature within Strand II. 
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Theme F - Personal Safety & Protection 
Strand I 
48.3% (n = 57) of survey participants said that they always felt sufficiently protected 
by their employer to conduct their enquiries effectively. Full details are shown in 
Table 21.  
 
Table 21 - Results To The Question “Do you feel sufficiently protected by your 
employer to conduct your enquiries effectively?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 57 43.5 48.3 48.3 
Most of the Time 39 29.8 33.1 81.4 
Sometimes 10 7.6 8.5 89.8 
Rarely 6 4.6 5.1 94.9 
Don't know 4 3.1 3.4 98.3 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
Total 131 100.0   
 
12.1% (n = 14) of survey participants confirmed that they had been threatened or had 
felt intimidated to either close an enquiry or allow a transaction to continue. Table 22 
outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 22 - Results To The Question “Have you ever been threatened or felt 
intimidated to close an enquiry or to continue with a transaction / business activity?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 14 10.7 12.1 12.1 
No 98 74.8 84.5 96.6 
Prefer not to say 4 3.1 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 88.5 100.0  
Missing Blank 15 11.5   
Total 131 100.0   
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It transpired that only 1.7% (n = 2) of these threats were of a personal nature. One of 
these participants was located in Lebanon, which ranks at position 143 out of 180 
countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, and the other participant was 
located in the UK, which ranks at position 8 (Transparency International, 2018). The 
other 10.3% (n = 12) of responses related to inappropriate comments from other areas 
of the business concerning the fact that business deals might fall through.  
 
Strand II 
 
A lack of employer protection was not mentioned in any of the interviews. However, 
there was an indication that employers were placing staff in difficult situations. In 
particular, comments such as “you’re not allowed to explain to them [customers] why 
you’re asking the questions” and “the goalposts changed, depending on the client” 
(Participant 15 (RM)) were suggestive of a lack of support and restrictions on 
fulfilling their roles effectively. 
 
Likewise, no threatening behaviour was identified during the interviews, although 
Participant 15 (RM) mentioned that he was taken aback with the challenging response 
he received during one conversation with another member of staff that caused him to 
think “Am I doing something wrong?”.  
 
 
Category (ii) - Training  
 
The literature review highlighted the importance of appropriate, effective and on-
going training. As such, the questions, both in the survey and the interviews, were 
structured so as to draw out the extent of training, on-going support and quality 
assessment provided to bank staff. The results are detailed in the three themes below. 
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Theme G – Training Provision 
 
Strand I 
 
60.2% (n = 53) of survey participants confirmed that they had never received any 
training to help them draft questions for third parties or intermediaries, such as 
relationship managers. Table 23 outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 23 - Results To The Question “Have you ever received specific training to help 
you when drafting questions which third parties (such as Relationship Managers) have 
to relay to customers?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 33 25.2 37.5 37.5 
No 53 40.5 60.2 97.7 
Don't know 2 1.5 2.3 100.0 
Total 88 67.2 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 43 32.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Of those who had been trained 35.2% (n = 31) provided a description of the training 
they had received, which appeared to consist primarily of informal or internal 
sessions. Only 2.3% (n = 2) made reference to any external training being provided, 
one which was intended to help with cultural differences and the other to improve 
communication with business partners.  
 
When asked whether training had been received to assist when asking customers 
awkward or difficult questions only 38 survey responses were provided in total. This 
was primarily due to the small number of participants (n = 50) who were directly 
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engaged with customers and were consequently presented with the question. Table 24 
outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 24 - Results To The Question “Have you ever received specific training to help 
you when asking customers awkward or difficult questions?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 13 9.9 34.2 34.2 
No 25 19.1 65.8 100.0 
Total 38 29.0 100.0  
Missing Blank 93 71.0   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Of the responses received 65.8% (n = 25) confirmed that they had never received 
such training. For those who had received training, this again consisted of informal or 
internal sessions, with only one individual referring to an external course, which was 
focused on managing difficult conversations. Despite this apparent lack of training 
73% (n=27) considered that they were appropriately equipped, experienced and 
trained to raise awkward or difficult questions with customers. Table 25 outlines the 
full set of responses. 
 
Table 25 - Results To The Question “Do you feel appropriately equipped, experienced 
and trained to raise awkward or difficult questions with customers?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 27 20.6 73.0 73.0 
No 8 6.1 21.6 94.6 
Not applicable 1 .8 2.7 97.3 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 2.7 100.0 
Total 37 28.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 94 71.8   
Total 131 100.0   
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37 survey replies were received in response to the question asking how comfortable 
participants felt when asking customers awkward or difficult questions. Limited 
responses were received due to the number of those having direct contact with 
customers (n = 50). Whilst 45.9% (n = 17) said they felt reasonably comfortable, and 
18.9% (n = 7) were very comfortable, 24.3% (n = 9) stated that they were somewhat 
uncomfortable, of which 8.1% (n = 3) were professionally qualified. None stated they 
felt very uncomfortable. The full set of responses in shown in Table 26. 
 
Table 26 - Results To The Question “When asking customers awkward or difficult 
questions, how comfortable do you feel?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very 
comfortable 
7 5.3 18.9 18.9 
Reasonably 
comfortable 
17 13.0 45.9 64.9 
Neither 
comfortable 
nor 
uncomfortable 
4 3.1 10.8 75.7 
Somewhat 
uncomfortable 
9 6.9 24.3 100.0 
Total 37 28.2 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8   
Blank 93 71.0   
Total 94 71.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
These results were quite different to those who were faced with asking third parties, 
such as relationship managers, difficult questions. The level of comfort here, dealing 
mainly with colleagues, was significantly greater, with 29.9% (n = 26) of those who 
responded stating they felt very comfortable, 50.6% (n = 44) felt reasonably 
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comfortable and only 4.6% (n = 4) stating that they were somewhat uncomfortable. 
Table 27 outlines the full set of responses received. 
 
Table 27 - Results To The Question “When asking third parties (such as Relationship 
Managers) awkward or difficult questions, how comfortable do you feel?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very comfortable 26 19.8 29.9 29.9 
Reasonably 
comfortable 
44 33.6 50.6 80.5 
Neither 
comfortable nor 
uncomfortable 
13 9.9 14.9 95.4 
Somewhat 
uncomfortable 
4 3.1 4.6 100.0 
Total 87 66.4 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to say 2 1.5   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 44 33.6   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Similarly, 80.7% (n = 71) of survey participants considered that they were 
appropriately trained, experienced and equipped to raise awkward or difficult 
questions with third parties. Table 28 contains the full set of responses. These 
individuals were spread across seven different countries and although the UK 
dominated, this was in keeping with the overall population spread. So despite many 
participants not having received significant training, and some feeling uncomfortable, 
as specified above, the majority in each category (73% and 80.7% respectively) still 
believed they were properly equipped to conduct their roles effectively. 
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Table 28 - Results To The Question “Do you feel appropriately equipped, 
experienced and trained to raise awkward or difficult questions with third parties 
(such as Relationship Managers)?” 
 
 
Strand II 
 
The survey responses were broadly mirrored in the interviews. It was noted that none 
of the seven individuals had ever had any formal training as to how to conduct 
interviews, nor any training related to questioning, although this was not necessarily 
recognised as a gap in knowledge. Participant 12 (AMLI) considered that he had 
received specific training relating to questioning techniques, although it transpired 
that this consisted of him attending a presentation at an annual seminar that outlined 
certain question types and how they should be asked. The only follow up to this was a 
quality control check, designed to revisit how the questions were phrased, along with 
the outcome of the case.  
 
Likewise, although Participant 43 (CR) was asked twice whether he had received 
specific training for his current role, his answers failed to describe any kind of 
training course. He referred instead to knowledge gained in his previous role and 
outlined the training that he was personally now responsible for delivering. This 
training actually related to his previous role related to sales and whilst this involved 
“managing relationships” he claimed that “you’d only really want to ask a question 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 71 54.2 80.7 80.7 
No 11 8.4 12.5 93.2 
Not applicable 5 3.8 5.7 98.9 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 1.1 100.0 
Total 88 67.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 43 32.8   
Total 131 100.0   
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where you kind of already know the answer” and that he would employ “disturbing 
techniques” in order to “paint a pretty grim picture” before advising the customer as 
to how he could solve their problems.  
 
Participant 15 (RM) was very clear in that he had not been given any specific training 
and was simply tasked with these duties as he had “supposedly got objection handling 
skills” and the bank had “relied on the fact that we know how to get information from 
clients through client meetings in a nice positive way”. He elaborated further to say 
that he had not been provided with specific training to assist where customers had not 
wanted to provide full details and confirmed that it had been “trial and error to be 
honest, with more to do with helping each other as colleagues”.  
 
Participant 15 (RM) also advised that he had previously had “one or two people 
actually break down crying . . . and get really, really defensive” whilst others would 
simply hang up. In the example he provided he mentioned that a particular customer 
“broke down” because she felt the bank was harassing her. He advised that, at the 
time, he was new to the role and essentially had been presented with a list of twenty 
points that he needed to cover with the customer. He explained that he was put in a 
position where he had to ask about her source of funds, which she had inherited from 
her deceased parents. However, this information alone was not deemed sufficient for 
the bank. He was therefore asked to go back to the customer to establish precisely 
what line of employment her parents had been in. Being placed in this difficult 
scenario, he explained how he “instantly started being apologetic” whilst the 
customer became “really emotional”. He recognised that showing empathy was 
important, but that “apologising almost makes it feel like you’re doing something 
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wrong”. He elaborated by saying that the customer then went “on the attack” due to 
her thinking “if you’re apologising and you’re asking me this, then you shouldn’t 
have asked”. He explained that the training within the bank he was employed with 
was “getting better” and that “the bank has sort of been learning as we go along”, 
although there was still inconsistency with details that would be acceptable for one 
client, yet not with another. He added “Most people don’t want to co-operate, if I’m 
being honest” and “I would say 90% of people don’t want to talk to you”.  
 
Participant 15 (RM) also emphasised the importance of trying to educate the 
customer, explaining that these questions were not personal, but were part of a 
“global standards” programme that was being rolled out across the bank. He 
explained that he would never state “I have to ask you this” because this would imply 
that someone, somewhere, was specifically directing that question at that particular 
customer. He made specific reference to positioning the questions carefully, 
preparing ahead of the call, adapting his style to different individuals, and trying not 
to lead customers. However, none of these techniques had been developed through 
any formal training process. Despite these efforts, he noted “it can get very 
uncomfortable very quickly” and that during one call he felt awkward and 
embarrassed, stating “I didn’t know how else to word it”. He attributed part of the 
difficulty to the fact that the customers were not “getting anything out of this” as their 
accounts were already open and the questioning provided no obvious benefit from the 
customers’ perspective. Furthermore, although a quality check was in place, this did 
not examine the questioning techniques themselves, but looked at the content of the 
findings. This participant also noted that those conducting the quality analysis were 
new to the environment and commented that “it’s almost as if sometimes they’re 
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listening to you to learn to hear what sort of things that clients are actually saying”. 
Despite an absence of his own personal guidance and training, he confirmed that he 
now trained staff as part of his current role. 
 
Participant 38 (AMLTM) confirmed that her only training had developed “just 
through years of working in financial institutions and speaking with customers, 
working on the front line, learning and understanding how you can speak to people 
and get the information you require”. Despite having received no formal training 
herself, she had recently been posted to her bank’s central monitoring hub to deliver 
training to a large number of staff in order to “provide some basic questioning 
technique training”. Although Participant 38 (AMLTM) stated that she frequently 
encountered obstacles herself when raising questions she did not seem to view this as 
being of concern. When asked to provide an example of an obstacle she had 
encountered she cited a closed question that had not generated the full response she 
had anticipated. This was somewhat in contradiction to a comment she had made 
earlier in the interview in which she specifically stated she would generally ask open 
questions to prevent receiving one word answers. 
 
When Participant 54 (AMLTM) was asked whether training had been provided 
relating to the phrasing or structuring of questions he confirmed that none had been 
delivered, stating “Not particularly phrasing questions. They don’t go for the details. 
The training does not go into details . . . they don’t detail how to take information 
from customers”. Although Participant 80 (CR) had received some training relating to 
the question types used, this had been provided two years earlier and was delivered 
by his compliance colleagues as opposed to any form of specialist or bespoke formal 
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training. This was prompted due to the fact “they were already aware that there were 
some troubles” with raising questions with the relationship managers. Likewise, 
Participant 5 (AMLTM) had received no formal training to guide him through the 
questioning process and he stated that he had “kind of just picked things up” as he 
went along. 
 
Theme H - Quality of Investigations 
 
Strand I 
 
28.7% (n = 31) of the survey participants confirmed that their interviewing or 
questioning skills had been reviewed, analysed, measured or quantified. Table 29 
outlines the full set of responses. 48.1% (n = 52) of survey participants had not 
received any feedback on their interviewing skills and a further 11.1% (n = 12) stated 
that they did not know. When asked to describe how these reviews were conducted, it 
became clear that only 16.1% (n = 5) of these 31 individuals had received formal, 
structured feedback. One participant had received appropriate training whilst in the 
police, although such reviews would not have continued within the financial services 
sector. 6.5% (n = 2) of the participants cited training and feedback they had received 
as part of selling financial products. File review was mentioned as the most common 
form of analysis, with 12.9% (n = 4) confirming that role-play was used and 22.6% (n 
= 7) referring to call listening.  
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Table 29 - Results To The Question “Have your interviewing / questioning skills ever 
been analysed, measured or quantified in any way?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 31 23.7 28.7 28.7 
No 52 39.7 48.1 76.9 
Don't know 12 9.2 11.1 88.0 
Not applicable 10 7.6 9.3 97.2 
Prefer not to say 3 2.3 2.8 100.0 
Total 108 82.4 100.0  
Missing Blank 23 17.6   
Total 131 100.0   
 
80.2% (n = 93) of survey participants felt that when they escalated suspicious cases 
their opinion was usually supported by clear and conclusive information. Table 30 
outlines the full set of responses. 
 
Table 30 - Results To The Question “When escalating suspicious cases, do you 
generally find that your opinion is supported by clear and conclusive information?” 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid All of the Time 26 19.8 22.4 22.4 
Often 67 51.1 57.8 80.2 
Sometimes 19 14.5 16.4 96.6 
Rarely 4 3.1 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 88.5 100.0  
Missing Don't know 1 .8   
Prefer not to say 2 1.5   
Not applicable 3 2.3   
Blank 9 6.9   
Total 15 11.5   
Total 131 100.0   
 
In a similar vein 87% (n = 100) considered that they generally had sufficient 
information to close a case review. Table 31 outlines the full set of responses. 
 
 
166 
 
  
 
34.2% (n = 41) of the survey participants stated that they had escalated cases, either 
internally or to the authorities knowing that the details were incomplete. The full set 
of responses is shown in Table 32.  
 
Table 32 - Results To The Question “Have you ever escalated a case (either internally 
or to external authorities) knowing that the details were incomplete?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 41 31.3 34.2 34.2 
No 66 50.4 55.0 89.2 
Don't know 10 7.6 8.3 97.5 
Prefer not to say 3 2.3 2.5 100.0 
Total 120 91.6 100.0  
Missing Blank 11 8.4   
Total 131 100.0   
 
The reasons provided for doing so included: “It wasn’t possible to establish without 
alerting the customer” (Participant 62); “Client was unwilling to provide all the 
required information” (Participant 23); “To avoid tipping off” (Participant 6); 
Table 31 - Results To The Question “When closing cases without further escalation, or 
allowing transactions / business activity to proceed, do you generally find that your 
opinion is supported by clear and conclusive information?” 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid All of the Time 53 40.5 46.1 46.1 
Often 47 35.9 40.9 87.0 
Sometimes 11 8.4 9.6 96.5 
Rarely 4 3.1 3.5 100.0 
Total 115 87.8 100.0  
Missing Don't know 1 .8   
Prefer not to say 1 .8   
Not applicable 5 3.8   
Blank 9 6.9   
Total 16 12.2   
Total 131 100.0   
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“Information is not provided by the client” (Participant 30); and “to avoid reaching to 
customer many times” (Participant 41).  
 
25.8% (n = 31) of the survey participants confirmed that they had submitted SARs 
direct to the authorities (Table 33), and of these 11.7% (n = 14) also confirmed that 
they had escalated cases knowing that the details were incomplete.  
 
Table 33 - Results To The Question “Have you ever submitted a Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR) direct to the authorities?” 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 31 23.7  25.8  25.8 
No 82 62.6  68.3  94.2 
Prefer not to say 7 5.3  5.8  100.0 
Total 120 91.6  100.0  
Missing Blank 11 8.4   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Strand II 
 
The interviews revealed an assortment of responses when asked about feedback. 
Participant 54 (AMLTM) confirmed “I’ve never had any kind of feedback” and 
Participant 15 (RM) stated that he felt that he was actually helping to train those who 
ought to be undertaking the reviews. Although there was some evidence of quality 
checks or audits taking place (Participants 12 (AMLI) and 43 (CR)) that, to some 
extent, reviewed the questions posed, there was no evidence of a structured training 
refresher programme being implemented. 
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Theme I - Question Type 
Strand I 
The final question in the survey asked for participants to provide three examples of 
questions they might raise in response to a given scenario. The purpose of this 
question was not to assess their AML knowledge, but simply to ascertain how they 
structured their questions. 75 responses were received. Although participants were 
asked to list the questions exactly as they would phrase them, whether verbally or in 
writing, 14.7% (n = 11) did not follow this instruction and simply provided detail as 
to what they would be seeking to clarify. Of those who did provide example 
questions only 2.6% (n = 2) used open questions, such as “That large sum deposited 
is somewhat out of keeping with your normal transactions, what can you tell me 
about it?” (Participant 43 (CR)). 61.3% (n =46) favoured closed questions, examples 
of which included: “Has the government official been adequately investigated by 
compliance?” (Participant 2); “Can we have an invoice confirming the payment?” 
(Participant 16); and “Can you produce evidence to justify the source of the money” 
(Participant 44). The participant who described himself as being a Tier 2 police 
trained interviewer used one closed question and two multiple questions in the 
examples he provided. 
 
Strand II 
 
Participant 80 (CR) outlined that whilst there was a variety of training on offer 
covering “quite wide topics from, let’s say, organised crime to fraud” there was very 
little targeted at the investigation process. He mentioned that many of the questions 
employed were standardised, leaving little flexibility to the individual posing them. 
Participant 5 (AMLTM) also made mention of standardised questions being used, 
describing them as being “generic”. Where the questions did not suit the situation, he 
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commented that “analysts try to formulate their own questions and that’s where you 
get most of the confusion because you tell it’s the analyst trying to put together new 
language and sometimes you get a lot of muddled words”. Participant 38 (AMLTM) 
also referenced the use of standardised questions and stated that “they can be 
restricted to the number of questions they can ask as well”. This was apparently the 
result of a business decision to try to reduce the numbers of Requests For Information 
that were being sent. Participant 43 (CR) mentioned that standardised templates were 
used during the first stage of client interaction but thereafter communication would 
become a little less formal. He considered that these templates helped to ensure 
consistency, having been compiled with input from numerous senior individuals 
within the firm. 
 
When specifically asked about the phrasing of questions Participant 5 (AMLTM) said 
that he tried to keep his communications as straightforward and simple as possible, 
using bullet points to guide the reader. Participants 5 (AMLTM) and 38 (AMLTM) 
both confirmed that most communications were conducted via email in order to have 
an audit trail, although it was acknowledged that this would mean that “they will get 
just the questions, no background to the situation” (Participant 38 (AMLTM)). 
Participant 54 (AMLTM) confirmed that care was taken to ensure that the customer 
was not tipped off. No consideration beyond this was mentioned, aside from asking 
the business to be diplomatic in their questioning. Participant 15 (RM) included that 
he was not permitted to challenge the responses provided by customers stating “you 
can’t let on that you’re not happy with the answer . . . even if you think it’s ridiculous 
and doesn’t make any sense and they can’t actually give you a proper answer”.  
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Participant 38 (AMLTM) also commented that a centralised hub analyst, who would 
have already presented the customer with “quite basic” questions, had already 
conducted preliminary investigations on the cases that she handled. This could 
sometimes lead to customers being deliberately obstructive when questioned further 
as “they feel they may have already been asked these questions by the monitoring hub 
in the first round of questions”.  
 
Category (iii) - Commercial  
The final category drew out the commercial considerations that impacted the quality 
of the investigations undertaken. 
 
Theme J - Competition 
Strand I 
The surveys did not reveal any issues relating to rival banks.  
 
Strand II 
 
Participant 5 (AMLTM) explained that he dealt primarily with correspondent banking 
enquiries, where the customer was another bank, processing transactions on behalf of 
underlying clients. He mentioned that in addition to language barriers, banks “don’t 
like to disclose information to [other] banks, most especially banks that they feel 
might be their competitors . . . because they actually feel like we’re looking to poach 
clients off them . . . like we’re trying to steal customers off of them and they don’t 
want to tell you everything”.  
 
In a similar vein Participant 43 (CR) mentioned that many of their corporate 
customers were also their rivals and that “in certain instances we are direct 
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competitors in certain markets” and commented that “we’re looking at essentially 
saying to our customer “you’ve got to tell us all these potentially . . . market sensitive 
pieces of information . . . it could be a situation that they point blank refuse to tell 
us”.  
 
Theme K - Internal Friction 
Strand I 
Internal friction, politics or conflict was not mentioned in any of the survey 
responses. 
 
Strand II 
 
Although this was not apparent from the survey responses, one of the interviews 
revealed some internal politics that had contributed to investigation difficulties. 
Participant 15 (RM) mentioned that he had refused to raise further questions with a 
customer as he considered that having contacted them four times already this should 
have been sufficient. He emphasised the disparity that can exist between front line 
staff and the compliance function on occasion. 
 
Strand I & Strand II Research Conclusion 
The research findings from Strand I and Strand II revealed a broad spectrum of 
difficulties that were scattered across the globe. Numerous instances of inappropriate 
questioning were identified and descriptive examples were cited which demonstrated 
some of the issues faced when discussing delicate financial matters with customers. It 
was apparent that adequate training had not been offered to staff that were tasked 
with undertaking AML investigations. 
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Strand III – Questioning Observations 
The case files contained redacted extracts of the host organisation’s AML 
investigation records. Of the initial 56 cases, one held no details, two were erroneous 
(meaning that no case details could be retrieved), one case was duplicated, one did 
not contain a Request For Information (the primary selection criterion required) and 
one was inaccessible as it contained non-UK data. These six cases were therefore 
excluded from further analysis. As the extraction process had been conducted 
manually a small error rate was anticipated. 50 cases were therefore available for 
complete analysis.  
 
The case files contained: (i) a case reference number; (ii) a verbatim, redacted copy of 
the Request For Information (including the exact questions) that had been sent to the 
relationship manager or branch; (iii) a verbatim, redacted copy of the background to 
the query, the concerns raised, an outline of the responses received and the rationale 
for the decision; and (iv) the final outcome as to whether a SAR was raised. Whilst in 
24 cases there were specific comments made referring to the response received from 
the relationship manager, 26 made no mention of this. As such, it was not always 
clear whether a response was received but not incorporated into the findings, or 
whether no reply had been forthcoming. 
 
All of the cases reviewed came from the UK team of a large, international bank and 
although the data was redacted to the extent that this could not be confirmed, it 
appeared that the enquiries were being raised with UK based relationship managers.  
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All of the enquiries were raised in written format (through the bank’s internal AML 
system), which meant that it was not possible to examine prosody. It was not known 
whether any telephone call or other contact may have taken place outside of the data 
provided, although considering the manner and tone in which the questions were 
raised, this seemed unlikely. Whilst the questions were being raised with colleagues, 
rather than directly with the customer, background information surrounding the case 
would have allowed the relationship manager the opportunity to appreciate the wider 
concerns and have some context. However, there was little evidence of this 
(discussed further below). Neither were opening or closing statements noted that 
might encourage the relationship manager to engage. It was not possible to review the 
enquiries that were raised directly between the relationship manager and the customer 
and these were not recorded in the system. Consequently no assessment could be 
made as to whether any degree of brokering occurred, nor was it possible to 
determine how the relationship manager’s own bias and interpretation of the 
information supplied might have affected the response provided to the compliance 
analyst. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analysis was conducted and the observations were 
grouped into five themes that emerged: (A) Limited Background Detail; (B) Vague 
Rational; (C) No Response; (D) Inappropriate Questions; and (E) Limited 
Responses. Each theme is subsequently detailed and discussed in turn. 
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Theme A - Limited Background Detail 
 
Of the 50 cases reviewed 40% (n = 20) had resulted in a SAR being raised and 60% 
(n = 30) did not have a SAR raised. The cases included a brief statement of the 
circumstances or events leading to the query being raised. However, these were 
frequently isolated sentences, with little supporting information such as “Electronic 
credits totalling CCY received on Date from Company at Bank” (Case #3) or “A cash 
deposit for CCY paid into account on Date at Branch” (Case #7). In both of these 
examples this was the extent of detail supplied to the relationship manager, followed 
immediately with a closed question such as “Could you confirm the reason for the 
high credits received?” (Case #3) and “Could you confirm the reason for the cash 
deposit paid into the account?” (Case #7).  
 
Theme B - Vague Rationale 
In the example of Case #3 the bank branch stated that the customer had advised that 
the high credits related to a business investor “who shall be repaid in due course”. 
The case was then closed on the basis that “the activity identified on the business 
account is in relation to the customer’s business dealing rather than anything 
criminal, hence a disclosure will not be made on this occasion”. This suggests that the 
customer might have been expected to admit to involvement in criminal activity 
during the course of the enquiry. Furthermore, no clarity was sought as to who the 
business investor was, what their interest in the company was, or when they would 
expect to be repaid. Additionally, there was no explanation as to how any comfort 
had been obtained that these business dealings were normal and reasonable for this 
particular customer. In the second example, Case #7, the “highly unusual” cash credit 
was said to be from a late paying customer. The case was then closed on the basis that 
175 
 
  
“the cash deposit is a one off activity”, although there was no mention of the 
customer personally confirming that this would not occur again, nor any rationale as 
to why the late paying customer had opted to pay by cash.  
 
In total 34% (n = 17) of cases were closed with statements such as “the activity in the 
account on the account is personal in nature rather than anything criminal”. It was 
unclear how such a conclusion could have been reached in these cases. Nor indeed 
was it known precisely what kind of criminal activity was expected to be identified 
purely by reviewing banking transactions. In most cases it is the identification of 
unusual or uncharacteristic banking activity that prompts disclosure to the authorities, 
as opposed to explicitly exposing criminal behaviour, or the customer admitting to 
such. 
 
Theme C - No Response 
In 48% (n = 24) of cases no response from the relationship manager could be 
identified. It was understood that the host organisation allowed six days for a 
response from the relationship manager before the matter was escalated, with the final 
cut off for a response being nine days. In 75% (n = 18) of these 24 cases SARs were 
raised, despite a lack of information or clarity. One such example was noted in Case 
#2 in which the summary confirmed that a review of the account itself had raised no 
concerns, there were no concerns identified with the customer in open source 
research, and no adverse information was identified on World-Check (a subscription 
based service which facilitates the screening of negative news and sanctions). Despite 
this, a SAR was filed with the reason cited as “the legitimacy of the funds from 
Company is not established”. In a similar vein, Case #28 revealed no adverse 
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information or issues identified through World Check and the account activity was 
stated as being “in line with the stated nature of the business”. Nevertheless, a SAR 
was filed, despite no response being received from the relationship manager, as “the 
credit turnover on the account is in excess to the anticipated means quoted by the 
customer”. It was not clear when the customer had last been contacted to discuss their 
business activities and income. 
 
Further examples of the reasons for SAR filing included “The origins of cash deposits 
paid into the account are unknown.” (Case #9); “Origin and legitimacy of the funds 
received…is not known.” (Case #13); “We are concerned about the credits received 
from Company…and no details can be found about the company in google…” (Case 
#39).  
 
Theme D - Inappropriate Questions 
In total 99 questions were raised across the 50 cases. Of these 50 cases 10% (n = 5) 
contained no actual questions but held a statement of facts instead. It was not clear 
whether this information had been presented to the relationship manager, and no 
responses were indicated. As these cases contained neither questions nor responses 
they were excluded from any further analysis, leaving 45 cases in total. This gave a 
mean number of 2.2 questions per case and a range of 5 questions. 
 
Table 34 summarises the results from the analysis that was conducted on the question 
types (Appendix 8, Page 363). 
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Table 34 - Question Type Analysis – Part 1 – Analysis of Productive and Non-
Productive Questions 
 
 
Productive 
Open Probing 
17 0 
 
Non-productive 
Closed 
Meaning-
less Leading Multiple 
Forced 
Choice Opinions 
No 
Question 
63 24        1 14 0 0 4 
 
Of the 99 questions raised 17.2% (n = 17) were open questions (across nine cases) 
and 63.6% (n = 63) were closed questions (across 23 cases), thereby giving an OCR 
of 1:3.7. Whilst this was not particularly low, it should be borne in mind that these 
questions were not raised during the course of an interview, where closed questions 
might be used to confirm an earlier statement. Indeed, in 44% (n = 20) of the 45 cases 
these closed questions were the only questions used. Examples of the singular closed 
questions used included “Could you confirm the reason for the high credits 
received?” (Case #3) and “Could you confirm the reason for the cash deposit paid 
into the account?” (Case #7). Furthermore, of these 63 closed questions 38.1% (n = 
24) were regarded as meaningless whereby the relationship manager was asked a very 
ambiguous closed question such as “Also, do you have any concerns on the overall 
activity on the account?” (Cases #27, #32 & #33). No probing questions were raised 
in any of the cases. One leading question and 14 multiple questions were also noted. 
There were no forced choice questions raised, nor were any opinions stated. In 8.8% 
(n = 4) of the cases no actual question was posed, but an indication that a request for 
detail was being sought, such as “If you have also any concerns on the customer 
request to confirm regarding the same”. Of the nine cases containing open questions 
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22.2% (n = 2) had SARs raised, compared to 52.1% (n = 12) being raised against the 
23 cases with closed questions. This would suggest that the chance of a SAR being 
filed where closed questions are used is 2.36 times more likely than where open 
questions are used. However, as the ratio of open and closed questions was not 
proportionate, further research would be required in order to draw any firm 
conclusions from this. This would require access to many more case files than were 
available to the researcher. Such cases are treated extremely sensitively as the content 
relates to potential criminal matters which pose legal, reputational and commercial 
risks to the host organisation. The data is highly restricted, even internally, and 
obtaining access to large numbers of these sensitive cases presents numerous barriers.   
 
In order to measure the epistemic gradient and potentially to provide some 
explanation for some of the limited responses received from relationship managers, 
analysis was conducted to examine the grammatical construction of questions used. 
The results of this are shown in Table 35. The full results can also be found in 
Appendix 8, Page 363. 
 
Table 35 - Question Type Analysis – Part 2 – Grammatical Construction of Questions 
 
 
Question Type 
Polar 
Inverted 
(Polar) 
Negative 
(Polar) 
Tag 
Question 
(Polar) Content  Interrogative 
Tag 
Question 
28 0    0 0 70 1 0 
 
Of the 99 questions raised 28.3% (n = 28) were polar questions, requiring a simple 
yes or no response. Examples included “Do you have any concerns regarding these 
transactions? (Case #34) and “Is overall activity in line with the nature of the 
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account?” (Case #45). 70.7% (n = 70) of the questions were content questions, 
generally asking for an explanation of the account activity seen. Examples included 
“Could you please confirm the reason for the large value credits?” (Case #13) and 
“Kindly explain the reasons for regular cash deposits paid into the above said 
accounts and also explain the original source of cash.” (Case #49). Only one 
interrogative question was noted, this being “Could you please confirm if the cash 
deposits paid in the account are in relation to sale of property?” (Case #47).  This case 
generated no response from the relationship manager and a SAR was subsequently 
filed. It was therefore not possible to determine what impact using an interrogative 
question may have had compared to other question types. It should be noted that 
62.9% (n = 44) of the content questions were also closed questions, as indicated in 
Part 1 of the Question Type Analysis detailed above. This meant that whilst the 
question was seeking information, as opposed to a yes / no response, the question was 
phrased in such a manner as to perhaps only elicit one or two words in response. 
Examples included “Could you confirm the reason for the cash deposit paid into the 
account?” (Case #7) and “Could you please confirm the source for the cash deposits 
totalling CCY paid into the account?” (Case #12). 
 
Theme E - Limited Responses 
 
To measure the quality of the information obtained, the responses were sub-divided 
into five different categories, these being: Person, Action, Location, Item and 
Temporal, as outlined in the methodology. This analysis provided the opportunity to 
establish the what, who and why related to the account activity. Understanding the 
rationale for the transactional activity is key as to whether suspicion will be formed or 
not, so the quality of the detail supplied to the compliance analyst is an essential 
component of their analysis. 
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Of the 21 cases where a response was obtained from the relationship manager or 
branch a total of 100 IRI items was noted, with more Person details (45 items) being 
collected than any other category. The full breakdown can be seen in Table 36. 
 
Table 36 - IRI Results 
 
 
 
Examples of the IRI items included “the customer is self employed” (1 x Person) 
(Case #51); “the highly unusual cash credit (1 x Action) was from a late paying 
client” (1 x Person) (Case #7) and “funds are received from employer and from sale 
of property (2 x Item) (Case #34). Irrespective of the number of IRI items, only two 
SARs were raised against cases where a response had been received. 
 
In many cases the amount of IRI obtained was extremely limited, detailing only the 
bare minimum to provide a response of sorts, indicative of a tick-box approach to the 
process. However, this made little difference to the overall outcome, with only two 
SARs being raised against cases once the relationship manager had responded. In 
some cases the responses provided only one (Case #50) or two (Cases #25 and #52) 
items of IRI, yet the compliance analyst deemed this sufficient to close the case.  
 
By way of illustration, in Case #50 the only piece of information received from the 
relationship manger was that the customer held savings with another bank. In 
addition, the response for Case #23 detailed that large payments were received from 
the customer’s elderly mother who lived abroad, but provided no rationale as to why 
 
Person 
 
Action 
 
Location 
 
Item 
 
Temporal 
45 11 10 28 6 
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she would be sending funds through to the UK. In a similar vein, whilst the response 
for Case #52 confirmed that the customer’s husband worked for the company that had 
made the payment, there was no comment on either the purpose of the payment, or 
the reason why the customer was receiving this, as opposed to her husband. Likewise, 
the response in Case #34 confirmed that the majority of funds in the account were 
either from the employer or the sale of property. However, this response did not detail 
who the employer was, what line of business they were involved in, or whether this 
was a normal and expected level of income. Similarly, the reference to the sale of 
property provided no explanation as to what that property was, where it was located, 
or how the customer came to be in possession of it. The cost, and sometimes the 
ownership, of certain types of property, such as land, houses or cars, can be validated 
through publically available resources, such as Land Registry in the UK, which can 
provide an additional layer of comfort when undertaking investigations. These cases 
demonstrate that even where an initial enquiry was raised with the customer, only 
superficial responses were received and no indication of further questioning was 
observed.  
 
In Case #26 the relationship manager advised that they “had no knowledge regarding 
the transactions” indicating that not only were they unfamiliar with their client’s 
banking activity, but also that they were not prepared to attempt to contact them to 
find out. Despite this absence of detail a SAR was filed. Of the remaining 44% (n = 
20) of cases where more information (providing at least one piece of IRI) was 
provided from the relationship manager or branch, only one (Case #32) resulted in a 
SAR being filed, and there was no evidence that any of the detail in the response 
provided had been challenged. There were no financial crime concerns noted by the 
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relationship manager and a brief explanation for the unusual activity was provided. 
However, the analyst considered the response was “not sufficient enough”, although 
there was no mention as to what additional information was expected. The analyst 
then elected to file a SAR on the case rather than return to the relationship manager 
and insist that further detail was provided.  
 
Quantity of IRI Received in Comparison to Question Types 
The largest quantities of IRI were received in Cases #10, #20 and #40. None of these 
cases resulted in a SAR being filed (see Appendix 9, Page 388). Case #40 had 16 IRI 
items, whereas Case #10 had 11 items and Case #20 had nine items, with the mean 
across all 21 cases that received responses being 4.76 (SD = 3.67). Case #40, which 
had the most IRI items, contained two open questions. Case #10 contained one open 
question and one closed question (which was also noted to be a meaningless 
question). Case #20 contained three closed questions, one of which was also a 
meaningless question. The total number of questions raised in these three cases was 
largely aligned to the overall mean of 2.2.  
 
It was not possible to determine the amount of IRI generated by each individual 
question as many cases contained several questions and the responses did not directly 
correlate to each of the questions posed. As such, the analysis of the effectiveness of 
the different question types was limited to those cases that contained only open 
questions and those that contained only closed questions, these being the two largest 
categories noted. 
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Although the use of open questions prompted the largest amount of IRI for any single 
case, the same cannot be said of the other three cases where only open questions were 
noted, as demonstrated in Table 37. 
 
Table 37 - Quantity of IRI Obtained In Response to Cases With Only Open 
Questions 
 
 
Case  
#40 
 
Case  
#44 
 
Case  
#52 
 
Case  
#56 
16 4 2 4 
 
However, the four cases with only open questions generated a total of 22 IRI items 
between them, in contrast to the 20 cases with only closed questions, which generated 
a total of 30 IRI items, as demonstrated in Table 38.  
 
Table 38 - Quantity of IRI Obtained In Response to Cases With Only Closed 
Questions 
 
 
Case 
#2 
 
Case 
#3 
 
Case 
#4 
 
Case 
#6 
 
Case 
#7 
 
Case 
#9 
 
Case 
#12 
 
Case 
#13 
 
Case 
#15 
 
Case 
#17 
0 4 4 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Case 
#20 
 
Case 
#22 
 
Case 
#23 
 
Case 
#25 
 
Case 
#27 
 
Case 
#28 
 
Case 
#29 
 
Case 
#45 
 
Case 
#46 
 
Case 
#55 
9 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The mean number of IRI items for the four cases with only open questions was 
therefore 6.5 (SD = 6.4), compared to just 1.5 (SD = 2.46) for the 20 cases with only 
closed questions. This indicates that cases with only open questions produced 4.3 
times more IRI items than cases with only closed questions. However, as with SARs, 
the ratio of cases with only open or closed questions was not proportionate and 
further research would be required in order to draw any firm conclusions from this. 
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Linguistic Analysis 
In total, 1565 words were used in the 99 questions across the 45 valid cases. This 
generated a mean of 15.81 words per question (with a range of 34 words, SD = 6.42) 
and a mean of 34.77 words per case (with a range of 82 words, SD = 21.38). Table 39 
shows the impact on the number of IRI items obtained for each case, alongside the 
total number of words used. 
 
Table 39 - Number of Words Per Case Compared to Amount of IRI Produced 
 
Case Number #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 
No. of Questions 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 
No. of IRI Items 0 4 4 0 5 3 0 0 11 
No. of Words 20 10 10 76 10 13 23 10 32 
          
Case Number #12 #13 #15 #17 #20 #21 #22 #23 #25 
No. of Questions 4 2 1 1 3 2 4 2 4 
No. of IRI Items 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 2 
No. of Words 65 24 10 22 57 34 63 27 65 
          
Case Number #26 #27 #28 #29 #32 #33 #34 #37 #38 
No. of Questions 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 1 1 
No. of IRI Items 0 0 0 0 4 0 7 4 3 
No. of Words 18 27 23 92 31 35 25 28 13 
          
Case Number #39 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 
No. of Questions 5 2 3 5 1 2 2 2 3 
No. of IRI Items 0 16 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 
No. of Words 79 24 69 46 35 24 22 34 54 
          
Case Number #48 #49 #50 #51 #52 #53 #54 #55 #56 
No. of Questions 1 2 2 2 1 2 5 1 2 
No. of IRI Items 3 0 1 8 2 0 0 0 4 
No. of Words 13 35 33 49 14 51 57 12 51 
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As shown in Table 39, the number of words within each case did not necessarily 
generate more IRI items. Indeed, the two questions in Case #40, which generated the 
largest number of IRI items, only contained 24 words in total (below the mean per 
case of 34.77 words). This contrasted with the five questions in Case #29 in which 92 
words were used, which generated no response at all. Although this research 
examined an entirely different subject, the findings somewhat contradict Sexton and 
Helmreich (2000) who found that the more words that were used tended to improve 
communications. 
 
All 99 questions contained at least one word with six or more letters, with the mean 
LIWC output score being 29.5% (SD = 8.54). As all questions contained such words, 
it was not possible to assess the effect these had on the quantity of IRI items produced 
and accordingly, whether their use had any impact on performance and 
communication. 
 
LIWC percentage output scores were calculated across all 99 of the questions under 
the Summary Variables of Analytic (86.6%, SD = 22.69), Clout (89.7%, SD = 14.89), 
Authentic (23%, SD = 29.08) and Tone (68%, SD = 36.13), generating a cross 
Summary Variable mean of 66.8% (SD = 30.75). As mentioned previously, higher 
scores (up to 100) under these Summary Variables would indicate formal, logical 
thinking, expertise and confidence, and a more honest, personal and upbeat style. An 
overall mean of 66.8% therefore suggested that there was considerable room for 
improvement.  
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In terms of the Function Words used, only three cases contained a first-person 
singular word (“me”), creating a mean LIWC output score of 6.9% per question (SD 
= 1.26) and generating a total of three IRI items, with a mean of one (SD = 1.73) IRI 
item per case, contrasted with 97 IRI items across the remaining 42 cases, with a 
mean of 2.31 (SD = 3.54) IRI items per case. This suggests that the use of first-person 
singular words was not particularly effective at encouraging relationship managers to 
provide more IRI items. Seven cases contained a first-person plural word (“us”), 
creating a mean LIWC output score of 5.6% per question (SD = 2.74). These seven 
cases generated 16 IRI items, with a mean of 2.29 (SD = 2.98) IRI items per case, 
contrasted with 84 IRI items generated by the remaining 38 cases, with a mean of 
2.21 (SD = 3.57) IRI items per case. This indicates that a more collaborate approach 
resulted in the production of marginally more IRI items. A second-person pronoun 
(“you”) appeared in 72 of the 99 questions raised (75.8%). This created a mean 
LIWC output score of 7.2% per question (SD = 2.37), across 40 cases, generating 93 
IRI items, with a mean of 2.33 (SD = 3.62) IRI items per case, contrasted with seven 
IRI items across the remaining five cases, which generated a mean of 1.4 (SD = 1.52) 
IRI items per case. This suggests that second-person pronouns were slightly more 
effective at increasing the amount of IRI items generated, although the difference 
noted was again marginal. 
 
Only one case (Case #39) contained an opening salutation (“Hi Team”). However, 
this appeared to have little impact upon the recipient as no response was received. 
None of the cases contained any closing valedictions. As these messages were being 
delivered through an internal system within the host organisation, it was deduced that 
company practice did not encourage such convention, broadly aligning with the 
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findings of Gains (1999). As such, it was not possible to measure whether or not such 
comments had any impact on the level of detail received in response. 
 
In terms of politeness strategies, 42 of the 99 questions (42.4%) contained the word 
“please” (across 27 cases) and three (3%) contained the word “kindly” (across three 
cases). The use of the word “please” generated a mean LIWC output score of 98.4% 
under the Tone Summary Variable (SD = 3.03), compared to a mean of 39.3% (SD = 
34.58) where “please” was not used. “Kindly” generated a mean Tone Summary 
Variable score of 94.6% (SD = 7.58) compared to a mean Tone Summary Variable 
score of 36.7% (SD = 33.16) where neither “please” nor “kindly” were used. No 
other words associated with politeness or consideration were identified and many of 
the questions were rather blunt, for example “Do you have any concerns on the 
account?” (Case #31). Case #40 contained two questions, each of which asked the 
relationship manager if they could “please explain” the transactions under scrutiny. 
These questions not only scored 99% each under the Tone Summary Variable, but 
resulted in the highest number of IRI items received. Conversely, there were 18 
questions, across 18 other cases, that each scored 99% under the Tone Summary 
Variable, yet none produced a single item of IRI. This indicated that despite the 
findings of previous research (Eelen, 2014; Holmes & Stubbe, 2015) communications 
that were polite or courteous had no consistent bearing on the quantity of IRI items 
produced. There were no exceptional dimensions noted that might account for the 
large number of IRI items that were produced in Case #40.  
 
In terms of the 99 questions themselves, none generated an exceptionally high 
individual LIWC output score, with the mean total being 673.65 (SD = 67.73). The 
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question with the highest score of 833.74 (Case #21) did not generate a single item of 
IRI. Case #40, which had generated the largest number of IRI items, ranked tenth 
with an overall score of 755.14. Of the remaining top ten cases, only four generated 
any IRI items. It would therefore appear that the overall LIWC output score was not 
key to the production of IRI items. 
 
Strand III Research Conclusion 
Strand III, the case studies, demonstrated that questions were generally very poorly 
phrased, with extensive use of closed questions which generated incomplete and 
inadequate responses, if indeed any response was received at all. Despite the lack of 
response in 48% (n = 24) of the cases SARs were filed 75% (n = 18) of the time, 
thereby perpetuating the problem outside the financial services industry. Furthermore, 
when responses were received, all of these (n = 20) were accepted without challenge, 
even when sufficient detail was not supplied. 95% (n = 19) of these were 
subsequently closed based on these responses. Most of the questions used were either 
polar questions or content questions, with only one interrogative question noted. 
Cases with only open questions were found to generate 4.3 times more IRI items than 
cases with only closed questions, although further research would be required to 
validate this finding. From a linguistic perspective, no specific language was 
identified that consistently produced significantly larger numbers of IRI items.  
  
189 
 
  
Chapter Five – Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore whether those who were employed to 
undertake AML investigations within banks believed that they were adequately 
equipped to execute their roles effectively and to examine the question types used in 
practice. The specific research question posed was: 
Are global banking staff maximising communication strategies to assist in AML 
investigations? 
 
In order to evaluate this, the research involved an assessment of opinions, views and 
perceptions, along with a review of some of the questioning skills of bank staff. The 
challenges that faced these individuals were also explored, along with a review as to 
how other investigation departments, both public and private, have tackled their own 
investigations. This research set out to establish whether it was not so much what 
banks were doing that was flawed, but whether how they went about it could be 
improved. Using different strands of research, opinions were sought from those who 
were directly engaged in AML investigations, and case file analysis was conducted in 
order to ascertain how questions were posed in the workplace. 
 
The literature review demonstrated that none of the banks’ global regulatory 
frameworks or guidance documents that have been in existence since the 1930s has 
suggested that the quality of the AML investigation process itself should be 
examined. This was despite the obvious failings that have been identified and 
repeatedly called out through various regulatory thematic reviews, court cases and 
fines. Whilst it was apparent that AML investigations have been consistently failing 
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to meet the required standards, it appeared that no attempt had been made to explore 
the underlying reasons for this. Little examination seems to have taken place 
regarding the abilities of staff employed in various roles, the training and tools they 
are provided with, or their general feelings when conducting enquiries of this nature. 
This is certainly an area that would benefit from further research. 
 
The data presented within this thesis has provided insight into some of the difficulties 
faced by banking staff in executing their duties effectively. Discussions around 
finances can be extremely delicate matters, if not entirely taboo, with numerous 
individuals finding the topic difficult to broach. Despite these difficulties the 
literature review revealed scant research into this specific area and there was little in 
the way of training or guidance being delivered to bank staff that focused on 
questioning skills. One of the reasons behind this may be that investigations of this 
nature are relatively new to banks, with real interest only being sparked after 11 
September 2001 (Amoore & de Goede, 2008; Biersteker & Eckert, 2008; Naylor, 
2006; Wesseling, 2013). Prior to this event, banks had little motivation to investigate 
their clients’ activities, quite possibly because relationship managers were employed 
as confidential advisors as opposed to financial crime specialists. What is apparent 
from the research that has been conducted as part of this thesis is that the 
communication difficulties encountered when completing AML investigations do not 
appear to have been considered by banks, regulators, or indeed any other global body. 
 
As a means of managing the risks that they struggle to mitigate, banks have 
implemented extensive de-risking policies. However, these policies have left 
vulnerable individuals, communities and sometimes entire countries, without access 
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to the banking facilities they so desperately need (Darby, 2015; Furst & Wagner, 
2017; Lane, 2013). These actions have been countered with improvements in 
international co-operation and the issuance of best-practice guidance and procedures, 
plus an unprecedented rise in the number of compliance staff (Artingstall et al., 2016; 
Oligvie, 2017). However, this does not appear to have resolved the issues facing 
banks and enormous fines continue to be imposed by regulators, many of which relate 
to AML failings.  
 
The research conducted as part of this thesis has indicated that bank staff are not 
always appropriately equipped to ask the right questions. It was apparent that little 
had been provided in terms of training and support that would allow them to properly 
assess the risks presented to them. Not only did staff face numerous barriers when 
raising difficult questions, but the case file analysis revealed that the questions that 
were asked held little value. The evidence collected through the surveys and 
interviews demonstrated a collective view that relationship managers appeared fearful 
of causing offence to their customers. With appropriate training, relationship 
managers might be encouraged to use appropriate questioning techniques to 
maximise the information obtained from customers, aligning with the CI and CM 
ethos of searching for a reliable account. Whilst the success of applying such 
techniques in the real world is inconclusive (Clarke & Milne, 2016; Fisher et. al., 
2011; Griffiths, 2008; Kebbell et al., 1999; MacDonald et al., 2016), such training 
should, at the very least, encourage more complete responses to the questions posed. 
Not only would this allow for easier recognition of those who might be involved in 
illicit actions, but it would also help to identify vulnerable customers and ensure that 
they were treated fairly.  
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Vulnerable customers can present themselves to banks in an ever-increasing number 
of ways, from struggling businesses that are coerced into laundering money, to 
victims of human trafficking, or those trapped in modern slavery. Appropriate 
questioning of such customers could lead to the submission of a SAR, which may 
ultimately allow victims to be properly identified by the authorities and released from 
their situation. Likewise, suitable questioning techniques would ensure that customers 
who may have impaired memory, learning disabilities or other communication 
difficulties do not fall foul of the SAR regime simply because of their inability to 
provide suitable explanations for their banking activities. Treating each customer as 
an individual and assessing the risks presented in a fair and holistic manner would 
negate, or at least reduce, the need to exit customers without good reason, or de-risk 
entire groups en masse. 
 
Managing risk is clearly a difficult balance for banks. On the one hand they need to 
keep their regulators content and avoid reputational damage, and on the other they 
need to acquire new customers and minimise costs. The current strategy of choosing 
not to bank clients that are too risky to manage in a cost effective manner is neither a 
viable long-term solution for the banks, nor good for society as a whole. The surveys, 
interviews and case file analysis that have been conducted for this research have 
shown that bank staff are generally not conducting effective AML investigations. The 
participants themselves provided numerous examples of difficulties they had 
encountered and the case file analysis demonstrated that questions raised were often 
poorly phrased and generated limited, if any, responses. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
properly understand customers’ activity and behaviour. A revised approach to 
193 
 
  
managing those customers is therefore required to allow those relationships to 
continue. 
 
In terms of remedies to the problems highlighted by this research, the literature 
review examined some of the questioning techniques that had been adopted in other 
organisations, in both the public and private sector. Here it was noted that the CI and 
CM were implemented, to varying degrees of success, to help when undertaking 
various investigations. A common point between each of these approaches was that 
the use of open questions was advocated. Research has repeatedly demonstrated the 
benefits of using open and probing questions and specifically avoiding leading or 
multiple questions. Whilst such practices should be adopted for all individuals, they 
are particularly relevant when dealing with vulnerable individuals. Whilst this thesis 
has not specifically focused on those who may be considered vulnerable, this is 
nevertheless an issue for banks when they are conducting their enquiries. As such, 
techniques that can be applied to all segments of society would be considered useful 
tools. The CM phases of suspect agenda, police agenda and the challenge phase 
presented a structured approach to interviews that could be adopted by banks when 
dealing with their more complex investigations. It therefore appeared that there were 
several established tools and techniques that could be beneficial if adopted by banks. 
 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the findings of the research, from which five 
key issues have been identified: (i) Poor Quality SAR filings; (ii) Lack of Training 
and Feedback; (iii) Lack of Questioning Skills; (iv) Conflict of Interest; and (v) Lack 
of Consumer Awareness. Following assessment of these findings, recommendations 
have been made, where feasible, to address some of the key issues identified.  
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(i) Poor Quality SAR filings 
Banks have both a moral and legal obligation to identify bad actors. However, the 
research in this thesis has revealed that banks have seemingly failed to implement 
effective strategies to do so, and the consequence of this is felt on a global scale. 
Whilst the UK alone filed 419,451 SARs in 2016 (NCA, 2017), it is estimated that 
globally, 42% of SARs are either incomplete or of poor quality (Transparency 
International UK, 2015). Bearing in mind that legislation has been in place within the 
UK since 2002 under Section 330 of POCA, it might be expected that reasonable 
progress would have already been made in terms of training and equipping staff to a 
high standard. However, this thesis has revealed that this is simply not the case. 
Furthermore, this issue is not confined to the UK, but is experienced on a global 
scale. This substandard practice should not be ignored, yet the literature review has 
shown that little focus appears to be placed on improving the quality of investigations 
within banking, which account for 83.13% of SARs filed. The consequence of this 
means that government agencies are saturated with unsubstantiated, inconclusive 
documentation, which must surely drain valuable resources. The impact of poor 
quality enquiries extends beyond the banking sector and into external agencies such 
as the NCA as the recipients of this data. The consequence of this was not assessed as 
part of this research; however, in view of the number of SARs filed each year it is 
likely to be significant.  
 
Unjustified or inappropriate ‘defensive’ SARs damage reputations, businesses and 
ruin lives. Although legislation encourages firms to submit SARs, there are no 
published statistics indicating how many of these result in prosecution or conviction, 
nor is feedback provided on the content quality. As such, it is not possible to 
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determine the true value of the current process or identify where specific 
improvements could be made. As the primary contributor to the number of SARs 
filed, banks should take more responsibility and accountability for the quality of the 
details they submit. 
 
The case file analysis, whilst not conclusive in its own right, exhibited many of the 
issues identified by the survey and interview participants, particularly so with 
reference to the quality of responses provided by relationship managers. Of note was 
the fact over half of the cases where questions were raised with relationship managers 
received no response whatsoever, yet the majority (75% / n = 18) of these then 
proceeded to have SARs raised against them. The process for obtaining information 
in order to resolve enquiries would therefore appear to be flawed. The underlying 
reason for the low response rate was not entirely clear. The literature review, surveys 
and interviews suggested that relationship managers were reluctant to contact their 
clients for fear of disrupting the relationship. However, other factors could be at play. 
The time frame permitted for a response could be one such problem, as could the lack 
of background information supplied and poor phrasing of the questions posed, both of 
which were apparent from the case file analysis. A further factor could be that there is 
an imbalance of hierarchy between the relationship manager and compliance analyst, 
with the relationship manager simply considering the request as insignificant. Further 
research in this area is recommended to fully appreciate the reasons for this issue. 
 
The quality of the response appeared to make little difference, with only two SARs 
being raised once the relationship manager had replied. Furthermore, not a single 
challenge to any of the responses provided was raised, despite most of the replies 
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being extremely limited. In one instance the relationship manager simply advised that 
they had no knowledge of the transactions in question, yet a SAR was filed 
irrespective of the fact that no attempt had been made to contact the customer. 
Conversely, several participants confirmed that they had allowed business activity to 
continue despite knowing that the details of their reviews were incomplete. This 
could be tantamount to the banks having allowed money laundering concerns to go 
unreported. In these cases issues had been identified with the transactions that the 
banks then allowed to proceed whilst having no clear understanding of their purpose 
and potentially allowing the proceeds of crime to go unreported. One customer had 
specifically refused to provide information, which in itself should have been a cause 
for alarm. Similarly, one explanation suggested that the bank in question did not want 
to risk upsetting their customer and felt that probing further might cause friction. This 
is not an appropriate justification to close the case and the failure to report could 
potentially be a breach of section 330 of POCA. These results were mirrored to some 
degree in the interviews whereby it was mentioned that decisions were frequently 
made on a risk based approach due to lack of adequate detail. The case file analysis 
demonstrated examples of limited information being obtained during the course of 
investigations, yet decisions were made based on this inadequate detail. 
 
(ii) Lack of Training and Feedback 
The research findings show that little in the way of training had been delivered to 
help staff ask difficult questions, with many firms still seemingly considering that 
best-practice is learned on the job by observing more experienced staff. This issue is 
further compounded by the fact that those responsible for the training, on the whole, 
were existing members of staff, rather than specialists brought into the firms to 
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deliver the training. Staff were found to have very little knowledge of question types 
that might be useful when conducting enquiries with customers. Not only were 
individuals often ill equipped to undertake effective investigations themselves but 
they did not seem to recognise this and were frequently given responsibility for 
training others. This issue was epitomised when interviewing Participant 38 
(AMLTM) who had been given the responsibility of training a large number of staff 
when she herself frequently encountered issues when raising difficult questions. 
However, she did not appear to identify this and consequently did not appreciate that 
this might be a problem. There was no evidence obtained within any of the survey 
results or the interviews that independent, professional training, with appropriate on-
going support was normal practice.  
 
The survey results indicated that just over half of the participants were professionally 
qualified. As the survey selection criteria contained no specific requirements beyond 
the nature of employment, it is likely that the participants were broadly representative 
of the wider community and their responses are probably typical of those employed 
in similar positions. Professional qualifications are both expensive and time-
consuming, with annual membership fees to ACAMS for the private sector currently 
set at $295.00 and the examination package starting at $1,495.00 (ACAMS, 2018). 
The fact that so many individuals held them indicated that professional designation is 
considered desirable within the industry. However, the research demonstrated that 
such qualifications appeared to do little to help bank staff when undertaking AML 
investigations and those with professional qualifications did not have a significantly 
different perspective than those without.  
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Numerous studies (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Clarke & Milne, 2016; Davies, Bull & 
Milne, 2016; Milne & Bull, 2003a; Stockdale, 1993; Walsh & Bull, 2011) have 
shown that, in addition to an initial training programme, follow up training and 
regular feedback is vital to ensure that newly acquired skills do not start to erode once 
back in the workplace. Most survey participants confirmed that they received little, if 
anything, in the way of feedback. If analysis is not conducted to check the 
appropriateness of their decisions and processes are developed on the job, as opposed 
to through specialist trainers, it is most unlikely that poor practices will be identified. 
Without an appropriate feedback loop bank staff will be unaware of the impact of 
their approach to questioning and subsequent decisions. This situation appears to 
have instilled a false sense of security amongst staff who appear to genuinely believe 
they are making reasoned and well justified decisions.  
 
Banks could perhaps look to emulate some of the training that has been delivered 
within other organisations such as the DWP or NHS. That is not to suggest that the 
training needs to be as detailed or as extensive as that employed within the public 
sector, but a structured approach, led by suitably qualified instructors, followed by 
regular feedback would seem to be a step in the right direction. However, the 
implementation of appropriate training would no doubt be somewhat difficult and 
costly for banks, particularly those of a large, international nature. Such organisations 
not only have thousands of employees to consider, many of whom have different 
skills and degrees of knowledge, but legislation, culture and language would all need 
to be factored in to any training programme. Distance learning courses, such as those 
delivered by the Centre for Investigative Interviewing, may offer a suitable solution 
as customised training packages are available to suit specific organisational or 
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jurisdictional needs (Centre For Investigative Interviewing, 2018). Such courses can 
provide a means of distributing training across numerous countries in a timely 
fashion, whilst the modular approach allows for the training to be accommodated 
within busy work schedules. 
 
Both government bodies and insurers have adopted elements from the CI and CM in 
their efforts to combat fraud (Button et al., 2014; Shawyer & Milne, 2015; Shawyer 
& Walsh, 2007; Walsh & Bull, 2009). Whilst it could be argued that the degree of 
success achieved has been variable, there is sufficient research to support the view 
that such techniques can be beneficial. The limited research into their use within the 
private sector makes such a conclusion more difficult to ascertain, although the initial 
findings look promising.  
 
(iii) Lack of Questioning Skills 
Both the survey and the semi-structured interviews indicated that bank personnel 
were generally not comfortable when questioning a customer’s source of wealth or 
funds. It was a common belief that customers considered that the bank was not 
entitled to ask such intrusive questions and the participants’ comments demonstrated 
that many customers felt that the questions were invasive and inappropriate. Other 
responses suggested a general reluctance on the part of the customer to supply the 
requested information, such as the reliability of the information provided, responses 
that did not address the question, or a lack of any response at all.  
 
The responses that were provided as to the reasons why questions raised were not 
properly addressed suggested a deficiency in phrasing questions appropriately and a 
200 
 
  
lack of cultural awareness (discussed later). If bank staff do not have the knowledge 
and confidence to challenge effectively this could be rectified through training. In an 
ideal world the relationship manager would be in a position to provide full and clear 
details of the customer’s source of wealth or transactional activity. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the manner in which the compliance analyst raises the questions should be 
of little consequence. However, bearing in mind that relationship managers are 
compromised to some degree by their roles, there is a need for independent 
compliance analysts to ask clear questions and have the confidence to challenge 
inadequate or incomplete responses. One example was provided (Participant 38 
(AMLTM)) in which it was confirmed that relationship managers “can refer what we 
said directly”, meaning that the questions posed by the compliance analyst could 
sometimes be passed on directly to the customer. Training therefore cannot afford to 
be limited purely to those with the responsibility of asking the end customer, but must 
cover all roles involved in the process from start to finish.  
 
Although participants stated that they generally felt comfortable when posing difficult 
questions to their colleagues, the case file analysis demonstrated vague and poorly 
worded questions being raised by compliance analysts, which in turn generated 
inadequate responses from the relationship managers that were subsequently not 
challenged. The reasons why the participants appeared unable to pose difficult 
questions and challenge their colleagues effectively was not entirely clear and further 
research in this area would be beneficial in understanding this issue. 
 
AML investigations are complicated by the fact that there is a generally a three way 
dialogue, at least part of which is frequently conducted in writing, with 78.9% (n = 
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86) of survey participants stating that email was their primary communication 
method. This no doubt compounds the extent to which misunderstandings occur and 
creates problems with limited information being provided. The case file analysis 
revealed that 63.6% (n = 63) of the questions posed by compliance analysts were 
closed, with little or no background information being provided. The relationship 
manager was then expected to put these questions to the customer. However, as these 
are unlikely to be conveyed verbatim, they are subject to the relationship manager’s 
own bias and interpretation of the problem. Whatever the customer’s response, this is 
again subject to the relationship manager’s bias and interpretation, along with story 
reconstruction difficulties, when relaying the detail back to the compliance analyst. 
The problem is further compounded in that the compliance analyst has no specific 
means of recording the information provided, so whatever notes are made are then 
subject to their own bias and interpretation. Even if all of these interactions occur 
without error, there is a risk that accurate and complete detail will not be captured. 
This research was only able to examine one side of this scenario, that being the 
questions raised by the compliance analyst and the summary of the information 
subsequently recorded. Hence further research is warranted to establish the extent of 
this issue and fully appreciate how much information is lost or altered during this 
process. 
 
The case file analysis reflected numerous examples of poor practice, notably the 
application of meaningless questions, not one of which prompted disclosure of any 
information that warranted closer examination of the account, and in many cases was 
simply ignored. Indeed, the most comprehensive response received (in terms of the 
quantity of IRI items received) resulted from one of the few instances where such a 
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question was not included. This approach is indicative of an inappropriate practice 
being implemented across an entire department, without due consideration as to its 
effectiveness. Bearing in mind that the survey results confirmed that the majority of 
training was not of a specialist nature but was delivered via internal means, learned 
on the job, or was simply non-existent, this presents an example as to how 
undesirable habits can spread throughout entire organisations, with no measure or 
review being conducted in order to assess their efficacy. 
 
The case file analysis also revealed that by far the most comprehensive response in 
terms of the quantity of IRI items obtained was in reply to two open questions. This 
supports the extensive academic research that demonstrates that asking open 
questions can generate more substantive replies (Bull, 2010; Lamb, Sternberg & 
Esplin, 1998; Myklebust & Bjørklund, 2006; Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010; 
Poole & Lamb, 1998). Although it cannot be claimed that the quality of the questions 
posed was consistently responsible for generating the most IRI items, cases with only 
open questions generated 4.3 times the volume than those with only closed questions. 
However, further research is required to substantiate this finding. It would therefore 
appear that the use of open questions is fundamental in improving the quantity of 
information obtained. Closed questions may have been preferred in an attempt to 
expedite matters (Oxburgh, 2011), which is a key priority in a busy commercial 
environment. However, the results of the case file analysis indicated that they are not 
as effective as open questions in generating useful information. As a large number of 
communications are conducted in writing, overwhelmingly by email, the restraints of 
this medium should be considered. Both relationship managers and compliance 
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analysts should be trained to ensure that their email exchanges are clear and detailed 
and make use of appropriately phrased open questions.  
 
In terms of epistemic gradient 70.7% (n = 70) of the questions were found to be 
content questions, suggesting that the compliance analyst held little knowledge 
concerning the account activity in question. There was only one instance where 
knowledge of the rationale for the payment was indicated. No tag questions or 
negative interrogative questions were observed. This illustrated that the questions 
were generally being presented in a manner that did not require intonation to make 
the intention clear. Nevertheless as 62.9% (n = 44) of these content questions were 
also closed questions, the amount of information generated was limited. 
 
The linguistic analysis that was conducted was inconclusive. No particular language 
appeared to be directly related to the quantity of IRI items obtained. The use of first-
person plurals (we, our, us) and second-person pronouns (you, your, thou) did not 
appear to have any particular impact on the quality of the relationship between the 
compliance analyst and the relationship manager as the quantity of IRI items obtained 
was largely aligned to the overall mean across all cases. Conversely, the use of first-
person singular words (I, me, mine) actually caused the number of IRI items obtained 
to drop slightly below the overall mean.  
 
Although the case that had generated the largest number of IRI items obtained high 
LIWC output scores, particularly under the Tone Summary Variable, other cases that 
obtained similar scores received no response to the questions posed. Accordingly, no 
conclusions could be drawn from this that might explain which type of language or 
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approach could be helpful in increasing the quantity of IRI items obtained. Whilst this 
at odds with past research, this is likely to be due to the limited content of the cases, 
combined with banking norms and protocols of communication. 
 
The comments within both the survey and the interviews indicated that participants’ 
written requests were frequently misinterpreted, misunderstood, or simply ignored, 
causing them to either contact the relationship manager again, or make their decision 
based on inadequate information. There was no suggestion presented that when faced 
with a poor quality response the compliance analyst might initiate a verbal discussion 
with the relationship manager. Such engagement could allow for an enhanced 
discussion as to the root cause of the concern, which may well facilitate a better 
outcome for all parties.  
 
It was also apparent from that the surveys and interviews that template, or 
standardised questions were often used as a means of communication with 
relationship managers, these measures seemingly having been introduced to expedite 
processes and improve consistency. Whilst this may be beneficial from a practical 
point of view, it prevents compliance analysts from being clear and precise with their 
line of questioning and turns a unique investigation into a tick box exercise. The end 
result being that relationship managers receive stock questions that may not be 
relevant, along with meaningless questions.  
 
Those who dealt directly with customers confirmed that they made attempts to 
empathise and engage with them, although this frequently stemmed from a sales 
driven background and did not appear to always achieve the desired outcome, with 
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customers often becoming angry or distressed. Furthermore, the conversational 
techniques learned through sales training processes are certainly not aligned to the 
neutral, information gathering approaches advocated by the CI and CM. The most 
concerning example of this was provided by Participant 43 (CR) who used 
“disturbing techniques” in order to “paint a pretty grim picture”. Again further 
research would be required in this area to better understand the dynamics of these 
conversations. This could also facilitate a measure as to how accurately relationship 
managers summarise these conversations with customers when responding to 
compliance analysts. 
 
Some banks have attempted to accommodate their customers by conversing in their 
native language. However, for others, language barriers remain problematic. In one 
example, the compliance analysts were Polish and were expected to conduct their 
enquiries in English with relationship managers who could be based anywhere in the 
world, and as such, neither party would necessarily have English as their native 
language. Those relationship managers were then expected to raise these already 
translated questions with their clients in whichever language was appropriate. This 
chain of translation is likely to contribute to the numerous misunderstandings that 
were cited. 
 
Having staff that can converse in multiple languages is perhaps a somewhat 
unrealistic expectation for all banks to consider. However, cultural awareness is 
fundamental to helping staff understand transactional behaviour and local customs. 
Such recognition of cultural differences was not apparent within the survey. As one 
interviewee explained, his local banking culture, which was in a cash intensive 
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country, was very different to that of an international bank. Customers were not 
familiar with the stringent international requirements and this resulted in them feeling 
annoyed when questioned. Appreciation of cultural differences would help in 
understanding why certain customers might behave in particular ways. However, 
ensuring such recognition happens on global basis across banks would be difficult 
due to the number of staff that would require training, combined with the number of 
country and cultural differences that exist globally. For those banks that trade 
internationally, this would effectively mean that their staff would require knowledge 
concerning the nuances of every individual country. 
 
Training specifically covering the use of different question types would arguably be 
of most benefit to banking staff. This would help them to understand the importance 
of phrasing questions appropriately to ensure the most detailed responses are 
obtained. Open and probing questions should also encourage customers, irrespective 
of local culture, to willingly engage in meaningful dialogue rather than feel that the 
bank was asking intrusive questions. This in turn would help with level of staff 
confidence when faced with asking difficult questions. Awareness of their own 
interpretation of information supplied may also help to ensure that more 
comprehensive responses were captured. Whilst such training would not address all 
of the issues identified, it would assist with some of the more basic problems that 
have been observed and would form a good foundation for further development. 
 
(iv) Conflict of Interest 
 
One of the key issues highlighted within this thesis is the compromising situation in 
which relationship managers find themselves. The literature review revealed 
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relatively little detailed analysis on this subject, indicating that it is perhaps under-
researched, or even unrecognised. How such a significant issue has seemingly evaded 
the attention of the entire banking industry and academics alike (Demetriades, 2016) 
is unclear. However, there is a perceived conflict of interest that was repeatedly cited 
in both the survey responses and the interviews as being an issue. Comments included 
the fact that relationship managers would not want to “annoy” (Participant 93) or 
“offend” (Participant 24), customers, or “disrupt relationships” (Participant 5 
(AMLTM)). These comments aligned with regulatory thematic review findings where 
many banks were noted as being unwilling to request details from prominent 
customers (FCA, 2014b).  
 
It appears that the difficulty, or at least the perception of that difficulty, rests with the 
relationship managers. As one interviewee mentioned, this could be attributable to the 
fact that the relationship managers were reliant on these same customers to generate 
income. Hence there was a conflict of interest. She later followed this with 
confirmation that she did not personally feel uncomfortable when raising difficult 
questions with relationship managers, but stated “at times I feel sorry for the person 
who’s perhaps going to pick up the phone and ask, ask such difficult questions, 
because they can be quite personal at times as well”. Her view was reflected by 
another interviewee who was tasked with raising questions directly with customers, 
who agreed that doing so was “difficult” and “awkward”. None of the participants 
made any connection between the quality of the questions being put to the 
relationship manager and the subsequent actions of that relationship manager. Much 
of the criticism that was made relating to the quality of the responses obtained during 
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the investigations was directed towards the relationship managers being unable or 
unwilling to raise difficult questions with customers. 
 
The fact that relationship managers view these enquiries as a ‘risk’ to their client 
relationships, as opposed to being an opportunity to get to know their customers 
better, could be driven by the lack of transparency around the entire process, leading 
customers to question ‘what’s in it for me?’. This creates a vicious circle: customers 
fail to understand why they are being asked to explain their account behaviour, so 
they become agitated, difficult and angry; relationship managers do not want to 
question customers regarding their finances as they know they will not receive a 
warm response; consequently the questions are badly phrased, the answers obtained 
are inadequate and the account activity remains of concern. This conflict of interest 
cycle is perpetuated by the involvement of compliance analysts when enquiries are 
not made clear from the beginning, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 - The Customer Questioning Cycle
 
The need to know this information is not going to dissipate and as such, the only 
viable solution to address each stage of this cycle would appear to be the education of 
customers, perhaps through information leaflets and advertising campaigns, along 
with appropriate training and feedback for both relationship managers and 
compliance analysts. 
 
(v) Lack of Consumer Awareness 
 
Many of the comments made demonstrated that customers were not at all clear as to 
the reasons why they were required to provide such detail with respect to their source 
of funds or account activity. The enormous lack of transparency around the process 
Lack of customer 
understanding leads to poor 
quality responses being 
provided 
Compliance analyst has little 
information to work with and 
cannot understand account 
behaviour. 
Poorly phrased questions are 
presented to the relationship 
manager generally with 
limited, if any, background 
detail. 
 The relationhip manager may 
not fully understand the cause 
for concern, but is expected to 
contact the customer. 
The relationship manager feels 
uncomfortable questioning the 
customer and anticipates 
upsetting the relationship. 
Consequently, poorly phrased 
questions are put to the 
customer.  
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raises concern, suspicion, stress and sometimes anger as customers fail to 
comprehend why they are expected to provide such detail. A consumer awareness 
campaign (appropriately piloted) would certainly go some way in resolving this issue. 
If the campaign was distributed by email and promoted online it need not be 
expensive and could easily reach huge numbers of international customers. The 
benefits to such a campaign would be that customers would start to understand the 
requirements and hence should become more open, transparent and co-operative. This 
in turn would make staff feel more comfortable in asking seemingly difficult 
questions. This could potentially save enormous amounts of time as staff will not be 
so entrenched in trying to obtain details from difficult customers. In a similar vein, 
correspondent-banking relationships would improve as the wider banking community 
started to understand that information was not being requested with an aim to purloin 
customers, but to meet regulatory expectations and protect the entire financial 
services field. 
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Recommendations 
 
In conclusion, the following recommendations are proposed to address some of the 
key issues identified. In much the same way as the Framework for Investigative 
Transformation suggested by Griffiths and Milne (in press), if all recommendations 
were to be adopted they would act as enablers of effective AML investigations, 
whereas their absence would act as barriers. 
 
1. Poor Quality SAR filings: Banks should look to introduce a quality 
control process to their SAR filing to ensure that escalated cases provide a 
complete and logical rationale. Additionally, SARs should only be filed 
once a meaningful response has been received from the relationship 
manager, which may require an extension of existing time frames. SARs 
should only be raised without such a response in exceptional 
circumstances. Compliance analysts should also be encouraged to 
challenge inadequate responses. A means of recording verbatim responses 
should also be considered. 
 
2. Lack of Training and Feedback: Training should extend beyond merely 
‘learning on the job’ and include professional training courses, delivered 
by specialists. Such training should specifically include the appropriate 
use of different question types (detailed further below), the importance of 
providing context and the impact of bias and interpretation. Consideration 
should also be given as to how such training could be followed up and 
supported in the workplace. A key aspect here would be to ensure that line 
managers, or those responsible for quality assurance, were trained first. 
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This would ensure that when training was rolled out to the wider audience, 
adequate support and feedback could be provided. 
 
3. Lack of Questioning Skills: Staff involved in AML investigations should 
be trained (as a minimum) in the use of open and probing questions. This 
should initially be aimed at relationship managers (and their line 
managers) as this is the pivotal point of communication. Development of 
similar training aimed at compliance analysts (and their line managers) 
should subsequently be considered. Those banks that use standard or 
template questions should ensure the questions are appropriately phrased. 
 
4. Conflict of Interest: Relationship managers’ loyalties and obligations 
should lie directly with the bank rather than their customer. However, 
there are numerous instances where this does not appear to be the case in 
practice. Whilst training could help relationship managers when raising 
difficult questions, consideration should also be given to the remuneration 
and incentives that could drive inappropriate behaviour, although it is 
acknowledged that implementing such a cultural shift could be 
problematic. At the very least, regular checks should be implemented to 
oversee the quality of the customer enquiries conducted by relationship 
managers and the introduction of consequence management should be 
considered for cases that fall short of the required standard. 
 
5. Lack of Consumer Awareness: Banks frequently educate the general 
public through advertising or formal communications. This is both to 
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promote their own products or services, such as ‘Chip and PIN’ and to 
help combat fraud, such as highlighting the risks of identity theft or 
business email compromise. As many of these campaigns are simply 
distributed by email, or details are provided online, this need not be an 
expensive procedure. It is recommended that banks consider piloting a 
consumer awareness campaign to explain the reasons for requesting 
personal, and sometimes sensitive, information. 
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Research Observations and Limitations 
 
This research aimed to examine the extent of support and training that had been 
provided to banking staff across the globe, specifically those in customer facing roles 
and AML investigations. Whilst the research itself was of an international nature, the 
UK has dominated both the literature review and the research findings. This was 
partly because the UK is “unusually exposed” to money laundering risk due to the 
attractiveness of the London property market (Home Office, 2016a, p. 7), partly as a 
consequence of the UK having one of the most sophisticated AML frameworks in the 
world (Sofia de Oliveira et al., 2017), and partly due to the location of the researcher.  
 
One of the main limitations when conducting a survey is the low response rate. 
Having sent 628 personalised emails to carefully identified individuals, only 131 
responses (20.8%) were received. Furthermore, due to the anonymity of these 
responses, it was not possible to measure how many different banks were represented 
across the sample. As there was no compulsion or incentive to complete the survey, 
those who chose to take part may have done so due to a desire to air their views, and 
highly opinionated comments may not necessarily be reflective of the wider 
population. The sample population was also limited to individuals whose profiles 
were registered on LinkedIn and again this may mean that the opinions obtained were 
not necessarily representative of all bank staff engaged in AML investigations.  
 
Only 107 of the 131 survey responses (81.7%) were fully completed. However, all 
details that were provided were incorporated into the analysis. The fact that the 
majority of questionnaires were fully completed indicated that the survey design and 
structure was broadly successful at retaining people’s interest throughout. Aside from 
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grammatical mistakes in the free text responses, no questionnaire errors were 
identified and all questions raised received answers. However, the final question, that 
requested specific examples in response to a vignette, attracted very poor quality 
responses in the main. For those individuals who did not undertake any form of 
interviewing their responses must be regarded as having limited value to the analysis 
and this was factored in, where appropriate. The results indicated that the sampling 
strategy adopted had, on the whole, been successful in identifying those with 
appropriate exposure to customers and having opportunities to engage in AML 
investigations. Upon reflection, improvements could have been made to the 
questionnaire that would have aided subsequent analysis. In particular, the question 
relating to professional qualifications could have included a drop-down list as 
opposed to a free text narrative as this would have simplified the analysis. 
 
A further limitation of the survey was that it was distributed in English only. As this 
was not the first language of many of those to whom it was sent some of the 
responses were a little ambiguous. Ideally, surveys and interviews would be fully 
translated to ensure full comprehension. The case files themselves were all derived 
from within the UK, so any potential language issues that might arise during the 
phrasing of questions were not apparent. This was a further limitation of the research. 
 
The low number of interview participants was initially regarded as being a concern, 
particularly so as Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) suggest that around 12 samples 
are required to achieve data saturation. However, it became clear as the interviews 
progressed that similar themes were emerging from each. None of the participants 
had received appropriate training and all had encountered difficulties in getting 
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informative answers to questions they raised, whether this was direct with the 
customer or through another party. Whilst some of these difficulties were attributed 
to different causes, such as language barriers or inconsistent bank processes, the 
common fact remained that none had been trained in how to deal with such 
challenging scenarios or problematic customers. The interview size was sufficient to 
meet the data saturation requirements laid out by Fusch and Ness (2015) in that it was 
possible to extract meaningful data and replicate the study and no new themes 
emerged beyond those already recognised within the original survey. 
 
Interviews were only conducted with those who offered to take part and thus presents 
self-selection bias. This may mean that their opinions do not reflect those of the wider 
banking community, but may instead be limited to those who held particularly strong 
views on the subject matter. Those who are interviewed in qualitative research are not 
necessarily meant to be representative of a population and instead the findings “are to 
generalize to theory rather than to populations” (Bryman, 2012, p. 406). As this thesis 
has covered new territory in terms of academic research, it is difficult to say with any 
degree of certainty that the issues identified are endemic across the entire banking 
industry. However, it is clear from the fines that continue to be imposed by regulators 
that there is still much to learn in this field. In addition, although care was taken 
during the interviews to avoid any degree of judgement about their replies, social 
desirability bias may have influenced the responses provided, particularly if the 
interviewees were attempting to present themselves as being subject matter experts. 
 
A further limitation of this research was that the case file analysis, which was only a 
small sample size, contained only summaries of the responses received from the 
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relationship managers, compiled by the compliance analysts, rather than showing the 
verbatim response. As such, the actual phraseology employed by the relationship 
manager was not available for analysis. This also meant that the recorded comments 
within the files were those of the compliance analyst only and as such, were subject 
to their own interpretation and bias. For future research it would be invaluable to not 
only increase the sample size, but to obtain access to the verbatim responses from the 
relationship managers. However, this may only be achievable if the host organisation 
were to alter its current processes, or if research was carried out in a different 
company. 
 
The study of the chain of response from the customer to the relationship manager to 
the compliance analyst is a prominent area for future research and this may hold 
answers to many of the issues identified within this thesis. This in turn could prompt 
changes to bank process if deficiencies were identified. As part of such a study it 
would also be useful to examine the underlying reasons for the high volume of cases 
that receive no response. Depending on the results from this work, simple solutions 
could potentially be implemented to address the problems identified, such as 
extending the time frame available in which relationship managers must provide a 
response. 
 
Finally, having learned about the importance of testing reliability and validity of 
survey questions, any future research would ensure that the questionnaire design 
takes such requirements into account. The ability to undertake these tests was 
somewhat limited due to the lack of coherence between the Likert scales used and the 
different items and variables that were being measured. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion 
 
The original research set out to ascertain whether bank staff undertaking AML 
investigations believed that they were adequately equipped to execute their roles 
effectively. The specific research question posed was: 
Are global banking staff maximising communication strategies to assist in AML 
investigations? 
The results from this research demonstrate that this does not appear to be the case. 
The literature review indicated that the banking industry is plagued with problems 
and despite years of compliance guidance, little has improved. There are several 
flaws in the current process, notably the conflict of interest that exists with 
relationship managers. The desire to win new business, which generates a financial 
reward for the relationship manager, whether directly or indirectly, will frequently be 
at odds with the compliance requirements, which often necessitate difficult questions 
being raised. There are two potential solutions to this, however, neither appears to be 
viable. The first would be that the relationship manager should not be incentivised to 
acquire new business and should instead focus on retaining a more independent role. 
Such an approach is unlikely to be welcomed by the banking sector, would require 
enormous cultural shift, and could have a dramatic impact on new business volumes, 
and subsequently on share prices. The second option would be for the compliance 
analysts to raise their queries direct with the customer. However, as they will not 
have the full picture of the customer’s normal business activity they would be in a 
disadvantaged position compared to the relationship manager, who, at least in theory, 
should already know the customer extremely well. Such an approach would also 
extinguish the independence of the compliance function, thereby undermining the 
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three lines of defence model. As this conflict of interest seems likely to continue, an 
alternative solution to address the issue is therefore required. 
 
Of note is the fact that relationship managers seem unable, or perhaps unwilling, to 
respond to Requests For Information within the time frames provided. This leads to 
numerous SARs being filed with incomplete information. The remedy to this would 
appear to be relatively simple in that enquiries need to be prioritised to ensure the 
relationship managers are fully engaged, and the compliance analysts’ assessment of 
cases should not routinely proceed when details are missing. Additional research 
would be required in order to understand the root cause of this problem. A solution 
could be as simple as making a change to internal processes (such as extending the 
time frame), which banks could implement with relative ease and minimal cost. 
 
This study has revealed that the majority of problems encountered are linked, in many 
ways, to communication. Customers should be better informed to allow them to 
understand why it is that banks need to ask so many questions. Respondent banks 
need to understand that intrusive questions are not being raised in order to steal 
business, but to ensure the security and reputation of the entire industry. Training 
needs to be provided that enables staff to ask difficult questions with ease, and to 
challenge responses with confidence, safe in the knowledge they have the support and 
protection of their employer. Effective questioning from the outset would ensure that 
comprehensive customer details are captured and renewed on a regular basis. This in 
turn would allow banks to undertake far more effective risk assessments, allowing 
them to continue with higher risk business. The subsequent reduction in de-risking 
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would then ensure that banking facilities are made available to those that need them 
most. 
 
Much of this could be achieved through an effective investigation process model 
designed specifically for the banking sector. It is acknowledged that interviewing 
practices within the wider public sector have not been entirely successful, but this has 
been partly attributable to the lack of bespoke design and partly due to the absence of 
supportive ongoing training. There appears to have been a fair degree of success in 
implementing specific questioning techniques into the insurance sector and there is 
no reason to believe that a modified version of these could not be successful in 
banking.  
 
Some of the problems encountered with public sector interviews included pre-
judgement of guilt. This is an issue that is unlikely to present itself within banking as 
questions will need to be raised on a regular basis with all types of clients. Most will 
have perfectly plausible explanations; hence there is less reason for those relationship 
managers posing the questions to assume guilt. Another problem encountered during 
face-to-face interviews within the public sector was the, often incorrect, assessment 
of body language. Again this unlikely to be of concern within banking as the vast 
majority of AML investigations will be conducted over the telephone. 
 
Previous research has revealed that there are some significant obstacles when trying 
to implement effective interviewing practices. Of particular note are: the time taken to 
conduct each interview appropriately; a lack of continuous training; delivery by 
inexperienced trainers; an inflexible and cumbersome approach; and an 
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overwhelming training schedule. All of these issues could be remedied by creating a 
bespoke model, focused specifically on question types, which would also recognise 
that many interviews are straightforward and brief. 
 
Appropriately designed training courses would allow staff the opportunity to ensure 
that questions are asked in the most effective way possible. The training should aim 
to provide a flexible toolbox of skills. Of vital importance is that those conducting 
AML investigations are guided in the use of open and probing questions. Such 
training should include regular follow up sessions and sampling to ensure it remained 
effective. Whilst this would be an additional expense, the benefits could help to steer 
the banking industry away from its current cycle of regulatory fines and reputation 
damage. 
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Chapter Seven – Personal Reflection 
 
On reviewing the approach to my work I am confident that the research structure was 
appropriate. The surveys allowed initial views to be gathered, the interviews allowed 
for a more in-depth analysis of those views and the case file analysis allowed a real 
glimpse of what was actually happening in practice. I appreciate that the third strand 
was likely only to have been possible due to my professional practice, but the value 
this has provided has been extremely beneficial. Having insight into practice is 
fundamental in understanding how processes actually work, and in turn, how they 
might be improved. For future projects I would certainly look to retain an element of 
fieldwork or ethnography to ensure any findings are realistic and well grounded. 
 
Several of the educational elements, such as the use of SPSS and the value of 
Cronbach’s Alpha, are skills that I will continue to use. Other skills relate to time-
management and organisation; attributes I already possessed at the start of this course 
but have been honed as a consequence of it. The sense of contribution is also 
important. I genuinely feel that my work may new doors in banking as the sector 
appears oblivious to the very existence of the issues covered within this thesis. For 
too long banks have been focusing on policy and procedure with little insight as to 
why they might be failing to achieve their goals.  
 
From an academic perspective I have learned to critique both my own work and that 
of others, as well as accepting criticism myself. The knowledge gained through close 
examination of question structure is something I can continue to utilise going 
forward, ensuring that reliability and validity can be measured. Not only are 
223 
 
  
questioning skills important in many aspects of everyday life, they are highly relevant 
in my specific career. 
 
Working alongside others with shared interests has helped in fuelling discussions and 
has encouraged me to look at issues from different angles. Having been immersed in 
financial services for over 30 years it can sometimes be difficult to take an objective 
view. Working through my thesis and engaging with my supervisory team has made 
me appreciate the value of different perspectives, particularly those from outside of 
my profession. Most importantly I have learned how to take an idea forward by 
conducting appropriate research and presenting my findings in a logical and 
convincing manner. I have also become accustomed to ensuring that my thought 
processes are clearly documented in stages and that no assumptions are made. Again 
these are qualities that are often overlooked when working in a busy commercial 
environment. I am naturally a problem solver, so the fact that I may not always be 
able to find clear answers can be difficult for me. However, the fundamental value of 
research is in adding to the body of knowledge and knowing this has helped drive my 
research forward. The hope is that such research can prompt further work, either by 
others or myself. 
 
My next aim is to publish my research and findings. This is important as it will allow 
my work to be considered, not only within academia, but also within the banking 
sector where I hope to have most practical impact. I hope that from this I can further 
contribute by designing the training materials that might be used within banks. I also 
aim to deliver my findings across a variety of banking seminars and conferences, 
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which I hope will include influential international bodies such as the Wolfsberg 
Group and Transparency International.  
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Appendix 1 – FOS Analysis 
 
Case Reference Reason For Complaint 
DRN5430525  
 
Account in debt and bank received no response to multiple 
letters. 
DRN8149369  
 
Account closed in 2001, seemingly by customer, and no 
records available. 
DRN0111644 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN1862420  
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN4202277 
 
Partner closed joint account without customer’s 
knowledge. 
DRN2313507 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN2201291  
 
Bank suspected impersonation fraud and immediately 
closed new account. 
DRN4742649 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN3927444 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN6294311  
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN4441624 
 
Account closed by father in 1994 and daughter unaware. 
DRN6455710 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
Compensation provided for misleading details with the 
closure. 
DRN4996315 
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN4380262 
 
Account closed by customer, but incurred interest. 
DRN5546257 
 
Account closed due to lack of customer detail. 
Compensation awarded due to poor communication. 
Complaint upheld. 
DRN5679629  
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN2195414 
 
Account closed by bank, but overdraft remaining. Poor 
service / admin from bank, so compensation paid. 
DRN9031121  
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN4269307  
 
Account holder did not comply with account requirements, 
hence closed. 
DRN9427405 
 
Bank ISA closed in error. Compensation offered. FOS 
agreed reasonable. 
DRN8274937 
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN2753108 
 
Customer closed account but overdraft needed to be 
repaid. 
DRN9682568 Papers not fully completed, hence account closed. 
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DRN6736587 
 
Customer closed account but disputed charges. 
DRN9271082 
 
Closed account of third party involved in a currency 
exchange. 
DRN3603562 
 
Misunderstanding as to whether customer wanted account 
closed or not. 
DRN1516856  
 
Account being closed, but complaint related to associated 
admin. 
DRN6157078 
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN5556128  
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN0263688 
 
Customer thought account was closed but it was not and 
remained overdrawn. 
DRN7940890 
 
Customer asked for account to be closed. Admin issues 
related to this. Complaint upheld. 
DRN7787546 
 
Account closed due to failure to supply correct 
identification. 
DRN6164169 
 
Failure of bank to close account when requested. 
DRN6185101 
 
Account closed due to default on loan repayments. 
DRN2631060  
 
Account opened in error and then not closed suitably by 
bank. 
DRN4040679 
 
Account closed in 1999 but customer does not agree. 
DRN1561335  
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN2547047  
 
Bank branch was closed and staff rude. 
DRN5516724  
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN8865610  
 
Bank advised customer that accounts were being closed in 
error. Compensation offered. 
DRN6754709 
 
Bank closed account as dormant and then there were issues 
in re-opening it. Compensation offered. Complaint upheld. 
DRN5372179 
 
Bank required additional information and closed account 
when this was not received promptly. Complaint upheld. 
DRN5307063 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
DRN2047183 
 
Account closed and no explanation provided. 
Compensation awarded for not providing 60 days’ 
notice. 
DRN0646210  
 
Mistake in switching account. Compensation awarded. 
Complaint upheld. 
DRN6096740 
 
Bank did not close account promptly as instructed. 
DRN8505476 
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
254 
 
  
DRN7642121 
 
Poor customer service and account subsequently closed by 
customer. 
DRN1270727 
 
Account closed due to dormancy. 
DRN9543531  
 
Account closed due to breakdown in relationship. 
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Appendix 2 – Electronic Survey 
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Appendix 4 – Results Tables 
 
Q1 - Are you male or female? 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 79 60.3 60.3 60.3 
 Female 46 35.1 35.1 95.4 
 Prefer not to say 6 4.6 4.6 100.0 
 Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q2 - What is your age? 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Prefer not to say 1 .8 .8 .8 
16 to 24 years 7 5.3 5.3 6.1 
25 to 34 years 74 56.5 56.5 62.6 
35 to 44 years 37 28.2 28.2 90.8 
45 to 54 years 10 7.6 7.6 98.5 
55 to 64 years 1 .8 .8 99.2 
65 to 74 years 1 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
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Q3 - In which country are you employed? 
 
  Frequency Percent 
 Valid United Kingdom 76 58 
Poland 16 12.2 
Pakistan 9 6.9 
United States 8 6.1 
India 5 3.8 
Austria 2 1.5 
China 2 1.5 
Other 2 1.5 
Singapore 2 1.5 
Belgium 1 0.8 
Cote d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast 1 0.8 
France 1 0.8 
Ireland 1 0.8 
Lebanon 1 0.8 
Qatar 1 0.8 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.8 
Turkey 1 0.8 
United Arab Emirates 1 0.8 
Total 131 100 
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Q4 - How many years have you worked in banking? 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0.5 1 .8 .8 .8 
1 2 1.5 1.7 2.5 
1.5 4 3.1 3.4 5.9 
2 14 10.7 11.9 17.8 
3 11 8.4 9.3 27.1 
4 10 7.6 8.5 35.6 
5 16 12.2 13.6 49.2 
6 3 2.3 2.5 51.7 
7 3 2.3 2.5 54.2 
8 8 6.1 6.8 61.0 
9 5 3.8 4.2 65.3 
10 10 7.6 8.5 73.7 
11 3 2.3 2.5 76.3 
12 4 3.1 3.4 79.7 
13 3 2.3 2.5 82.2 
14 1 .8 .8 83.1 
15 8 6.1 6.8 89.8 
16 2 1.5 1.7 91.5 
17 2 1.5 1.7 93.2 
20 1 .8 .8 94.1 
21 1 .8 .8 94.9 
25 2 1.5 1.7 96.6 
26 1 .8 .8 97.5 
33 1 .8 .8 98.3 
35 1 .8 .8 99.2 
37 1 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Valid 118 
Missing 13 
Mean 8.3008 
Median 6.0000 
Mode 5.00 
Std. Deviation 7.01011 
Range 36.50 
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Q5 - Which of the following best describes your current position / department? 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative  
Percent 
 
Valid 
Relationship 
Management / Wealth 
Management 
9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Client On-boarding - 
KYC / CDD / EDD 
36 27.5 27.5 34.4 
Client Refresh - 
Renewal KYC / CDD 
/ EDD 
33 25.2 25.2 59.5 
AML Transaction 
Monitoring / Analysis 
19 14.5 14.5 74.0 
AML Investigations 18 13.7 13.7 87.8 
MLRO / Deputy 
MLRO 
5 3.8 3.8 91.6 
Other - please specify: 11 8.4 8.4 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
Other - please specify: 
Client On-boarding & Client Refresh - KYC/CDD/EDD 
QA 
Business Analyst/MiFID Analyst 
Compliance And AML/CTF 
Director of AML/BSA/OFAC 
Compliance Liaison Officer 
Nominated Officer 
Internal investigations manager 
Business Analyst - KYC Projects for Utilities 
FATCA/KYC 
Nominated Officer 
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Q6 - Please list any professional qualifications you hold that are directly relevant to 
your role. 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 24 18.3 18.3 18.3 
- 2 1.5 1.5 19.8 
advanced certificate in 
AML 
1 .8 .8 20.6 
AML and KYC from 
Indian Institute of 
Banking and Finance 
1 .8 .8 21.4 
BA , FPC , LEVEL 4 
CII DIPLOMA, 
Mortgage advice 
1 .8 .8 22.1 
Cams 1 .8 .8 22.9 
CAMs 1 .8 .8 23.7 
CAMS 14 10.7 10.7 34.4 
CAMS in progress 1 .8 .8 35.1 
CAMS, CAMS-FCI 1 .8 .8 35.9 
CAMS, CFE 1 .8 .8 36.6 
CAMS, CFE, CFCS 1 .8 .8 37.4 
CAMS, ICA, Dip. 
FRCM 
1 .8 .8 38.2 
CAMS,CFE 1 .8 .8 38.9 
CCO CAMS CRA 
CMA Advanced 
Certificate in 
Compliance CMA 
Advanced Certificate in 
AML CME-2 
1 .8 .8 39.7 
CeFA 1,2,3 1 .8 .8 40.5 
cemap 1 .8 .8 41.2 
CeMAP, CeFA 1 .8 .8 42.0 
Certificate in Advanced 
Investigations (Bond 
Solon) 
1 .8 .8 42.7 
Certificate in financial 
crime awareness 
1 .8 .8 43.5 
Certificate, Securities 
Institute; stage 1, 
Institute of Bankers 
1 .8 .8 44.3 
cfe 1 .8 .8 45.0 
Chartered Institute of 1 .8 .8 45.8 
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Securities and 
Investments Level 3 
Certificate in 
Combating Financial 
Crime 
CIB. MICA. ICA Dip 
AML. 
1 .8 .8 46.6 
CII Diploma Financial 
Planning CII Mortgage 
Adviser CII Equity 
Release 
1 .8 .8 47.3 
CIMA, CAMS 1 .8 .8 48.1 
CISI combatting 
financial crime 
1 .8 .8 48.9 
Dip CII, PCIAM 1 .8 .8 49.6 
Diploma in Financial 
Investigation CAMS 
1 .8 .8 50.4 
DipPFS, CeMAP, 
CeFA, DipFSM 
1 .8 .8 51.1 
economical education - 
master degree 
1 .8 .8 51.9 
I am on training to get 
ICA Advanced 
Certificate in Anti 
Money Laundering 
1 .8 .8 52.7 
IAC, CeMap, 1 .8 .8 53.4 
Ica 2 1.5 1.5 55.0 
ICA 8 6.1 6.1 61.1 
ICA - advanced 
certificate in AML 
1 .8 .8 61.8 
ICA Advanced 
certificate in AML 
1 .8 .8 62.6 
ICA certificate AML 1 .8 .8 63.4 
ICA Diploma in Anti-
Money Laundering 
Awareness 
1 .8 .8 64.1 
ICA Diploma in 
Governance, Risk and 
Compliance in progress. 
1 .8 .8 64.9 
ICA in Correspondent 
Banking 
1 .8 .8 65.6 
ICA UK Advanced Cert 
in AML 
1 .8 .8 66.4 
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Ifs 1 .8 .8 67.2 
IIBF 1 .8 .8 67.9 
IIBF AML KYC 1 .8 .8 68.7 
JAIBP and MBA in 
Banking and Finance 
1 .8 .8 69.5 
MBA in Risk 
Management 
1 .8 .8 70.2 
N.A 1 .8 .8 71.0 
n/a 4 3.1 3.1 74.0 
N/a 2 1.5 1.5 75.6 
N/A 4 3.1 3.1 78.6 
N/a (but 8 years EDD 
experience for 
consultancies) 
1 .8 .8 79.4 
na 1 .8 .8 80.2 
Na 1 .8 .8 80.9 
NA 2 1.5 1.5 82.4 
Nil 2 1.5 1.5 84.0 
No 1 .8 .8 84.7 
no certifications, 
economics major 
1 .8 .8 85.5 
none 3 2.3 2.3 87.8 
None 9 6.9 6.9 94.7 
None at the moment 1 .8 .8 95.4 
None yet 1 .8 .8 96.2 
Nope 1 .8 .8 96.9 
Plannig to undertake the 
Financial Crime 
Prevention Diploma 
(ICA) 
1 .8 .8 97.7 
Professional Banker 
Certificate CertPB 
Introduction to Risk 
(Insititute of Chartered 
Bankers) 
1 .8 .8 98.5 
Professional 
qualifications are not 
required at this stage as 
FATCA is new 
regulation, which came 
into effect 1st of July 
2014. Maybe in the 
future we will need 
1 .8 .8 99.2 
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some additional 
trainings. 
Promontory Sanctions 
Certificate 
1 .8 .8 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
Q7 - Does your current role involve direct contact with customers? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Yes 50 38.2 38.2 38.2 
No 79 60.3 60.3 98.5 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q8 - Does your current role involve directing questions for end customers through 
another employee or third party? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 107 81.7 81.7 81.7 
No 22 16.8 16.8 98.5 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 131 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q9 - When escalating suspicious cases, do you generally find that your opinion is 
supported by clear and conclusive information? 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid All of the Time 26 19.8 22.4 22.4 
Often 67 51.1 57.8 80.2 
Sometimes 19 14.5 16.4 96.6 
Rarely 4 3.1 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 88.5 100.0  
Missing Don't know 1 .8   
Prefer not to say 2 1.5   
Not applicable 3 2.3   
Blank 9 6.9   
Total 15 11.5   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q11 - Have you ever closed an enquiry, or allowed transactions / business activity to 
proceed knowing that the details were incomplete? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 16 12.2 13.1 13.1 
No 96 73.3 78.7 91.8 
Don't know 5 3.8 4.1 95.9 
Prefer not to say 5 3.8 4.1 100.0 
Total 122 93.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 9 6.9   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q10 - When closing cases without further escalation, or allowing transactions / 
business activity to proceed, do you generally find that your opinion is supported by 
clear and conclusive information? 
 Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid All of the Time 53 40.5 46.1 46.1 
Often 47 35.9 40.9 87.0 
Sometimes 11 8.4 9.6 96.5 
Rarely 4 3.1 3.5 100.0 
Total 115 87.8 100.0  
Missing Don't know 1 .8   
Prefer not to say 1 .8   
Not applicable 5 3.8   
Blank 9 6.9   
Total 16 12.2   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q11a - Please explain your reasons for closing an enquiry, or allowing transactions / 
business activity to proceed knowing that the details were incomplete? 
 Text Response 
1 There was waiver/ exception for draft documents which is required to be 
requested after kyc was completed 
2 No further information can be obtained due to privacy issues. Not enough 
information is available on the parties involved in the public domain. 
3 There are sufficient knowledge frm business end for incomplete details and they 
are willing to take on the risk. 
4 Sometimes the old accounts found with incomplete documentation. But the 
customer have caryying good banking relationships and market reputation, in 
these rare cases customer is asked to submit compelete documentation and 
provided few days time, for this particular period the alert/inquiry may close. 
5 Client refused to provide information due to secrecy law of that country. 
6 pressure of time to process the transaction - however, the decision was supported 
by Compliance, and they have extensive knowledge of all the KYC details, after 
further investigation they have agreed to allow the transaction 
7 usually due to critical priority, 
8 30 days for docs to be received after onboarding 
9 N/a 
10 Approval or Go ahead from Line Manager 
11 Sensitive client and high revenue from the transaction; incomplete information 
was however added shortly to the client's file/profile 
12 I used Risk Based Approach to evaluate the risk on the sitaution when details 
were incomplete. Even if I had incomplete details but based on the rest 
information I had I didn't see any red flags I allowed to proceed. 
13 risk based approach 
14 Risk based decisions against the risk appetite of the bank against sometimes a 
best in devours approach 
15 Reputational risk 
 
 
Q12 - Have you ever escalated a case (either internally or to external authorities) 
knowing that the details were incomplete? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 41 31.3 34.2 34.2 
No 66 50.4 55.0 89.2 
Don't know 10 7.6 8.3 97.5 
Prefer not to say 3 2.3 2.5 100.0 
Total 120 91.6 100.0  
Missing Blank 11 8.4   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q12a - Please explain your reasons for escalating a case knowing that the details were 
incomplete: 
 Text Response 
1 It was escalate for waiver approval 
2 High risk money laundering jurisdictions involved. Payment fits a certain 
typology. 
3 To avoid tipping off 
4 When Customer is avoiding to provide the requested detail of transaction then 
case is reffered for reporting to regulatory bodies 
5 I didn't have all details to hand and the issue was potentially quite serious and I 
knew I could proved the rest of the details at a later date 
6 On those occasions when the missing information cannot be obtained 
7 client was unwilling to provide all the required information 
8 Negative News are known publicly although it may not be captured via normal 
protocol. 
9 Sometimes customer failed to provide evidence against unusual transaction 
which doesn't harmonize with customer profile, these cases are further escalated 
internally and externally. 
10 Tight deadline 
11 Information is not provided by the client. 
12 unable to source further evidences 
13 again it's pressure of time - I've been escalating cases to Compliance even 
though not all the KYC details were complete, however, always making sure to 
gather as much information as possible. Such situations happen when there's 
pressure of time and we want to avoid reaching to customer many times. 
Together with Compliance we were gathering as much as we could, and were 
coming back to customer only if necessary to obtain information via sources. 
14 I was the '4-eye' checker and information had been fudged to get the case to 
initial sign-off 
15 - 
16 It wasn't possible to establish without alerting the customer 
17 Second opinion 
18 Source of Wealth, Asset providers for SPV's, Ownership Structure for Medium, 
High & Higher risk clients, Individuals ID proofs who are Authority to act  at 
client's space, Certification of Incorporation proof etc.,. 
19 suspicion 
20 I know that no information doesn't equal suspicious but sometimes you feel that 
some activity looks strange/unusual and it would be better if Compliance would 
take a look at it. Also sometime Compliance have more sources to look for 
information and for them single relationship could be a part of a greater scheme 
which is impossible to see as an Analyst. 
21 non availability of some details 
22 If fraud/money laundering is discovered through my investigations, I may refer 
to the police immediately with limited information thus preventing tipping off or 
jeopardising a criminal case. 
23 Transaction was too risky to wait for additional information. 
24 Other parties were responsible for obtaining the remaining details 
25 When making referrals internally it is sometimes the procedure to make the 
referrals without investigating 
26 In some situations it is not possible to obtain full information, such as if a 
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customer has already exited their relationship with the bank. 
27 significant red flags 
28 Another area had to supply the missing information. 
29 To clarify the situation and obtain more details 
30 There was sufficient information at the time without waiting to determine further 
facts within the investigation in its totality 
31 for furher review 
32 You cannot get what you require, and you to kill the client. 
33 Unable to obtain further information 
34 at that stage it wasn't necessary to have all the info avaiable 
 
 
 
Q13 - Have you ever submitted a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) direct to the 
authorities? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 31 23.7  25.8  25.8 
No 82 62.6  68.3  94.2 
Prefer not to say 7 5.3  5.8  100.0 
Total 120 91.6  100.0  
Missing Blank 11 8.4   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
 
Q14 - Do you feel sufficiently protected by your employer to conduct your enquiries 
effectively? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 57 43.5 48.3 48.3 
Most of the Time 39 29.8 33.1 81.4 
Sometimes 10 7.6 8.5 89.8 
Rarely 6 4.6 5.1 94.9 
Don't know 4 3.1 3.4 98.3 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q15 - Does a customer's background (religion, political position, social standing, 
age etc.) influence the way you deal with them? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 13 9.9 11.0 11.0 
Most of the Time 13 9.9 11.0 22.0 
Sometimes 29 22.1 24.6 46.6 
Rarely 10 7.6 8.5 55.1 
Never 45 34.4 38.1 93.2 
Don't know 6 4.6 5.1 98.3 
Prefer not to say 2 1.5 1.7 100.0 
Total 118 90.1 100.0  
Missing Blank 13 9.9   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q15a - Please describe what you might do differently depending on the customer's 
background: 
 Text Response 
1 More information required for risk classification 
2 EDD depending country residence / orgin 
3 Make additional enquiries where possible. 
4 If the customer is PEP, connected to PEP, or Public Official 
5 Perform a more robust check than I would normally do, and ask more questions 
6 Method of communication 
7 Political exposed people are high risk of money laundering 
8 If customer is a politically exposed person, more due diligence is performed 
9 Request for additional information when dealing with PEPs and associated 
entities 
10 A customers age has to be considered at all times, Potentially Vulnerable Clients 
are very important to spot 
11 Make more enquiries and cross check information given 
12 Certain precaution is applied to high / very high risk customers 
13 From a customer-face off point of view, there is always a tendency to be client-
aligned. Depends on the character of the customer, the communication would be 
appropriately aligned 
14 Further checks, escalations, reports, 3rd party enquieries 
15 The local high profiles often found difficult to deal with. informations regarding 
these types of customers is fetched from LEA's and other sources. 
16 Politically exposed persons are subjected to additional scrutiny; religious leaders 
with extremist views are also subjected to enhanced scrutiny 
17 Raise it to compliance team. 
18 If elderly often a more detailed explanation is required to ensure they are aware of 
the risks, considering their age. 
19 terrorist links 
20 For Example EDD if the customer is PEP 
21 Age, religion and social standing has nothing to do with the way clients are 
treated.  We have to consider the political standing of a client because if they are a 
prominent public figure and/or have access to public funding (better known as 
PEPs), they need to be treated as high risk in which case they would be screened 
more regularly and proof of documentation would be more in depth 
22 I would conduct a thorough investigation to ensure the customer isn't 
reported/exited due to racial profiling/bias. 
23 Interview tactics  has to be adapted so as to maximise receipt of information and 
evidence 
24 be able to source out more info on the individual, espacially important for PEPs, 
religious figures, HNWIs 
25 Extra searches. More id&v and detail requested. Example verify source of wealth 
and funds 
26 Eg Politically Exposed People (PEPs) are escalated to compliance to see if they 
affected the clients overall risk rating. 
27 Politicians could be PEP 
28 Depending on a clients social standing: involvement in politics  more information 
may be requested 
29 Politically exposed persons require background check and sign off by MLRO and 
senior manager for example 
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30 Take into consideration regional and historic economic situations when analysing 
historic source of wealth 
31 As a KYC Analyst primary responsibility is to know about our Customer. So 
knowing who are our customer & what they are dealing with plays vital role. If 
client's PPOB / Registered address or SOW / SOI are from Tier 1 /s sanctions 
country, Onboarding analyst has to take further measures in collecting more 
information about client, because of risk associated with. It's always good to 
escalate our regional Fin crime / AMLC to notify them we are onboarding this 
client to monitor their transactions closely & also approvals from AML. 
32 Extra Care and Trying to source as many documents publicly for HNW 
INDIVIDUALS 
33 We don't do business with individuals. However, organisations from different 
regions require different approach tactics 
34 completing case 
35 Enhanced checks - high risk countries - possible sanction related issues to 
consider. 
36 A part of my role requires me to contact clients with more complex queries about 
their transactional activity. Each contact is different and I have to adjust my style 
and approach depending on the person I am dealing with. For example, I would 
approach a client who has 20 years of experience in banking and is fully aware of 
AML procedures differently to a client who has no banking knowledge 
whatsoever. Each contact is different and so a variety of different approaches 
must be used to obtain the information I require. 
37 sometimes customer's background make u feel suspicious 
38 PEPs are more closely monitored 
39 If a customer is of a particular background it might inform the direction the 
investigation takes - ie focusing on specific risk areas for a geography or other 
demographic. 
40 Will analyse the case as per the customers profile and his past activities with the 
bank. 
41 Dependent on the situation but I treat people as individuals and not a collective 
42 na 
43 keen observation 
44 Level of information obtained 
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Q16 - Have you ever been threatened or felt intimidated to close an enquiry or to 
continue with a transaction / business activity? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 14 10.7 12.1 12.1 
No 98 74.8 84.5 96.6 
Prefer not to say 4 3.1 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 88.5 100.0  
Missing Blank 15 11.5   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
 
Q16a - Please provide details of the threat / intimidation and explain what happened: 
 Text Response 
1 NA 
2 n/a 
3 Being asked by the Business to expedite decision on case closure or 
authorisation of a transaction as a delay would loses revenue or damage the 
client experience. 
4 immediate escalations, calls with senior mgmt explaining the delays etc. 
5 i 
6 N.A 
7 Investigated a customer that had a registered address 2 blocks from my home 
address. The customer is question had deliberately lied about info on official 
bank documents to get a new account open. The account was opened regardless 
which raised a suspicion of insider trading. As I investigated the case, I feared 
that if the customer had someone on the inside, they would be able to see I was 
the investigator of the case, after the customer was found out for fraud. 
8 Business was pushing hard and wanted me to take responsibility for trade not 
being executed. I was however supported both by my TL and higher 
management within my department 
9 customer has been told about the investigation and from whom it was. so i was 
threatened by phone 
10 A few lines of business over the years have tried to intimidate me by becoming 
aggravated and telling me that a multimillion deal would fall through because of 
me, this tactic doesn't work on me. 
 
285 
 
  
Q17 - What barriers have you encountered when raising questions about a customer's 
source of wealth / funds or their transactions? 
 Text Response 
1 Front office u willing to go the client for such Information 
2 I havnt encountered any Barriers. The relationship mangers are happy to ask the 
question to the client, and there are no complaints from the client. 
3 Account balance 
4 Lack of evidence supporting claims. RMs reluctant to reach out to clients so as 
not to disrupt relationships. Respondent and correspondent banks withholding 
information. Poor quality of information. 
5 Information are usually retrieved from public resources, and most of the PEP 
customers are not willing to provide such information 
6 it is a part of KYC to disclose the source of fund/proof of Income. 
7 Time pressures from internal stakeholders 
8 Confusion over what the requirement is because it isn't well known. 
9 Our customers know they won't be able to maintain a relationship with the Bank 
if they are unwilling to answer the above questions. 
10 Incorrect/incomplete/uncertified information 
11 That customer has been with the bank a long time 
12 Reluctance of clients to provide information/possibility of tipping off. 
13 Delays in the provision of the information requested or documentary evidence 
14 Clients do not want to tell you this information a lof of the time and do not feel 
they should have to. Some clients have point blank refused 
15 Clients have the belief that we know their business, or family 
connections/history and sometimes do feel the questions we ask are too 
intrusive. 
16 Unwillingess the customer to give out information re source of funds due to 
legal barriers. 
17 Barriers only come into play normally (on the rare occasion) when trying to seek 
out the true UBO when all evidence suggests that the public face of ownership is 
a nominee or defacto representative 
18 Work in commercial banking no individuals 
19 a barrier where the person asked do not understand the definition of source of 
wealth/funds. Inacurate answers Clients have issues with talking about their 
money - answering "we cannot tell because we can't" 
20 client was not sure what kind of information we are requesting or did not want to 
provide 
21 Front office staff may be client centric and may not wish to offend the client by 
asking personal question. 
22 Unwillingness of relationship managers to pursue unsatisfactory explanations 
23 Insuficient data may sometimes be provided. The real problem is the fact thag 
the AML analyst has a tendency to accept it without actually understanding what 
the client is doing and what the purpose of the transaction is. Therefore coverage 
against potential risks is not at the standards that it should be. You might have 
situations in the the relationship managers might push back and refuse to give 
you the necessary info, however that does not mean that a client should be 
onboarded, signed off, etc. 
24 Customer usually not willing to provide his all sources of funds. Many 
customers provide only evidence of job or business. However with the time 
being we find that customers having investments in different saving schemes, 
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properties, stocks, bonds etc. 
25 Internally - Relationship manager's fear of loosing the deal Externally - 
Customers deliberately not providing detailed answers and using intermediaries 
26 none 
27 UBO is marked but no information regarding source of wealth 
28 Often we are asked to question transactions when details are already held on the 
bank's systems. 
29 RM resistance 
30 Proof of source of funds 
31 Questioning skills to avoid tipping off 
32 Possibly getting the relationship manager to ask such questions because they are 
reluctant to do so for fear that they will lose the client.  Some clients do not 
understand the regulatory requirements within our jurisdiction and the pressure 
put on banks to adhere to them because they might live in a jurisdiction that is 
more lax about regulation.  They sometimes think that we are being difficult and 
do not care about our business relationship with them. 
33 The party required to ask the questions feel uncomfortable doing so as feels they 
are being intrusive . Or the party take  the customers details without thinking 
'does this make sense' and not further questioning or corroborating the 
information provided. 
34 Difficult to obtain for well known and public individuals 
35 Poor and insufficient answers received back via the RM 
36 resistance of Relationship Managers/Salespersons, who treated those questions 
as unnecessary and waste of time 
37 It happens that customers do not know what source of funds is, and what exactly 
contributes to it. 
38 The most common question is "Why do you need this?". More significant 
barriers can relate to wealth structuring i.e. complex/off-shore arrangements and 
complicated financial instruments. Often, how a client/prospect has established 
their wealth is as hard to determine as it is to evidence their net worth. 
39 no law/ Policy on it. difficult to justify 
40 total denial to answer, rudeness after quesioning their SOW/SOF, 
41 none 
42 Direct response from client. 
43 Customers will sometimes not reply with sufficient information 
44 None, always have sufficient SOW and no barriers 
45 Sometimes customers are reluctant in replying to queries. 
46 Unwillingness to provide full breakdown and lack of understanding 
47 In many instances you have to rely on the customer telling the truth, which is not 
always reliable. 
48 Client not willing to respond 
49 Lack of public domain information; client brevity / sparse with details 
50 Prefer to not say 
51 - 
52 General reluctance 
53 Reluctance of clients to disclose information or third parties to ask clients certain 
questions which they may deem intrusive 
54 Customers often don't want to provide these details in which waivers are used 
55 None 
56 Lack of responses Responses that did not address the questions 
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57 None 
58 For client types  like PIC, SPV's & for trust always pain to identify their SOW, 
when we were asking documents for evidence we use to get different 
information which is not present in Factiva, Bloomberg etc., so we have always 
push back for these clients. However for client like Asset / Fund / Investment 
mangers SOW / SOI will be available easily in  databases like D&B, ASIC & 
MAS etc.., 
59 none 
60 Not indepth enough - vague statements 
61 Only bond customers have privacy issues in disclosing info 
62 unwillingness of RMs to provide  missing information 
63 Privacy issues 
64 Deny answering 
65 Customers commenting that this type of information is none of the banks 
business and is certainly not required. 
66 Some clients seem not to understand what SOW means, despite definition 
provided. Additionally, some of them claim the question is not relevant or they 
are simply unwilling to provide such details 
67 language barriers, RM dont know how to use a system to provide answers, RM 
didin't know how to ask a customer, RM didnt provide an answer and didnt reply 
why, RM answred but it looked like a typical answer/taken from a list 
68 local culture 
69 The business not completely understanding why certain questions are being 
asked and wanting to hurry the application/transaction. 
70 1. Making contact with clients can sometimes be difficult.  2. Clients sometimes 
feel this is not any of our business and refuse to co-operate 3. Some of the line of 
questioning can be deemed quite invasive and the way in which we approach the 
client must considered very carefully - often with on-the-spot decisions on how 
best to obtain the information 
71 Not applicable to my role 
72 blocked by bank manager and soe employee 
73 Clients relationship with Relationship Manager. Cultural backgrounds 
74 lack of cooperation from CMs' side, CMs' covering for clients, clients using their 
VIP position within the bank (or close association with MB) to evade questions, 
75 Lack of publicly available information and reluctance to reach out to the client 
for more information 
76 "none of my other banks ask for that" 
77 Branches are sometimes reluctant to close a large relationship, but they 
eventually do. 
78 Front line staff who contact the customer may be reluctant to "annoy" their client 
as it may lead to complaints or to them deciding to leave the business or not 
make further investments with the business. 
79 Lack of a response, lack of evidence. "Why do i need to provide this, you know 
how much I have?" 
80 lack of response from customer 
81 Often false information,low income reported by customer,customer do not 
discuss other bussines they have. 
82 None 
83 no barriers i have come across as of now. 
84 why are you asking for this information? 
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85 Clients often question why you ask, but when explained they are usually 
accommodating. 
86 Unwillingness to present detailed info; general responses 
87 Clients have raised complaints for us asking too much information and delaying 
account openings, relationship managers have been less than forthcoming with 
information because they don't know the customer very well and dont want to 
ask the client 
88 RM's having a very different mindset to Compliance personnel. 
89 n/a 
90 Answers such as 'yet to be established' proves difficult when working a case 
91 rude responses from either RM or the clients; client's position that made the 
banker state they will not ask the questions; insignificant amounts in comparison 
to TNW in order to ask about transactions; correspondent banking relationship - 
not always the same AML approach and thus the responses frequently 
inadequate 
92 none 
93 Source of funds relates to transactions. Source of wealth is not about 
transactions. It is how the individual obtained their wealth. Eg: inheritance. 
SOW should be provided every time. We need to verify it. We just push back 
and insist on it. 
94 Technical issue. Client and business are unresponsive 
95 no idea 
96 some time customer reluctant 
97 N/a 
98 a failure to understand correctly what source of wealth/funds is 
99 Most of the time customer is not willing to cooperate 
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Thematic analysis of the above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded from analysis due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question 
posed). 
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none of my other banks 
ask for that 
 
           x  
1. Making contact with 
clients can sometimes be 
difficult.  2. Clients 
sometimes feel this is not 
any of our business and 
refuse to co-operate 3. 
Some of the line of 
questioning can be 
deemed quite invasive and 
the way in which we 
approach the client 
mustconsidered very 
carefully - often with on-
the-spot decisions on how 
best to obtain the 
information 
 
 x x      x     
a barrier where the person 
asked do not understand 
the definition of source of 
wealth/funds. Inacurate 
answers Clients have 
issues with talking about 
their money - answering 
"we cannot tell because 
we can't" 
 
      x     x  
a failure to understand            x  
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correctly what source of 
wealth/funds is 
 
Account balance 
 
             
Answers such as 'yet to be 
established' proves 
difficult when working a 
case 
 
     x        
Barriers only come into 
play normally (on the 
rare occasion) when 
trying to seek out the true 
UBO when all evidence 
suggests that the public 
face of ownership is a 
nominee or defacto 
representative 
 
             
blocked by bank manager 
and soe employee 
 
             
Branches are sometimes 
reluctant to close a large 
relationship, but they 
eventually do. 
 
         x    
Client not willing to 
respond 
 
  x           
client was not sure what 
kind of information we are 
requesting or did not want 
to provide 
 
  x         x  
Clients do not want to tell 
you this information a lof 
of the time and do not feel 
they should have to. Some 
clients have point blank 
refused 
 
  x x          
Clients have raised 
complaints for us asking 
too much information and 
delaying account 
openings, relationship 
managers have been less 
than forthcoming with 
    x   x      
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information because they 
don't know the customer 
very well and dont want to 
ask the client 
 
Clients have the belief that 
we know their business, or 
family connections/history 
and sometimes do feel the 
questions we ask are too 
intrusive. 
 
   x          
Clients often question why 
you ask, but when 
explained they are usually 
accommodating. 
 
           x  
Clients relationship with 
Relationship Manager. 
Cultural backgrounds 
 
          x   
Confusion over what the 
requirement is because it 
isn't well known. 
 
           x  
Customer usually not 
willing to provide his all 
sources of funds. Many 
customers provide only 
evidence of job or 
business. However with 
the time being we find that 
customers having 
investments in different 
saving schemes, 
properties, stocks, bonds 
etc. 
 
     x        
Customers commenting 
that this type of 
information is none of the 
banks business and is 
certainly not required. 
 
   x          
Customers often don't 
want to provide these 
details in which waivers 
are used 
 
   x          
Customers will sometimes      x        
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not reply with sufficient 
information 
 
Delays in the provision of 
the information requested 
or documentary evidence 
 
 x            
Deny answering 
 
  x           
Difficult to obtain for 
well known and public 
individuals 
 
             
Direct response from 
client. 
 
             
For client types  like PIC, 
SPV's & for trust always 
pain to identify their 
SOW, when we were 
asking documents for 
evidence we use to get 
different information 
which is not present in 
Factiva, Bloomberg etc., 
so we have always push 
back for these 
clients.However for client 
like Asset / Fund / 
Investment mangers SOW 
/ SOI will be available 
easily in  databases like 
D&B, ASIC & MAS etc.., 
 
     x        
Front line staff who 
contact the customer may 
be reluctant to "annoy" 
their client as it may lead 
to complaints or to them 
deciding to leave the 
business or not make 
further investments with 
the business. 
         x    
 
Front office staff may be 
client centric and may not 
wish to offend the client 
by asking personal 
question. 
         x    
Front office u willing to        x      
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go the client for such 
Information 
 
General reluctance 
 
             
I havnt encountered any 
Barriers. The relationship 
mangers are happy to ask 
the question to the client, 
and there are no 
complaints from the 
client. 
 
            x 
In many instances you 
have to rely on the 
customer telling the truth, 
which is not always 
reliable. 
 
      x       
Incorrect/incomplete/unce
rtified information 
 
     x x       
Information are usually 
retrieved from public 
resources, and most of the 
PEP customers are not 
willing to provide such 
information 
 
   x          
Insuficient data may 
sometimes be provided. 
The real problem is the 
fact thag the AML analyst 
has a tendency to accept it 
without actually 
understanding what the 
client is doing and what 
the purpose of the 
transaction is. Therefore 
coverage against potental 
risks is not at the 
standards that it should be. 
You might have situations 
in the the relationship 
managers might push back 
and refuse to give you the 
necessary info, however 
that does not mean that a 
client should be 
onboarded, signed off, etc. 
     x  x      
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Internally - Relationship 
manager's fear of loosing 
the deal Externally - 
Customers deliberately 
not providing detailed 
answers and using 
intermediaries 
 
     x    x    
It happens that customers 
do not know what source 
of funds is, and what 
exactly contributes to it. 
 
           x  
it is a part of KYC to 
disclose the source of 
fund/proof of Income. 
 
             
Lack of a response, lack of 
evidence. "Why do i need 
to provide this, you know 
how much I have?" 
 
x     x      x  
lack of cooperation from 
CMs' side, CMs' covering 
for clients, clients using 
their VIP position within 
the bank (or close 
association with MB) to 
evade questions, 
 
       x      
Lack of evidence 
supporting claims. RMs 
reluctant to reach out to 
clients so as not to disrupt 
relationships. Respondent 
and correspondent banks 
withholding information. 
Poor quality of 
information. 
 
     x    x    
Lack of public domain 
information; client brevity 
/ sparse with details 
 
     x        
Lack of publicly available 
information and reluctance 
to reach out to the client 
for more information 
       x      
 
lack of response from 
x             
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customer 
Lack of responses 
Responses that did not 
address the questions 
 
x     x        
language barriers, RM 
dont know how to use a 
system to provide 
answers, RM didin't know 
how to ask a customer, 
RM didnt provide an 
answer and didnt reply 
why, RM answred but it 
looked like a typical 
answer/taken from a list 
 
       x    x  
local culture 
 
          x   
Most of the time customer 
is not willing to cooperate 
 
  x           
n/a 
 
             
N/a 
 
             
no barriers i have come 
across as of now. 
 
            x 
no idea 
 
             
no law/ Policy on it. 
difficult to justify 
 
        x     
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None 
 
            x 
None, always have 
sufficient SOW and no 
barriers 
            x 
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Not applicable to my role 
 
             
Not indepth enough - 
vague statements 
 
     x        
Often false 
information,low income 
reported by 
customer,customer do not 
discuss other bussines 
they have. 
 
     x x       
Often we are asked to 
question transactions 
when details are already 
held on the bank's 
systems. 
 
             
Only bond customers 
have privacy issues in 
disclosing info 
 
             
Our customers know they 
won't be able to maintain 
a relationship with the 
Bank if they are 
unwilling to answer the 
above questions. 
 
             
Poor and insufficient 
answers received back via 
the RM 
 
     x        
Possibly getting the 
relationship manager to 
ask such questions 
because they are reluctant 
to do so for fear that they 
will lose the client.  Some 
clients do not understand 
the regulatory 
requirements within our 
jurisdiction and the 
pressure put on banks o 
adhere to them because 
they might live in a 
jurisdiction that is more 
lax about regulation.  
They sometimes think that 
         x  x  
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we are being difficult and 
do not care about our 
business relationship with 
them. 
Prefer to not say 
 
             
Privacy issues 
 
             
Proof of source of funds 
 
             
Questioning skills to avoid 
tipping off 
 
        x     
Reluctance of clients to 
disclose information or 
third parties to ask clients 
certain questions which 
they may deem intrusive 
 
   x     x     
Reluctance of clients to 
provide 
information/possibility of 
tipping off. 
 
   x          
resistance of Relationship 
Managers/Salespersons, 
who treated those 
questions as unnecessary 
and waste of time 
 
       x      
RM resistance 
 
       x      
RM's having a very 
different mindset to 
Compliance personnel. 
 
             
rude responses from either 
RM or the clients; client's 
position that made the 
banker state they will not 
ask the questions; 
insignificant amounts in 
comparison to TNW in 
order to ask about 
transactions; 
correspondent banking 
relationship - not always 
the ame AML approach 
and thus the responses 
frequently inadequate 
     x  x      
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Some clients seem not to 
understand what SOW 
means, despite definition 
provided. Additionally, 
some of them claim the 
question is not relevant or 
they are simply unwilling 
to provide such details 
 
  x x        x  
some time customer 
reluctant 
 
   x          
Sometimes customers are 
reluctant in replying to 
queries. 
 
   x          
Source of funds relates to 
transactions. Source of 
wealth is not about 
transactions. It is how the 
individual obtained their 
wealth. Eg: inheritance. 
SOW should be provided 
every time. We need to 
verify it. We just push 
back and insist on it. 
 
             
Technical issue. Client 
and business are 
unresponsive 
 
x             
That customer has been 
with the bank a long time 
 
           x  
The business not 
completely understanding 
why certain questions are 
being asked and wanting 
to hurry the 
application/transaction. 
 
           x  
The most common 
question is "Why do you 
need this?". More 
significant barriers can 
relate to wealth structuring 
i.e. complex/off-shore 
arrangements and 
complicated financial 
           x  
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instruments. Often, how a 
client/prospect has 
established their wealth is 
as hardto determine as it is 
to evidence their net 
worth. 
The party required to ask 
the questions feel 
uncomfortable doing so as 
feels they are being 
intrusive . Or the party 
take  the customers details 
without thinking 'does this 
make sense' and not 
further questioning or 
corroborating the 
information provided. 
 
       x x     
Time pressures from 
internal stakeholders 
 
             
total denial to answer, 
rudeness after quesioning 
their SOW/SOF, 
 
  x x          
UBO is marked but no 
information regarding 
source of wealth 
 
     x        
Unwillingess the customer 
to give out information re 
source of funds due to 
legal barriers. 
 
  x x          
Unwillingness of 
relationship managers to 
pursue unsatisfactory 
explanations 
 
       x      
unwillingness of RMs to 
provide  missing 
information 
 
       x      
Unwillingness to present 
detailed info; general 
responses 
 
     x        
Unwillingness to provide 
full breakdown and lack of 
understanding 
     x      x  
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why are you asking for 
this information? 
 
           x  
Work in commercial 
banking no individuals 
 
             
Totals 4 2 9 12 1 18 4 12 5 6 2 16 10 
 
 
 
 
Survey Theme Frequency (n=x) 
  
Incomplete details 18 
Lack of understanding 16 
Customer unhappy to supply information 12 
RM not happy to ask 12 
No issue 10 
Client refusal 9 
Fear of losing/annoying client 6 
Discomfort posing questions 5 
No response 4 
Incorrect information 4 
Contact difficulty 2 
Cultural issues 2 
Complaints 1 
 
Responses excluded from analysis 20 
 
 
 
 
Q18 - Have you ever experienced a situation where the questions you've asked have 
not been properly addressed? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 80 61.1 71.4 71.4 
No 22 16.8 19.6 91.1 
Don't know 9 6.9 8.0 99.1 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 112 85.5 100.0  
Missing Blank 19 14.5   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q18a - Where your questions were not properly addressed, please describe what 
happened: 
 Text Response 
1 I have had to push back to front office for more information 
2 NA 
3 Case was escalated to Advisory and disclosed to the authorities. 
4 We conduct open-source search to retrieve the missing details. 
5 Confidencial to Disclose 
6 I had to go back with more questions. 
7 Sometimes our clients do not want to answer the question directly or do not want 
to provide full information. We approch them as many time as needed to have all 
the information and documents needed. They know they will have to provide all 
the information if the relationship is to be left open. 
8 Explain problems to client until corrected. If problems persistent they client will 
not get our business 
9 Escalate to senior management 
10 Clients were warned that their business relationships could be terminated should 
they not provide adequate or required information. 
11 I flagged up that a Special Category Client wasn't adhering to our policies at 
HSBC and was told as he used to be in an influential job with the company, they 
were allowing him to use us. I refused to sign off the case 
12 I would ask the client to clarify or request evidence of a transaction if that would 
satisfy my questions. I would under no circumstances accept an improperly 
addressed question/s. 
13 Insufficient information provided re eg on-goin litigation cases. 
14 Escalation under company's AML Policy and the commissioning of EDD with 
an external firm 
15 Re-asked the questions 
16 mostly in such situations they are redirected to proper persons. Never had a 
situation where such situation would be a breach of compliance. 
17 improper information provided by the client were not sufficient for the internal 
compliance team 
18 Following a standard set of guideline, we may proceed based on that even 
though personally, some cases may need to be looked at differently 
19 I pressed further 
20 Follow up email explaining the purpose of the question as well as the regulation 
that obliges the business to answer it. If that did not work, escalation to 
management 
21 A customer deposited millions of cash same day with a pattern that no currency 
transaction was reported. After few days he closed that captured account and 
transferred all the many in the new with same branch. When he was asked to 
provide evidence against the transactions, he provided reason that it was 
proceeds of sales of prize bonds. When he asked to submit valid evidence he 
failed to provide the same. 
22 refusal to disclose Ultimate beneficial owners of of offshore trusts refusal to give 
detailed explanation to justify the source of wealth 
23 I revert to the client/business for further clarification. 
24 Clients often give as little information as they think is required in order to keep 
matters private. We then often have to go back to them with more detailed 
questions. 
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25 Re-raised them 
26 I rephrased the questions 
27 Prefer not to say 
28 People assuming what the client meant, not clarifying what the person actually 
meant, or simply not understanding the question or the response 
29 Closure of account/Exit/Escalation 
30 I would need to push back & escalate if need be until they are properly 
addressed 
31 coming back to Relationship Manager as much to obtain the required details - 
explaining point by point what information is needed and why to finally have the 
proper information to process the transaction 
32 Client requested additional information in order to understand requirements. 
33 We chose to exit the relationship 
34 information we get may not be directly relevant 
35 usual answer is/was - the ABC entity is a reputable institution, regulated by 
XYZ regualtor, having a global exposure to martkets,   also what happens often 
is a answer that seems to be an answer but directs you into the same docs you 
already saw and gives no new info 
36 Pushed back to the business until they were prepared to reach out to the client 
for more info. 
37 I cant 
38 Time scales were given and based on the hit funds were returned or frozen or 
discounted 
39 Most of the time, customer is not willing to disclose the true origion or purpose 
of the remittance. 
40 Discussions with client on requirements 
41 Ask further 
42 I persisted - ultimately clients' accounts aren't going to get opened if I don't get 
the information I require 
43 - 
44 We were asked to go back to the customer and ask them to provide further 
details 
45 Questions have been misinterpreted, or the full story has not been given 
46 Escalate to senior business management with concerns identified with potential 
exiting of relationship 
47 Lack of communication from customer/agent 
48 I will defiantly push back to client's information which is required & explains 
the importance of that information. Post which client will agree to provided 
later. Like MAR (Financials) & MIFID consent (limit / Execution) etc.., 
49 n/a 
50 Clients often do not understand what we are asking for, RMs do not know the 
process. 
51 Questions around beneficial ownership structure are rarely answered in a way 
which are easily understandable, due to customers not understanding why a 
break down of shareholding (including all types of shares, including bearer 
shares etc.) is of importance to the bank. 
52 person who received my questions redirected them to proper person; nothing 
happend, no response; 
53 Some times there is a communication gap, I try to fill that gap and increase the 
pressure. At times however the non availability of the desired information 
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constitutes a suspicious activity 
54 The third party asked questions raised by myself, but the answers given posed 
further questions, which were not asked (a lack of common sense). 
55 1. Source of wealth - if this has been requested from another colleague (e.g. 
Relationship Manager), the true source of wealth is not always captured. For 
example, "the client transferred the funds from his HSBC account"). 2. Building 
the client's wealth profile. If a client earns X amount, we may expect to see X 
wealth. Lack of explanation as to why the client has so much wealth on such a 
wage.  A general lack of detail around a client's wealth is often the main 
problem, including a lack of information around the client's employment history 
as this will assist in building a picture of our client. 
56 Not applicable 
57 Question was asked again, issue escalated to Head of Compliance or MB 
58 it either has to be addressed in some other way or the relationship is closed 
59 I escalated the question to the person's manager and got them to respond. 
60 The case would be escalated to the nominated officer and/or the manager of the 
staff member making contact with the customer to address the issues with the 
member of staff and provide feedback. 
61 I re asked until i got a suitable answer. 
62 lack of experince of relationship manager 
63 As part of CDD/KYC ownership was provided but without evidence to validate 
it, the client has pushed back and a call was placed to the client to explain why 
this information is required in a particular way, after some discussion the client 
provided the correct documentation. 
64 Had to follow up until the point all of the responses were received 
65 When I have questioned nominee structures relating to an already established 
account. Our Second Line of Defence tended to wipe their hands on the situation 
when asked for guidance and therefore had to alter group policies ourselves 
66 RM's rephrased questions to suit themselves when asking the client, in turn 
providing a set of responses that fell outside of the parameters of the 
investigation, and did not resolve the AML concerns at hand 
67 either you ask for explanation/ clarification/more information on the response or 
it happens the first response is the ultimate response. Then the decision needs to 
be made whether the response is sufficient to close the review. 
68 We pushed back again several times. We received a document, but it was not 
sufficient, so we raised a SAR. 
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Q19 - Speaking generally, do you have enough time to complete enquiries 
thoroughly and to the best of your ability? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Always 20 15.3 18.3 18.3 
Most of the 
time 
61 46.6 56.0 74.3 
Sometimes 20 15.3 18.3 92.7 
Rarely 7 5.3 6.4 99.1 
Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 109 83.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 22 16.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Q20 - What is your PRIMARY method of communications when raising AML / 
KYC queries with customers or third parties? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Telephone 8 6.1 7.3 7.3 
Email 86 65.6 78.9 86.2 
Face-to-face 1 .8 .9 87.2 
Other (please 
specify) 
6 4.6 5.5 92.7 
Not applicable 7 5.3 6.4 99.1 
Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8 .9 100.0 
Total 109 83.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 22 16.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Other (please specify) 
1 Telephone if the query is urgent.  Email and letter if the query is not so urgent 
and the client is out of the country.  Face to face if the relationship manager 
already has a meeting scheduled with them 
2 Telephone is the method my team use, the Relationship Managers use telephone 
and face-to-face. Email is then a very convenient and much-used communication 
channel also. Letter is used more as a last resort - fax is never used. 
3 dedicated software 
4 not to specify 
5 Work requests through Avalon system 
6 Via Relationship Managers 
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Q21 - When raising AML / KYC queries with customers, how important is it for 
you to build rapport with the person you are dealing with? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Extremely 
important 
20 15.3 52.6 52.6 
Important 15 11.5 39.5 92.1 
Neither 
important nor 
unimportant 
3 2.3 7.9 100.0 
Total 38 29.0 100.0  
Missing Blank 93 71.0   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q22 - When raising AML / KYC queries with third parties (such as Relationship 
Managers), how important is it for you to build rapport with the person you are 
dealing with? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Extremely 
important 
42 32.1 48.8 48.8 
Important 33 25.2 38.4 87.2 
Neither 
important nor 
unimportant 
10 7.6 11.6 98.8 
Not at all 
important 
1 .8 1.2 100.0 
Total 86 65.6 100.0  
Missing Not applicable 3 2.3   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 45 34.4   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q23 - When asking customers awkward or difficult questions, how comfortable do 
you feel?  
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very 
comfortable 
7 5.3 18.9 18.9 
Reasonably 
comfortable 
17 13.0 45.9 64.9 
Neither 
comfortable 
nor 
uncomfortable 
4 3.1 10.8 75.7 
Somewhat 
uncomfortable 
9 6.9 24.3 100.0 
Total 37 28.2 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8   
Blank 93 71.0   
Total 94 71.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
Q24 - When asking third parties (such as Relationship Managers) awkward or 
difficult questions, how comfortable do you feel? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very comfortable 26 19.8 29.9 29.9 
Reasonably 
comfortable 
44 33.6 50.6 80.5 
Neither 
comfortable nor 
uncomfortable 
13 9.9 14.9 95.4 
Somewhat 
uncomfortable 
4 3.1 4.6 100.0 
Total 87 66.4 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to say 2 1.5   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 44 33.6   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q25 - Have you ever received specific training to help you when drafting questions 
which third parties (such as Relationship Managers) have to relay to customers? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 33 25.2 37.5 37.5 
No 53 40.5 60.2 97.7 
Don't know 2 1.5 2.3 100.0 
Total 88 67.2 100.0  
Missing Prefer not to 
say 
1 .8   
Blank 42 32.1   
Total 43 32.8   
Total 131 100.0   
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Text Response 
1 Interviewing  acams 
2 AML/CFT 
3 On the job 
4 internal training provided 
5 AML workshops involving real life examples. 
6 DPA, CTF, detailing request 
7 client focus, customer relatioship 
8 Framing issues regarding questions to be asked, mail writings , etc 
9 Investigation skills 
10 Communication skills, difficult interactions 
11 Communication training - 2 day interactive training on communication with 
business partners, ending with final conversation being recorded 
12 It was on a 'Managing Relationships at Work' course with a previous employer 
and also on my 'Induction Training' with my current employer 
13 external vendor trainings to help with cultural differences 
14 CAMS 
15 Quarterly reading and tests 
16 AML instructor led training by ICA 
17 Prefer to not say 
18 Classroom based training and colleague one on one training regarding 
conversations with third parties, and listening in on calls. 
19 Courses were organized with case studies and role play training. 
20 had a training organised for the team to attend to. Some wording slides were 
provided to use as templates 
21 On the job training via line management as well course training including 
modules on customer service and 'tipping off' - which ensures my 
correspondence are presented in a suitable format without raising any 
unnecessary questions with the receiver. 
22 The gaining was called "Dealing with challenging situations with clients". 
Additionally, I attended "Building relationships over the phone" training. Both 
were extremely helpful in the matter of assertiveness and ability to explain 
business needs. 
23 training provided by Compliance about how to address questions to RMs 
24 AML/CFT 
25 Bond Solon 
26 money laundering cases 
27 Role play of commonly asked questions 
28 Classroom session and reviewing of questions to develop better questioning 
techniques. 
29 Internal training on confronting RM's with details required,and ways to speak, 
write and follow up without escalating any issue among us 
30 Buddy training and shadowing analyst to see how the CDD policies are used to 
draft questions efficiently and appropriately 
31 Advice re: tipping off. 
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Thematic analysis of the above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded from analysis due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question 
posed). 
 Internal 
training 
External 
training 
ACAMS 
/ ICA 
Informal / 
on the job 
Interviewing  acams 
 
  x  
AML/CFT 
 
    
On the job 
 
   x 
internal training provided 
 
x    
AML workshops involving real life 
examples. 
 
x    
DPA, CTF, detailing request 
 
   x 
client focus, customer relationship 
 
   x 
Framing issues regarding questions 
to be asked, mail writings , etc 
 
   x 
Investigation skills 
 
x    
Communication skills, difficult 
interactions 
 
x    
Communication training - 2 day 
interactive training on 
communication with business 
partners, ending with final 
conversation being recorded 
 
 x   
It was on a 'Managing Relationships 
at Work' course with a previous 
employer and also on my 'Induction 
Training' with my current employer 
 
x    
external vendor trainings to help with 
cultural differences 
 
 x   
CAMS 
 
  x  
Quarterly reading and tests 
 
   x 
AML instructor led training by ICA 
 
  x  
Prefer to not say     
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Classroom based training and 
colleague one on one training 
regarding conversations with third 
parties, and listening in on calls. 
 
x    
Courses were organized with case 
studies and role play training. 
 
x    
had a training organised for the team 
to attend to. Some wording slides 
were provided to use as templates 
 
x    
On the job training via line 
management as well course training 
including modules on customer 
service and 'tipping off' - which 
ensures my correspondence are 
presented in a suitable format 
without raising any unnecessary 
questions with the receiver. 
 
x   x 
The gaining was called "Dealing with 
challenging situations with clients". 
Additionally, I attended "Building 
relationships over the phone" 
training. Both were extremely helpful 
in the matter of assertiveness and 
ability to explain business needs. 
 
x    
training provided by Compliance 
about how to address questions to 
RMs 
 
x    
AML/CFT 
 
   x 
Bond Solon 
 
    
money laundering cases 
 
   x 
Role play of commonly asked 
questions 
 
x    
Classroom session and reviewing of 
questions to develop better 
questioning techniques. 
 
x    
Internal training on confronting RM's 
with details required,and ways to 
speak,write and follow up without 
x    
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escalating any issue among us 
 
Buddy training and shadowing 
analyst to see how the CDD policies 
are used to draft questions efficiently 
and appropriately 
 
   x 
Advice re: tipping off. 
 
 
   x 
Total 14 2 3 10 
 
 
Q26 - Have you ever received specific training to help you when asking customers 
awkward or difficult questions? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 13 9.9 34.2 34.2 
No 25 19.1 65.8 100.0 
Total 38 29.0 100.0  
Missing Blank 93 71.0   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Text Response 
1 On the job 
2 Attended a company sponsored course focussing on managing difficult 
conversations/meetings 
3 Investigation skills 
4 As previous 
5 Online training on how to present questions and explain background on request 
6 Nothing Specific Training has been provided. But case by case if we get any 
exceptions then our AML team set-up training to everyone with that scenario 
7 Same as above 
8 scripts and one on one sessions. 
9 Compliance training. 
10 Soft skills tranings such as Client Focus and Building Relationship over the 
phone 
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Thematic analysis of the above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded from analysis due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question 
posed). 
 Internal 
training 
External 
training 
ACAMS 
/ ICA 
Informal 
/ on the 
job 
On the job 
 
   x 
Attended a company sponsored course 
focussing on managing difficult 
conversations/meetings 
 
 x   
Investigation skills 
 
x    
As previous 
 
    
Online training on how to present 
questions and explain background on 
request 
 
x    
Nothing Specific Training has been 
provided. But case by case if we get any 
exceptions then our AML team set-up 
training to everyone with that scenario 
 
   x 
Same as above 
 
    
scripts and one on one sessions. 
 
x    
Compliance training. 
 
x    
Soft skills tranings such as Client Focus 
and Building Relationship over the 
phone 
 
x    
Total 5 1 0 2 
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Q27 - Do you feel appropriately equipped, experienced and trained to raise awkward 
or difficult questions with customers? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 27 20.6 73.0 73.0 
No 8 6.1 21.6 94.6 
Not applicable 1 .8 2.7 97.3 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 2.7 100.0 
Total 37 28.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 94 71.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
Q28 - Do you feel appropriately equipped, experienced and trained to raise awkward 
or difficult questions with third parties (such as Relationship Managers)? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 71 54.2 80.7 80.7 
No 11 8.4 12.5 93.2 
Not applicable 5 3.8 5.7 98.9 
Prefer not to say 1 .8 1.1 100.0 
Total 88 67.2 100.0  
Missing Blank 43 32.8   
Total 131 100.0   
 
 
 
Q29 - Have your interviewing / questioning skills ever been analysed, measured or 
quantified in any way? 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 31 23.7 28.7 28.7 
No 52 39.7 48.1 76.9 
Don't know 12 9.2 11.1 88.0 
Not applicable 10 7.6 9.3 97.2 
Prefer not to say 3 2.3 2.8 100.0 
Total 108 82.4 100.0  
Missing Blank 23 17.6   
Total 131 100.0   
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Q30 – Please describe how the analysis of your interviewing / questioning skills was 
conducted. 
Text Response 
1 Observation and feedback 
2 Phone 
3 With Case study 
4 all our correspondence with front office has been checked by our management 
5 Interim assessments 
6 Routine quality assurance sampling by the Unit head. 
7 Previously agreed within the team and management - template in place 
8 Through my work, knowledge about the product, productivity, etc. 
9 I have attending courses to assist but skills have never been appraised. 
10 Observation & coaching sessions 
11 Class room training 
12 Through 3rd party training company via phone. Prior to the call team has 
received a scenario. 
13 I was formerly a regulated seller of mortgages and investments (CF21) hence it 
was a requirement of the FSA (now FCA) that I was regularly reviewed and 
assessed to ensure compliance. This was partially a good sales practice as well 
hence my Manager was keen to coach me around my questioning technique. 
14 prefer not to say 
15 In a previous role I was a Personal Banker which involved selling financial 
products to clients for a bank via face to face communication. My interviewing 
and questioning skills were regularly analysed and tested via role plays and live 
observations. 
16 verbal 
17 Sit in on calls with client 
18 When asking questions via email, these emails have been seen by the quality 
assurance team 
19 Every month we have accreditation with all recent updates & new procedures or 
updates with in KYC view. It's compulsory to clear that accreditation 
20 I am a Tier two Police trained interviewer, from my previous career as a 
Detective. 
21 Shadowed by colleague/line manager. Completed investigative interviewing 
skills course. 
22 Monitoring by my manager 
23 Questions are often analysed as part of business as usual processes by the 
Nomitated officer, particularly in high profile/sensitive cases. 
24 regular quarterly assesments, also during role plays. 
25 not to specify 
26 QA review 
27 na 
28 Soft skills training, internal courses 
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Thematic analysis of the above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question posed).	
 Informal / 
Internal 
Structured 
/ External 
Police Sales 
Related 
Observation and feedback 
 
x    
Phone 
 
x    
With Case study 
 
x    
all our correspondence with front 
office has been checked by our 
management 
 
x    
Interim assessments 
 
x    
Routine quality assurance sampling 
by the Unit head. 
 
x    
Previously agreed within the team 
and management - template in place 
 
x    
Through my work, knowledge about 
the product, productivity, etc. 
 
x    
I have attending courses to assist but 
skills have never been appraised. 
 
x    
Observation & coaching sessions 
 
x    
Class room training 
 
 x   
Through 3rd party training company 
via phone. Prior to the call team has 
received a scenario. 
 
 x   
I was formerly a regulated seller of 
mortgages and investments (CF21) 
hence it was a requirement of the 
FSA (now FCA) that I was regularly 
reviewed and assessed to ensure 
compliance. This was partially a good 
sales practice as well hence my 
Manager was keen to coach me 
around my questioning technique. 
 
   x 
prefer not to say 
 
    
In a previous role I was a Personal 
Banker which involved selling 
   x 
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financial products to clients for a 
bank via face to face communication. 
My interviewing and questioning 
skills were regularly analysed and 
tested via role plays and live 
observations. 
 
Verbal 
 
x    
Sit in on calls with client 
 
x    
When asking questions via email, 
these emails have been seen by the 
quality assurance team 
 
x    
Every month we have accreditation 
with all recent updates & new 
procedures or updates with in KYC 
view. It's compulsory to clear that 
accreditation 
 
 x   
I am a Tier two Police trained 
interviewer, from my previous career 
as a Detective. 
 
  x  
Shadowed by colleague/line manager. 
Completed investigative interviewing 
skills course. 
 
 x   
Monitoring by my manager 
 
x    
Questions are often analysed as part 
of business as usual processes by the 
Nomitated officer, particularly in 
high profile/sensitive cases. 
 
x    
regular quarterly assesments, also 
during role plays. 
 
 x   
not to specify 
 
    
QA review 
 
x    
Na 
 
    
Soft skills training, internal courses 
 
x    
Total 17 5 1 2 
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Q31 – What structures and strategies are in place to ensure that you are asking 
questions effectively and appropriately (call listening, file reviews, role play etc)? 
Text Response 
1 File review 
2 There are no structures in place 
3 call experience 
4 None 
5 File reviews 
6 Structures defined by my organization 
7 File reviews and spot checks 
8 Quality assurance, internal audit, management oversight 
9 File reviews 
10 Tests 
11 Policies and procedures designed specifically to conduct high risk 
investigations. 
12 Quality assurance sampling of files and correspondences with thrid parties. 
13 Policy and procedures 
14 There was one course put on by HSBC to look at this area of questions, it was a 
two day course 
15 File reviews by the Compliance Manager 
16 N/A 
17 None apart from the "four eye ball" checking that is undertaken on a quality 
assurance basis of completed files 
18 Emails are checked 
19 none 
20 file reviews 
21 File review and mentor guidance 
22 Team inbox cc'ed as well as manager where necessary. Mainly the template 
covers all queries 
23 There is a system which captured unusual transactions, each transacrtion 
reviewed separately. We have template containing relevant questions about the 
odd pattern transactions. We usually load these templates to ask questions 
24 Customer feedback 
25 Monthly catch-up meetings where e-mail correspondence is discussed and 
proper feedbacks provided, following brainstorming. 
26 File reviews. 
27 Some file reviews, but little else as far as I am aware. 
28 None 
29 file reviews 
30 file reviews 
31 Role plays, team exercises 
32 Not applicable.  If I have a query, I will relay it onto the Relationship Manager 
("RM") and he/she will conduct the interview 
33 4-eyes check of each file 
34 None 
35 No official strategies - peer feedback only 
36 None 
37 file reviews 
38 file reviews 
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39 All our calls were recorded and Management would regularly listen to client 
conversations. File reviews were also undertaken as a matter of course. Role 
plays would be most prevalent during training courses and/or coaching 
sessions. 
40 Record of interview available for scrutiny 
41 prefer not to say 
42 call listening 
43 None at the moment. 
44 Case testing 
45 having different escalation routes 
46 Experience 
47 We copy our Line Manager while raising queries with Relationship Managers. 
Line Managers sometimes provide his feedback. 
48 File reviews 
49 I usually write emails and these were would be checked by a manager before 
sending to client in the initial stages of a new job before they felt comfortable I 
can ask the right questions myself. 
50 Na 
51 Not really applicable - I approach my manager when I need to better understand 
what I need to do, but wouldn't want call listening. Secondly, I review high risk 
clients only, so my team don't review files. Finally, I rarely have to ask difficult 
questions 
52 Prefer to not say 
53 - 
54 Template emails 
55 First line of defence (Quality Assurance) to check the review of my file, 
followed by Second Line of Defence review. 
56 Thorough understanding of available background information on the subject's 
activities/background is critical to ask effective questions 
57 Checklist 
58 We have prepared check list based on different client types. So before we send 
any email to client / business. So that analyst will not miss any of the 
information 
59 Not sure 
60 file reviews 
61 Team managers are constantly reviewing files (as a second level of defence) to 
ensure colleagues get it right first time. 1:1 feedback sessions are in place for 
colleagues who need additional help with effective case reviewing and 
questioning techniques. 
62 4eye check of clients' files I prepare 
63 I think that only way to check if I had asked properly is when the senior analyst 
is authorising an inquiry 
64 No structure or strategies are in place. One has to depend on his/her wits and 
experience 
65 Maker / Checker function. 
66 Every call is recorded, though this is not currently monitored to assess how 
effectively or appropriately questions are asked. 
67 In my role, monthly reviews. 
68 all that you mentioned. plus analysis 
69 None 
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70 None 
71 File reviews 
72 file reviews 
73 templates, dual interview, monitoring, etc. 
74 All cases are reviewed and approved by the nominated officer. 
75 file reviews, role play, listening to calls in the last resort. Client feedback. 
76 training 
77 strategies like showing that its a important part of regulatory requirement and 
needs to be completed on time,training is conducted by taking previous 
communication into consideration. 
78 None 
79 not to specify 
80 none 
81 We have a number of testing programs in place, quality assurance and quality 
control. 
82 Email follow up by managers 
83 File reviews but they don't specifically look at our queries. 
84 To my knowledge, there is nothing available at the current time.  My 
experience comes from a former role as a police officer. 
85 file review 
86 na 
87 It comes with experience. 
88 Call listening, file reviews, role play 
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Thematic analysis of above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded from analysis due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question 
posed). 
 None File 
Review 
Role 
Play 
Call 
listening 
Email 
review 
File review 
 
 x    
There are no structures 
in place 
 
x     
call experience 
 
     
None 
 
x     
File reviews 
 
 x    
Structures defined by 
my organization 
 
     
File reviews and spot 
checks 
 
 x    
Quality assurance, 
internal audit, 
management oversight 
 
 x    
File reviews 
 
 x    
Tests 
 
     
Policies and procedures 
designed specifically to 
conduct high risk 
investigations. 
 
     
Quality assurance 
sampling of files and 
correspondences with 
thrid parties. 
 
 x    
Policy and procedures      
There was one course 
put on by HSBC to look 
at this area of questions, 
it was a two day course 
 
     
File reviews by the 
Compliance Manager 
 
 x    
N/A      
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None apart from the 
"four eye ball" checking 
that is undertaken on a 
quality assurance basis 
of completed files 
 
x x    
Emails are checked 
 
    x 
None 
 
x     
file reviews 
 
 x    
File review and mentor 
guidance 
 
 x    
Team inbox cc'ed as 
well as manager where 
necessary. Mainly the 
template covers all 
queries 
 
    x 
There is a system which 
captured unusual 
transactions, each 
transacrtion reviewed 
separately. We have 
template containing 
relevant questions about 
the odd pattern 
transactions. We 
usually load these 
templates              to ask 
questions 
 
     
Customer feedback 
 
     
Monthly catch-up 
meetings where e-mail 
correspondence is 
discussed and proper 
feedbacks provided, 
following brainstorming. 
 
    x 
File reviews. 
 
 x    
Some file reviews, but 
little else as far as I am 
aware. 
 
 x    
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None 
 
x     
file reviews 
 
 x    
file reviews 
 
 x    
Role plays, team 
exercises 
 
  x   
Not applicable.  If I have 
a query, I will relay it 
onto the Relationship 
Manager ("RM") and 
he/she will conduct the 
interview 
 
x     
4-eyes check of each file 
 
 x    
None 
 
x     
No official strategies - 
peer feedback only 
 
x     
None 
 
x     
file reviews 
 
 x    
file reviews 
 
 x    
All our calls were 
recorded and 
Management would 
regularly listen to client 
conversations. File 
reviews were also 
undertaken as a matter 
of course. Role plays 
would be most prevalent 
during training courses 
and/or coaching 
sessions. 
 x  x  
Record of interview 
available for scrutiny 
 
   x  
prefer not to say 
 
     
call listening 
 
   x  
None at the moment. 
 
x     
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Case testing 
 
 x    
having different 
escalation routes 
 
     
Experience 
 
     
We copy our Line 
Manager while raising 
queries with 
Relationship Managers. 
Line Managers 
sometimes provide his 
feedback. 
 
    x 
File reviews 
 
 x    
I usually write emails 
and these were would be 
checked by a manager 
before sending to client 
in the initial stages of a 
new job before they felt 
comfortable I can ask 
the right questions 
myself. 
 
    x 
Na 
 
     
Not really applicable - I 
approach my manager 
when I need to better 
understand what I need 
to do, but wouldn't want 
call listening. Secondly, 
I review high risk clients 
only, so my team don't 
review files. Finally, I 
rarely have to ask 
difficult questions 
 
x     
Prefer to not say 
 
     
- 
 
     
Template emails 
 
     
First line of defence 
(Quality Assurance) to 
check the review of my 
 x    
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file, followed by Second 
Line of Defence review. 
 
Thorough 
understanding of 
available background 
information on the 
subject's 
activities/background is 
critical to ask effective 
questions 
 
     
Checklist 
 
     
We have prepared check 
list based on different 
client types. So before 
we send any email to 
client / business. So that 
analyst will not miss 
any of the information 
 
     
Not sure 
 
     
file reviews 
 
 x    
Team managers are 
constantly reviewing 
files (as a second level 
of defence) to ensure 
colleagues get it right 
first time. 1:1 feedback 
sessions are in place for 
colleagues who need 
additional help with 
effective case reviewing 
and questioning 
techniques. 
 
 x    
4eye check of clients' 
files I prepare 
 
 x    
I think that only way to 
check if I had asked 
properly is when the 
senior analyst is 
authorising an inquiry 
 
 x    
No structure or strategies 
are in place. One has to 
x     
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depend on his/her wits 
and experience 
 
Maker / Checker 
function. 
 
 x    
Every call is recorded, 
though this is not 
currently monitored to 
assess how effectively or 
appropriately questions 
are asked. 
 
x     
In my role, monthly 
reviews. 
 
 x    
all that you mentioned. 
plus analysis 
 
 x x x  
None 
 
x     
None 
 
x     
File reviews 
 
 x    
file reviews 
 
 x    
templates, dual 
interview, monitoring, 
etc. 
 
   x  
All cases are reviewed 
and approved by the 
nominated officer. 
 
 x    
file reviews, role play, 
listening to calls in the 
last resort. Client 
feedback. 
 
 x x x  
training      
strategies like showing 
that its a important part 
of regulatory 
requirement and needs 
to be completed on 
time,training is 
conducted by taking 
previous 
communication into 
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consideration. 
 
None 
 
x     
not to specify 
 
x     
None 
 
x     
We have a number of 
testing programs in 
place, quality assurance 
and quality control. 
 
 x    
Email follow up by 
managers 
 
    x 
File reviews but they 
don't specifically look at 
our queries. 
 
 x    
To my knowledge, there 
is nothing available at 
the current time.  My 
experience comes from a 
former role as a police 
officer. 
 
x     
file review 
 
 x    
na      
It comes with 
experience. 
 
     
Call listening, file 
reviews, role play 
 
 x x x  
Total 19 36 4 7 6 
 
 
327 
 
  
Q32 – Suppose there were some enquiries that you needed to make to establish the 
source of a large sum of money that had been deposited into a personal bank account 
belonging to a government official within your country. What are the top three 
questions you would ask? Please list the questions exactly as you would phrase them, 
whether verbally or in writing. 
Text Response 
1 Occupation of the individual Source of wealth Purpose of the money 
2 Where is the money derived from? What will the funds be used for? Has the 
government official been adequately investigated by compliance? 
3 Supporting documents, source of funds, business mdoels 
4 Can you please provide further clarification regarding the purpose of 
transactions? Is the activity inline with the clients profile? Do you have any 
concerns regarding the alerted transactions? 
5 1- What is the source of the deposited fund? 2- Why is it paid in cash? 3- Do 
you have any supporting documents? 
6 1. Source of large funds credited in customers account? 2. disclose the reason 
of large cash deposited and justification for mismatch of actual turnover with 
KYC? 3. Satisfaction of the Third party (relationship manager) about the 
transaction? 
7 What is the sum for? Is this a one off payment? What the money will be used 
for? 
8 Prefer not to answer 
9 We do not have individual clients. In addition, as part of KYC team, we don't 
monitor transactions. 
10 What is the customer's present occupation/profession or business. What 
countries does customer conduct their business What other relationships does 
customer have with the bank 
11 1. What is the source of the Cash deposit? 2. What is the intended use of the 
funds being deposited? 3. Does the amount of money deposited correspond to 
the account holder's profile and perceived net worth/wealth? 
12 What is the source of this fund For what purpose was the transfer made  Can 
you provide a certified ducumentary evidence to support the answers provided 
above 
13 1) Are you aware of a recent transaction on your account - give date 2) Can 
you confirm what the transaction was 3) Can you tell me the reason for the 
transaction 
14 What is the reason for receiving this payment? Who is the sender of the 
payment? Can we have an invoice confirming the payment? 
15 1. What is the source of the large sum of money? 2. What is the sum payment 
for? 3. Is this a recurring payment? 
16 - From internal electronic resources, what are the full details of the payment 
and the originating Bank? - Are there historical records of such payments 
coming from this source? - If not, then is there any apparent information in the 
public domain which would explain such a payment 
17 not applicable to my role 
18 According to the regulations imposed by law I have to ask the question where 
the funds are coming from? Are you a Politically Exposed Persons? Are the 
money deposited in the account coming from your remuneration? 
19 na 
20 1) request for a description from the official or his assistant on where the 
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origin of the fund comes from. 2) obtain appropriate supporting evidence of  
the answer provided in 1. 3) further conduct internet searches to identify any 
possible negative news allegations against the public official. 
21 When has the transfer been made? Where has the sum come from (country, 
entity, etc) Have there been any similar transactions in the past Any additional 
questions regarding to when the client was onboarded and potentially 
reviewing their pep forms in place 
22 What is the source of these funds generation? Is this a regular practice of 
customer to deposit large sum of money? Why the transaction carried out in 
form of cash? 
23 Origin of funds, purpose of funds, source of depositor's wealth, existing 
banking relations 
24 1. Please provide the proof of money from where it is deposited?  2. Please 
provide ownership proof  3. Please provide client confirmation mail 
25 1) Please could you provide further details or the transaction on XX/XX/XX, 
and the source and purpose of these funds. 2) Who was the remitter and how 
are you related to that person/company. 3) To what do the funds relate and 
what is the intended use for the funds. 
26 What is the source of the funds and who is the remitted?  What is the purpose 
of the transaction? What documentary evidence can you provide to support 
this? 
27 N.A 
28 Is the transaction a normal pattern?  What are the circumstances surrounding 
the money?  What is the status of the PEP 
29 Again, not applicable.  The RM is qualified and experienced enough to query 
the client accordingly.  But I would ask the RM to find out the reason of the 
large deposit, the source of funds (in this case, since a government official is 
involved, documented and certified proof would need to be obtained from e.g. 
an accountant) and if there is a third party involved, to verify the relationship 
with the third party. 
30 Outside of remit of KYC Team 
31 What is the source of the deposit. What is the purpose of the deposit. What 
plans does the customer have for the monies e.g investments, savings, a 
purchase 
32 What is annual income of the client? (including from employment and any 
addtional, if there is income other than from employment, please specify the 
source it is originated from, including the amount and currency per annum)  
Please state how the source of wealth for this deposit has been raised.  Please 
state where the source of wealth for this deposit derived from. 
33 It would depend partly upon to whom the questions would be addressed 
however, on the basis that it is the client, I would ask the following;  That large 
sum deposited is somewhat out of keeping with your normal transactions, what 
can you tell me about it?  If it were directed to the Relationship Manager, I 
would ask the following question;  He/She uses their account with us for their 
Government income and associated expenses, please explain to me everything 
you know about this new payment.  Lastly, I would want details around the 
origination of the payment hence I would be interested in obtaining SWIFT 
data etc thus I would be speaking with our back office in this regard 
34 1. We have information regarding your transaction. it is in your interest to tell 
us everything about it. 2. Can your provide/ detail your sources of income ? 3. 
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Can you produce evidence to justify the source of the money? 3. 
35 prefer not to. 
36 I work with other investigators that would handle the inquiry base on the 
corporate policy. 
37 1. Hi Mr/Mrs xxx. My name is xxx and I am calling from your bank. Do you 
have a minute for a quick chat regarding your account please?  2. Thanks. Just 
for security purposes I have noticed that a large sum of money has been 
deposited into your bank account recently. As the deposit is slightly out of 
character compared to your normal account activity can you please confirm the 
source of these funds?  3. Great thanks for answering that. Finally do you have 
any plans for the money? 
38 What is your source of funds? What is your line of business ? 
39 N/a 
40 Source of fund. Reason of deposit of that huge amount. Is 
Business/Relationship Manager comfortable with this Transaction 
41 Na 
42 Where has the money come from? What is its purpose? Is it proportionate to 
the individual's income and wealth? 
43 Prefer to not say 
44 - 
45 N/A 
46 Please clarify the nature, and provide a rationale for this payment. Does this 
payment represent normal course of business? Please confirm the source of 
this payment. 
47 What is the source and where does the fund come from? What areas of work 
do the government official come from or responsible for? What is the official's 
known/reported remuneration from the government 
48 Rm ask the questions not us 
49 not in scope for us 
50 Na, do not do business with individuals 
51 1. where does this money come from? 2. why this money was deposited into a 
personal account? 3. why this is a plausible explanation? 
52 What is the source of funds? What is the purpose of the account?what is the 
expected activity of the account? 
53 1. Could you kindly explain where the funds were paid from (name of sender 
and country of origin), as the reference on the transaction is not clear and the 
amount is outside of regular trading activity for this account? Please note: All 
anomalies are investigated as standard practice.  2. Please explain the reason 
for the abovementioned transaction in more detail? (I.e. What is the funds 
intended for?) 3. Please provide any additional info you may feel would be 
relevant further to the mentioned questions. 
54 Would you be able to advise what is the source of funds to be used in the 
relationship with us? Additionally, for the purpose of categorisation, would 
you be able to estimate your own funds? Have you made recently any 
transactions exceeding XXX $? If yes, could you please advise what they were 
related to? 
55 I understand that these questions will go to RM who will ask customer directly 
1. What is a source of funds of these deposited money? 2. Could you please 
provide any documenation supporting this activity? 3. Do you (RM) have any 
AML concerns about this activiy and it is expected in the future? 
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56 1) Kindly provide the detailed purpose of the transaction. 2) Does the 
transaction matches with the KYC profile of the customer? 3) Do you have 
any reason to suspect that the transaction may be related to any unlawful 
activity? 
57 1) What is your current role within Government? 2) What are the reasons for 
the deposits into account........ on .......2015 and can you please provide 
documentary evidence to support the provenance of these funds? 3) Do you 
anticipate further large transactional activity through your accounts and if so, 
for what reason? 
58 "I'm calling with regards to some transactional activity on your account. As 
your bank, we're looking to be in a position to understand the money flows 
coming into and out of our business.The more we know about how you like to 
use your account with us, the better placed we are to understand the activity 
we see and keep your account secure".  1. You received X amount into your 
account on X date, are you able to confirm the reason for this transaction and 
where these funds originated from?   *Dependent on answer, this may be 
clarified or queried until I understand the exact source of the funds and 
purpose"  2. Are you able to confirm your relationship with the originator of 
the funds? What is their full name? *If client is uncomfortable at any point, I 
explain that if we understand where our clients send funds to where they 
receive them from, it assists us in keeping the account secure if we see similar 
activity in future*  3. Has your account been used at any point for purposes 
related to your job? *Query this much further if client answers yes* 
59 source of wealth and the real beneficial owner of the funds  the relationship 
with the sender (depends how the money were deposited through cash, 
incoming payment order..) so in that case if it was from his account u can ask 
for a statement of account or if we can inquire to the other bank 
60 1. Could you please deliver the documentation attesting the source of funds for 
the transaction XY performed on XX.XX.2015? 2. What was the reason of 
said transaction and whether this was/is connected to your activities as 
politically exposed person? 3. Could you please state whether the Bank can 
expect similar activity in the foreseeable future and what is the reason for this? 
61 What was the nature of the deposit (e.g. cash, wire, check)? The response 
would dictate my follow on questions. 
62 I can't answer that, it would be a breach of our controls 
63 Please can you confirm your relationship to the remitter of these funds? Please 
can you explain the reason for this transaction? Should the bank expect to see 
any further credits from this source? 
64 Were you expecting to receive this amount into your account?  May i ascertain 
the source of these funds and what they are for, just so we can satisfy our 
internal procedures?  What are your plans for the money moving forward? 
65 what is a source of funds deposited could you please enclose the suppording 
hard documentary evidence confirming dource of funds 
66 Will check if person was identified as PEP in companies records,if no, then if 
would have to be escalated, if yes,then will have RM of the account to talk to 
client asking what this money is about,where they intend to use it and where it 
is coming from, this can de done under pretense of selling some product. 
67 What is your source of wealth? Can you send us some evidence? Can we get a 
biography or resume? 
68 first we will get that particular account reviewed in terms of KYC & AML 
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then we will call to customer to specific reason for so much large amount been 
deposited in their account and its purpose. if we don't satisfy with the purpose 
then file STR against it will also identify the source account and its 
background from AML perspective. 
69 where it came from who from reason for payment 
70 I wouldn't deal with a payment of this kind as I only deal with Corporate 
clients 
71 What is the source if these funds? What is the intended use of these funds? 
72 1) Please explain the source of these funds 2) What are they intended for 3) 
Please provide evidence to support the above 
73 1. Please provide the details of the source of funds (the originator and its 
business activity if applicable/ available) deposited into the client's account 
and the relatonship between the parties? 2. Please explain the reason for and 
purpose of the large deposit being paid to the client's account and 3. What 
services or products is the client paid for? Please provide supporting 
documentation e.g. invoices or contracts. 
74 na 
75 I would make internal enquiries first. What is the client profile? Source of 
funds - monthly salary? Source of Wealth - inheritance, business, investments. 
Does the source of funds make sense? Is it a regular payment. Are there any 
red flags? High risk countries, sanctions, SDN/sanctions etc... 
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Thematic analysis of the above results (bold italics denote that response has been 
excluded from analysis due to it not providing a relevant/clear answer to the question 
posed). 
Analysis of t  Primarily 
Open 
Questions 
Primarily 
Closed 
Questions 
Occupation of the individual Source of wealth Purpose 
of the money 
 
  
Where is the money derived from? What will the funds 
be used for? Has the government official been 
adequately investigated by compliance? 
 
 x 
Supporting documents, source of funds, business 
mdoels 
 
  
Can you please provide further clarification regarding 
the purpose of transactions? Is the activity inline with 
the clients profile? Do you have any concerns regarding 
the alerted transactions? 
 
 x 
1- What is the source of the deposited fund? 2- Why is it 
paid in cash? 3- Do you have any supporting 
documents? 
 
 x 
1. Source of large funds credited in customers account? 
2. disclose the reason of large cash deposited and 
justification for mismatch of actual turnover with KYC? 
3. Satisfaction of the Third party (relationship manager) 
about the transaction? 
 
 x 
What is the sum for? Is this a one off payment? What 
the money will be used for? 
 
 x 
Prefer not to answer 
 
  
We do not have individual clients. In addition, as part 
of KYC team, we don't monitor transactions. 
 
  
What is the customer's present occupation/profession or 
business. What countries does customer conduct their 
business What other relationships does customer have 
with the bank 
 
 x 
1. What is the source of the Cash deposit? 2. What is the 
intended use of the funds being deposited? 3. Does the 
amount of money deposited correspond to the account 
holder's profile and perceived net worth/wealth? 
 x 
What is the source of this fund For what purpose was the 
transfer made  Can you provide a certified ducumentary 
 x 
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evidence to support the answers provided above 
 
1) Are you aware of a recent transaction on your account 
- give date 2) Can you confirm what the transaction was 
3) Can you tell me the reason for the transaction 
 
 x 
What is the reason for receiving this payment? Who is 
the sender of the payment? Can we have an invoice 
confirming the payment? 
 
 x 
1. What is the source of the large sum of money? 2. 
What is the sum payment for? 3. Is this a recurring 
payment? 
 
 x 
- From internal electronic resources, what are the full 
details of the payment and the originating Bank? - Are 
there historical records of such payments coming from 
this source? - If not, then is there any apparent 
information in the public domain which would explain 
such a payment 
 
 x 
not applicable to my role 
 
  
According to the regulations imposed by law I have to 
ask the question where the funds are coming from? Are 
you a Politically Exposed Persons? Are the money 
deposited in the account coming from your 
remuneration? 
 
 x 
Na 
 
  
1) request for a description from the official or his 
assistant on where the origin of the fund comes from. 
2) obtain appropriate supporting evidence of  the 
answer provided in 1. 3) further conduct internet 
searches to identify any possible negative news 
allegations against the public official. 
 
  
When has the transfer been made? Where has the sum 
come from (country, entity, etc) Have there been any 
similar transactions in the past Any additional questions 
regarding to when the client was onboarded and 
potentially reviewing their pep forms in place 
 
 x 
What is the source of these funds generation? Is this a 
regular practice of customer to deposit large sum of 
money? Why the transaction carried out in form of cash? 
 
 x 
Origin of funds, purpose of funds, source of 
depositor's wealth, existing banking relations 
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1. Please provide the proof of money from where it is 
deposited?  2. Please provide ownership proof  3. Please 
provide client confirmation mail 
 
 x 
1) Please could you provide further details or the 
transaction on XX/XX/XX, and the source and purpose 
of these funds. 2) Who was the remitter and how are you 
related to that person/company. 3) To what do the funds 
relate and what is the intended use for the funds. 
 
 x 
What is the source of the funds and who is the remitted?  
What is the purpose of the transaction? What 
documentary evidence can you provide to support this? 
 
 x 
N.A 
 
  
Is the transaction a normal pattern?  What are the 
circumstances surrounding the money?  What is the 
status of the PEP 
 
 x 
Again, not applicable.  The RM is qualified and 
experienced enough to query the client accordingly.  
But I would ask the RM to find out the reason of the 
large deposit, the source of funds (in this case, since a 
government official is involved, documented and 
certified proof would need to be obtained from e.g. an 
accountant) and if there is a third party involved, to 
verify the relationship with the third party. 
 
  
Outside of remit of KYC Team 
 
  
What is the source of the deposit. What is the purpose of 
the deposit. What plans does the customer have for the 
monies e.g investments, savings, a purchase 
 
 x 
What is annual income of the client? (including from 
employment and any addtional, if there is income other 
than from employment, please specify the source it is 
originated from, including the amount and currency per 
annum)  Please state how the source of wealth for this 
deposit has been raised.  Please state where the source of 
wealth for this deposit derived from. 
 
 x 
It would depend partly upon to whom the questions 
would be addressed however, on the basis that it is the 
client, I would ask the following;  That large sum 
deposited is somewhat out of keeping with your normal 
transactions, what can you tell me about it?  If it were 
directed to the Relationship Manager, I would ask the 
x  
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following question;  He/She uses their account with us 
for their Government income and associated expenses, 
please explain to me everything you know about this 
new payment.  Lastly, I would want details around the 
origination of the payment hence I would be interested 
in obtaining SWIFT data etc thus I would be speaking 
with our back office in this regard 
 
1. We have information regarding your transaction. it is 
in your interest to tell us everything about it. 2. Can your 
provide/ detail your sources of income ? 3. Can you 
produce evidence to justify the source of the money? 3. 
 
 x 
prefer not to. 
 
  
I work with other investigators that would handle the 
inquiry base on the corporate policy. 
 
  
1. Hi Mr/Mrs xxx. My name is xxx and I am calling 
from your bank. Do you have a minute for a quick chat 
regarding your account please?  2. Thanks. Just for 
security purposes I have noticed that a large sum of 
money has been deposited into your bank account 
recently. As the deposit is slightly out of character 
compared to your normal account activity can you 
please confirm the source of these funds?  3. Great 
thanks for answering that. Finally do you have any plans 
for the money? 
 
 x 
What is your source of funds? What is your line of 
business ? 
 
 x 
N/a 
 
  
Source of fund. Reason of deposit of that huge amount. 
Is Business/Relationship Manager comfortable with this 
Transaction 
 
 x 
Na 
 
  
Where has the money come from? What is its purpose? 
Is it proportionate to the individual's income and wealth? 
 
 x 
Prefer to not say 
 
  
- 
 
  
N/A 
 
  
Please clarify the nature, and provide a rationale for this  x 
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payment. Does this payment represent normal course of 
business? Please confirm the source of this payment. 
 
What is the source and where does the fund come from? 
What areas of work do the government official come 
from or responsible for? What is the official's 
known/reported remuneration from the government 
 x 
Rm ask the questions not us 
 
  
not in scope for us 
 
  
Na, do not do business with individuals 
 
  
1. where does this money come from? 2. why this 
money was deposited into a personal account? 3. why 
this is a plausible explanation? 
 
 x 
What is the source of funds? What is the purpose of the 
account?what is the expected activity of the account? 
 
 x 
1. Could you kindly explain where the funds were paid 
from (name of sender and country of origin), as the 
reference on the transaction is not clear and the amount 
is outside of regular trading activity for this account? 
Please note: All anomalies are investigated as standard 
practice.  2. Please explain the reason for the 
abovementioned transaction in more detail? (I.e. What is 
the funds intended for?) 3. Please provide any additional 
info you may feel would be relevant further to the 
mentioned questions. 
 
x  
Would you be able to advise what is the source of funds 
to be used in the relationship with us? Additionally, for 
the purpose of categorisation, would you be able to 
estimate your own funds? Have you made recently any 
transactions exceeding XXX $? If yes, could you please 
advise what they were related to? 
 
 x 
I understand that these questions will go to RM who will 
ask customer directly 1. What is a source of funds of 
these deposited money? 2. Could you please provide any 
documenation supporting this activity? 3. Do you (RM) 
have any AML concerns about this activiy and it is 
expected in the future? 
 
 x 
1) Kindly provide the detailed purpose of the 
transaction. 2) Does the transaction matches with the 
KYC profile of the customer? 3) Do you have any 
reason to suspect that the transaction may be related to 
any unlawful activity? 
 x 
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1) What is your current role within Government? 2) 
What are the reasons for the deposits into account........ 
on .......2015 and can you please provide documentary 
evidence to support the provenance of these funds? 3) 
Do you anticipate further large transactional activity 
through your accounts and if so, for what reason? 
 
 x 
"I'm calling with regards to some transactional activity 
on your account. As your bank, we're looking to be in a 
position to understand the money flows coming into and 
out of our business.The more we know about how you 
like to use your account with us, the better placed we are 
to understand the activity we see and keep your account 
secure".  1. You received X amount into your account on 
X date, are you able to confirm the reason for this 
transaction and where these funds originated from?   
*Dependent on answer, this may be clarified or queried 
until I understand the exact source of the funds and 
purpose"  2. Are you able to confirm your relationship 
with the originator of the funds? What is their full 
name? *If client is uncomfortable at any point, I explain 
that if we understand where our clients send funds to 
where they receive them from, it assists us in keeping 
the account secure if we see similar activity in future*  
3. Has your account been used at any point for purposes 
related to your job? *Query this much further if client 
answers yes* 
 
 x 
source of wealth and the real beneficial owner of the 
funds  the relationship with the sender (depends how 
the money were deposited through cash, incoming 
payment order..) so in that case if it was from his 
account u can ask for a statement of account or if we 
can inquire to the other bank 
 
  
1. Could you please deliver the documentation attesting 
the source of funds for the transaction XY performed on 
XX.XX.2015? 2. What was the reason of said 
transaction and whether this was/is connected to your 
activities as politically exposed person? 3. Could you 
please state whether the Bank can expect similar activity 
in the foreseeable future and what is the reason for this? 
 
 x 
What was the nature of the deposit (e.g. cash, wire, 
check)? The response would dictate my follow on 
questions. 
 
 x 
I can't answer that, it would be a breach of our 
controls 
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Please can you confirm your relationship to the remitter 
of these funds? Please can you explain the reason for 
this transaction? Should the bank expect to see any 
further credits from this source? 
 
 x 
Were you expecting to receive this amount into your 
account?  May i ascertain the source of these funds and 
what they are for, just so we can satisfy our internal 
procedures?  What are your plans for the money moving 
forward? 
 
 x 
what is a source of funds deposited could you please 
enclose the suppording hard documentary evidence 
confirming dource of funds 
 
 x 
Will check if person was identified as PEP in 
companies records,if no, then if would have to be 
escalated, if yes,then will have RM of the account to 
talk to client asking what this money is about,where 
they intend to use it and where it is coming from, this 
can de done under pretense of selling some product. 
 
  
What is your source of wealth? Can you send us some 
evidence? Can we get a biography or resume? 
 
 x 
first we will get that particular account reviewed in 
terms of KYC & AML then we will call to customer to 
specific reason for so much large amount been 
deposited in their account and its purpose. if we don't 
satisfy with the purpose then file STR against it will 
also identify the source account and its background 
from AML perspective. 
 
  
where it came from who from reason for payment 
 
 x 
I wouldn't deal with a payment of this kind as I only 
deal with Corporate clients 
 
  
What is the source if these funds? What is the intended 
use of these funds? 
 
 x 
1) Please explain the source of these funds 2) What are 
they intended for 3) Please provide evidence to support 
the above 
 
 x 
1. Please provide the details of the source of funds (the 
originator and its business activity if applicable/ 
available) deposited into the client's account and the 
relatonship between the parties? 2. Please explain the 
 x 
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reason for and purpose of the large deposit being paid to 
the client's account and 3. What services or products is 
the client paid for? Please provide supporting 
documentation e.g. invoices or contracts. 
 
Na 
 
  
I would make internal enquiries first. What is the client 
profile? Source of funds - monthly salary? Source of 
Wealth - inheritance, business, investments. Does the 
source of funds make sense? Is it a regular payment. Are 
there any red flags? High risk countries, sanctions, 
SDN/sanctions etc... 
 
 x 
Total 2 46 
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Appendix 5 – Thematic Analysis Example 
 
Transcript – Call Seven – 15 March 2016 – Participant 43 (CR) 
 
Irrelevant/Background Material – Yellow 
Training – Blue 
Question Style – Green 
Culture, Language & Background – Grey 
Red text – issues related specifically to communication difficulties 
 
AV –  …just set up my recorder here…OK. So I’ve got everything ready to go. 
Firstly thank you so much for giving me this time today. I really do appreciate it.  
 
HV - That’s ok. 
 
AV - Because I appreciate how difficult it is to get people to take parts on these 
sorts of things, so I really do value your input to this. 
 
HV - No problem. 
 
AV - So I am going to be taping the call today, just to remind as to what was sent 
out on the consent forms. This is really for my doctoral research and I’m looking at 
investigative interviewing processes, specifically around AML and KYC processes.  
 
HV - Sure. Obviously I probably just need to add in as well that these are purely my 
thoughts and feelings, not necessarily those of XXX. Again, I’m sure we’ll come 
across any issues as we, as we go. 
 
AV - Yes, absolutely, and that’s actually what I’m interested in. I’m not really here 
to be collecting the information about certain processes or policies of different 
companies, I’m looking at the actual individuals and how those individuals feel about 
different situations. So I don’t actually even need to know the name of your 
employer. For the purposes of typing this up, just to let you know, I will actually edit 
out any mention that you make of that, so that it remains anonymous for you. 
 
HV - That’s grand. Lovely. 
 
AV - OK. So I notice from the questionnaire that you completed, that you…you’ve 
worked in banking for quite a long time, almost as long as me I think!  
 
HV - Longer than we care to remember if I’m honest! 
 
AV - Yes exactly. And I notice that you have both contact directly with customers 
and through other third parties, so relationship managers and so on. That’s quite an 
unusual position to be in because a lot of the people I’ve spoken to are only in one or 
other of those roles, so I wonder if you could just tell me a bit about what your job 
entails and how it is that you come to interact with both the customer direct and 
through third parties. 
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HV - Yes. The primary focus of the project that I’m working on is of remediation. 
So this relates directly to a consent order that the OCC in the States placed on my 
company and in essence, what the company then did in response was to establish 
what they consider to be a gold, and then later, a platinum standard in terms of AML 
and KYC requirements. So what we’re trying to do is remediate the entire backbook 
of the business to current standards. 
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - So as a consequence they wanted people that had a degree of front office 
experience, which obviously I do, but also had a rounding, or a rounded 
understanding of AML, KYC processes and the like, so I wouldn’t say that it’s every 
single incidence that I’m dealing with the client directly, but certainly with my 
background and the mix of skills that I’ve got, a number of the front office, you 
know, relationship managers would be comfortable to say yes, this is the person you 
need to speak to and then it would either be interacting directly via email, or more 
often, actually on the telephone to clarify exactly what the requirements are and, more 
importantly, why we need them.   
 
AV - Right, OK. So you do a lot of your work over the phone as well as by email 
then? 
 
HV - Yes. 
 
AV - OK. 
 
HV - That’s preferable actually, if I’m honest. We tend to follow up a phone call 
with an email just to clarify each, each respective party’s understanding of the call 
just to make sure that the requirements are clear, and again, if necessary we can go 
into a bit more detail and expand the requirements. 
 
AV - OK, great. And when you’re raising questions with either customers direct, or 
even perhaps through other parties, do you ever find that you have to raise a question 
that makes the conversation difficult or makes you feel uncomfortable in any way? 
 
HV - It certainly makes the conversation difficult. I’m less uncomfortable with it 
now that I used to be, but again in fairness I think it’s my front office experience 
that’s driven that, not my middle office experience, if that makes sense. 
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - And just to sort of put a bit of context around that, I’ve always been in a 
position where I’ve had to ask difficult questions of clients. Normally that’s to get a 
sale… 
 
AV - Yes. 
 
HV - In this instance it’s to get the crux of whether or not we’ve got an issue with 
an account, and if so, what we do to mitigate it or, you know, in certain instances say 
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“Thanks very much but we’re not prepared to continue the relationship as it is”. So 
it’s a completely different requirement, but the…a lot of the skills that are required 
are actually quite similar. 
 
AV - OK. So when you had your original training for the more sort of sales angle 
that you used to work in, was…was that around how to phrase questions or…what 
sort of training was that specifically? 
 
HV -  Well as you can imagine, over the twenty-something odd years, there’s been 
quite a bit. The two key things that really stand out, one was around managing 
relationships and that is essentially I suppose more, if you follow a legal aspect, if 
you’re thinking you’d only really want to ask a question where you kind of already 
know the answer. So I’m not suggesting that it would be a leading question, but it 
would be a case that you’re trying to turn, let’s say a want into a need, or equally, to 
make a client aware that they have a need that you can fulfill. So that then puts you 
into the other aspect which is, dare I say, “disturbing” techniques and there are a 
number of different ways that you can do that. But certainly from my days as a 
regulated seller of life assurance products, as you can imagine, you’ve got to paint a 
pretty grim picture, but then of course you can say “But don’t worry about that 
because I can solve all of your problems”… 
 
AV - Yes. 
 
HV - …and it will only cost you…each month. 
 
AV - Right. OK. 
 
HV - So it’s a balance between the two and one of the other key things obviously is 
the use of silence. 
 
AV - Right, yes. And the questioning techniques that you use today in the enquiries 
that you’re making, are there any sort of specific techniques you use or, or do you 
tend to let the conversation flow? 
 
HV - A bit of both actually because the, often the case, and this is one of the 
difficulties of the world that I currently move in, what we’re invariably trying to do, 
hopefully, is prove a negative, and as you can probably imagine, that can be quite 
difficult. So what we often, and again, it’s difficult to speak specifically but I have 
seen instances of where the proceeds of crime have been filtered into the financial 
system, so I can speak with a degree of experience and know what money laundering 
actually physically looks like. But equally, we’re inevitably trying to prove that 
something hasn’t happened or, more importantly, isn’t going to happen, or we’re 
significantly reducing the chances of anything untoward happening. So that’s 
probably more around starting off with very broad, very generic questions, initially to 
gain the client’s understanding of their KYC policy, but equally, our KYC policy and 
why we’re doing what we’re doing and not hiding behind the OCC, because 
obviously, you know, it’s the primary reason that we’re doing this, but it’s also an 
element of housekeeping. 
 
AV - Right. 
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HV - So it’s sort of using reflecting techniques to say to the client “So, you know, 
I’m sure in your day to day existence you come across instances where you’re going 
to be taking on business with new client, tell me a little bit more about what you do, 
or can you explain to me how you get comfortable with doing business with a certain 
entity, or with a certain company or industry ahead of something else. And they can 
say “Oh well of course, when we deal with these stone cutters and these precious 
metals guys, you know, we have to do this, this, this and this”. “Oh OK great, so 
you’re familiar with the processes that we follow?” and so on and so on. 
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - Equally, if then get a complete blank face, and an initial reaction of “I haven’t 
got a clue what you’re talking about” you obviously then have to pitch your “sales 
patter” for want of a better expression, at a completely different level. So it’s that sort 
of opening gambit that gives you the feel of where on a scale of nought to ten let’s 
say from an AML KYC compliance perspective where your client actually is. 
 
AV -  OK. So it sounds like you’re being quite open with the customer as to what 
you’re doing and why you’re collecting that information… 
 
HV - Yes. 
 
AV - I guess with your particular role you’re focused on the KYC side more than 
perhaps looking at transactional alerts that have come out, or does that ever 
focus…does that ever come into your job? 
 
HV - It’s funny you should say that because the reason I was a little bit late on the 
call was ‘cause I was actually looking at a transactional alert for an existing client that 
we’d already remediated.  
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - And, can’t obviously go into sort of detail, but it’s not good. And I was 
gobsmacked when I saw it come through because it was one of the entities I’d looked 
at and thought “Yeah, nice neat, tidy, vanilla, happy, easy, yep glad to get that one 
remediated and pushed through’. Then you get this alert come through and you’re 
thinking “That is absolutely paradoxical to my understanding of that business”. So 
again, I need to have a look at that in a bit more detail and understand what’s 
happened. 
 
AV -  OK. And would that then involve you actually reaching out direct to the 
client? To get clarification? 
 
HV - I think in this one I probably won’t do. This one I think would probably sit 
with the KYC owner as we would call it, or the relationship manager in this instance. 
 
AV - Right. 
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HV - Purely because I don’t know the extent and the depth of their relationship and 
how it may or may not affect the individual or individuals concerned. So for me to go 
in with my size tens, clonking all round the place saying “What on earth do you think 
you’re doing?”, they may say “Well actually we’re aware of this. We were aware of 
this two years ago. We were waiting for, you know, the adjudication or the 
sentencing or what have you. We know for a fact there are mitigating circumstances 
and he’s going to appeal”. So, you know, to have that level of interaction, we need to 
get a really, really good understanding of the relationship side of the business because 
when I look at some of the entities, and this is across all of the banks, you know, 
there will be entities where appetite will determine whether or not we retain that 
relationship and equally, whether or not we develop it.  
 
AV - Yes. 
 
HV - And again, in the space of twelve months, when I was with a previous 
employer, I put a very, very exhaustive report together that went up to the number 
two in our business. So as you can imagine, in a high street Plc, that’s quite senior, so 
I had to make sure I’d dotted every i and crossed every t and it got signed off. 
Absolutely fine, no problem at all. Twelve months later, no obvious change in 
circumstances, other than the appetite, and the business says “You’re not one for us 
any more. Thanks very much. We’re going to exit you”. And this was an influential 
person who potentially has connections with literally millions of XX’s customers as it 
was. 
 
AV - Oh, OK. 
 
HV - So you can imagine the level of detail that has to go into our conversation, has 
to be relevant to the entity in question, but equally you’ve got to understand what the 
wider implications could be. 
 
AV - OK great. Thank you. When you’re asking your questions to customer, and I 
don’t know if you have a specific example of this, is there anything in particular that 
you find especially difficult? 
 
HV - Yes. The, um, again, one of the things that we would normally look to do is to 
understand the types of controls that are certain entity would have, and if I give you 
an example, we, we determined that foreign correspondent banks, or FCBs as we 
affectionately refer to them, were sort of the highest risk ranked type of entity that we 
have interaction with, so as a consequence, and again to placate the OCC, as a 
business, we said, we’re going to remediate all of these first. It’s taken us a while as 
you can imagine, cause we’ve got a lot of them, because of the transactional services 
that they offer, and we’re actually in a position now where we’re starting to renew 
some of the high risk ones that were remediated 12 months ago, so it shows that we 
are not only remediating, but we’re now reviewing as well.  
 
AV - OK. 
 
HV - So as you can imagine, some of these guys whilst we are bedfellows we are 
also competitors and in certain instances we are direct competitors in certain markets. 
So we’re looking at essentially saying to our customer “You’ve got to tell us all these 
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potentially, you know, market sensitive pieces of information”. As you can imagine, 
quite often the response is “Nah, you can forget about it! We’ll show you ours, if you 
show us yours!”. And, of course, we’re not going to do that. So we sometimes enter 
into this sort of stand off, and again, partly based on my judgement of the situation, 
it’s a judgement call to say do we accept this is a regulated entity, on a recognised 
exchange, in a low risk, medium risk, whatever it is, jurisdiction, you know, we are 
prepared to tell them what we’re asking them to provide us with, that, to me, seems 
not unreasonable, but we would then caveat that by saying “Well OK, can you 
confirm that you do have these types of controls in place?”. And if they still won’t 
provide that then we would normally go to our financial crimes compliance team to 
say “Look, this is the situation, this is the entity, this is who we’ve spoken to, it’s a 
senior compliance manager in their back office or middle office”, dependent upon 
who we’re talking to, and then again it’s allowing somebody who’s better placed to 
make that judgement to say “Actually yes we’re fine with that” or “Actually no we’re 
not, can you go back and ask these questions”, and if they’re not prepared to answer 
those then we’ve got to look at exiting the relationship and that has happened. 
 
AV – Right. OK. So that’s more about, sort of, their reluctance to share their own 
competitive information if you like, rather than any deliberate, you know, reluctance 
in giving you that information for other reasons? 
 
HV - That in itself is very, very good point and I think that really is what it boils 
down to, because in certain instances we will ask for information that the customer 
can’t provide, so that could potentially be relating to their ownership chain, or the 
structure of the way that the entity is positioned. Equally it could be a situation that 
they won’t tell us unless we tell them, and equally it could be a situation that they 
point blank refuse to tell us because, as you’ve mentioned, that they could potentially 
be hiding something. So that’s the decision that we take. And anytime we ask a 
question and we don’t get an answer, or we don’t get an acceptable answer, as you 
can imagine, the spiny senses start tingling and you’ve got to think “Why won’t they 
tell us that?” and then it’s down the process of saying “OK, you know, we’ve asked 
you for this information, you’ve explained…we’ve explained why it’s important, why 
we need it, you’re telling me you won’t provide it, can you give me a rationale, or, 
you know, something I can put to my senior management to say we’re not going to 
get this and here’s why. And if they’re saying “Well no, we’re just not going to tell 
you, we just won’t enter into that conversation at all”, then again, it puts the ball back 
in our court, but essentially, the way that we’ve interpreted the legislation, we have 
the ability to make a risk based decision, based on those facts, so yeah, on occasion 
we’ll do that. 
 
AV - OK, thank you. It sounds as though most of the clients you’re dealing with a 
corporates, is that the case, or do you have any individuals as well? 
 
HV - We do have a few individuals, but they’re not necessarily what we’d 
affectionately refer to as sort of two-legged individuals. 
 
AV - Right! 
 
HV - And I’ll just explain that and hopefully translate it into English. Because of 
the type of bank that we are, our private bank normally would pick up the individuals. 
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AV - Oh right, I see. 
 
HV - So they will still have some corporate structures. Generally speaking the bit 
that we’re going to be interested in are the types of companies that we can provide 
our core services to. So that would be things like transaction services, corporate 
finance, investment banking, these sorts of things. So we would have, for want of a 
better expression, a target audience, that we would look to, and I don’t want to sound 
facetious, sort of pick and choose from, as to who we would like to do business with, 
and it’s a very enviable position in the market, but there’d be no point in having it if 
we didn’t exploit it. So to a degree we will have fairly rigid consistencies with the 
type of entities that we deal with, and as I’ve touched on before, we’ve categorised 
those into a number of different types, so you’d have a client type of a non-bank 
financial institution or a bank or a foreign correspondent bank, and we have a number 
of corporate entities as well, but we wouldn’t really be looking at the individual side 
of things, unless they were directly involved in the ownership chain. 
 
AV - OK, I see. Right, thank you for clarifying that for me. You’ve mentioned 
about the fact that you’re obviously using your previous skills from more of a sales 
angle in some of the work that you’re doing now, but have you actually ever had any 
specific training relating to investigation techniques to help you do your current role? 
 
HV - Not for this particular area, but I suppose the, the principles are very, very 
similar. Again, it was something that was said to me relatively early in my banking 
career, specifically around credit analysis actually. You know, if you average an hour 
for a meeting, your first 15 minutes is building up your gut feel and then the next 45 
minutes is justifying that. And I suppose that’s my point here. If I’m looking at a 
case, and I’ve sort of gone through it cover to cover, you know, if there’s off-shore 
implications, or a complex ownership chain, or whathaveyou, now I could look at that 
and think “Does that make sense?” and if the answer to any of the questions I’ve just 
raised is “No” then I’ve obviously got to do a little bit more digging and if I still can’t 
get comfortable, then it’s a case of reaching out to the client owner to say “Look, I’ve 
got my concerns, can you just put some thought to these questions?”. Half a dozen or 
so or whatever it is and then come back to me. And if it’s the case that they can’t 
answer them, as is occasionally the case, then they have to go out to the customer as 
well themselves, or equally they might say “Well look, don’t, don’t get me involved 
in the process cause I can’t be bothered and I’m too busy, speak to this guy on a 
Wednesday at 3.00 o’clock and you’ll be fine and tell you whatever you want to 
know”. So that tends to be understanding where the gaps are, if you like, and then 
working out a process of how we then get the information, or at least get comfortable 
if we can’t fill the gaps. 
 
AV - OK. So, I mean, what I, what I guess I’m interested in for the purposes of my 
doctorate as well is about whether people have had any specific training that helps 
them understand how to go about engaging with the customer. Now obviously you’ve 
touched on that in a number of different ways, with your, sort of, previous role 
specifically, but I guess what I’d like to know is whether there’s any kind of training 
on offer for you at the moment which might help you understand how you actually 
engage with the customer, as opposed to what it is that you’re actually needing to 
cover off.  
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HV - Yeah, that has been…it was part of the initial training for this particular role 
and again it’s probably helpful just to give you a very quick oversight as to the way 
that it’s structured. We’ve essentially got one managing director who’s responsible 
for the remediations globally, we’ve then got 4 executive directors who deal with the 
different regions, and we have been tending in, sorry, in Europe, we tended to be used 
as a bit of a guinea pig for the other areas, so that’s North America, APAC, Asia-
Pacific and then North and South America tend to be split ‘cause we’ve still got quite 
a bit of business there to be done. But EMEA, that’s Europe, Middle East and Africa, 
as you can imagine, that’s quite a big footprint. A lot of the training we have had, and 
I’ve actually been helpful in rolling some of that out, I delivered some of that a 
couple of months ago now actually, we do talk about interacting firstly with the front 
office, and then again expanding in a bit more detail about how we would potentially 
interact with, with um, front office and equally when they then refer us on to the 
customer as well, the types of language and the types of expression that we would 
use. But usually what we’ve advocated is getting a standard template or a 
personalisable template let’s say, that we would send to the client, so that we’ve got a 
consistency in terms of what we’re asking for.  
 
AV - Right, and does everybody use that template? 
 
HV - To the best of my knowledge, they would do, probably for the first interaction 
and then I think thereafter, it can be a little bit more informal. But certainly the 
impression that I was given, and there again it’s not mandatory, I don’t think there’d 
be anybody checking your sent items to see whether or not that had been followed, 
but you’d be pretty daft not to use it to be honest with you because it’s quite a good 
document. 
 
AV - OK. And do you know who actually put that document together? 
 
HV - It was put together, there was a working committee. There were…we operate 
what we call a pod structure, so we are organised geographically. My pod happens to 
be France and Russia, so it’s all very Napoleonic! But it kind of works for us. One of 
my colleagues in our Swiss pod, she worked with financial crime compliance guys, 
and also someone from the front office as well, and it worked, I wasn’t involved in it 
directly, but it worked quite well because you’ve got one party saying “Well we need 
this information and here’s why…”, we’ve got another bit saying “Well yeah, but I 
know that our quality assurance function want this, this and this” and you’ve got our 
front office guy saying “Well if we’re asking that question, why don’t we ask this one 
as well and that will cover everything”. So it was proven to be fit for purpose and was 
signed off by our compliance guys as well so, you know, we’re on pretty solid ground 
that it was going to be a workable document. 
 
AV - Right. And has that proven to be the case, that it’s managed to produce, on the 
whole, the information that you were after? 
 
HV - Um, yeah. It’s probably worth specifying as well that, and I was being a little 
bit flippant earlier on when I said that, you know, some of the KYC analysts just say 
“look I just physically haven’t got time”, those are people that are less likely to be 
involved in the actual transactional side. They’re more likely be our, what we call, 
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markets guys. So these are people that are going to be, you know, effecting trades, 
providing advice and guidance on corporate funds and the like. They’re going to have 
less involvement with the actual KYC side of things. And they’re the ones that are 
much more likely to say to us “Look, that’s fine, just speak to this guy. I’m not 
interested. Get on with it. Take care of business and let me know if there’s a 
problem”. So that interaction has been incredibly successful.  
 
AV -  Right. OK, thanks. The…you mentioned earlier about a quality assurance side 
of things as well – is all of your work, or a sample of your work, put through quality 
assurance on a regular basis? 
 
HV - Yes. I have my own thoughts about what levels we should be sampling, but 
that’s another story. But in essence yeah, we risk rank all of our entities, essentially 
low, medium risk and high. We also risk rank our jurisdictions and there’s a slightly 
different scale for those, and again we may have local uplifts or industry uplifts on 
our standard policy, and you know I sort of mentioned it earlier, what with oil and 
things like precious metals, these sorts of things, banks as well, you know, we would 
look at those in a slightly different light if they were in Turkey let’s say, as if they 
were in the UK. So, you know, we accept that there are industry and geographical 
differences. But in essence we would then sample accordingly from an audit point of 
point of view. So again, that’s where we would get the back office involved, to check 
what we’re checking and equally from an industry review perspective, and from a 
regulatory standpoint, you know, the FCA are regularly in contact with us, making 
sure that we’re on track and that we’re on target to achieve their goals, because 
obviously they’ve have their…they look at the books, if you like, and they’ve made 
their comments because we are obviously transacting in the UK, their jurisdiction as 
well as being an American bank, so we’ve got a lot of people that we need to keep 
happy and again that’s an ongoing process, so that’s evolving. And also, if we need to 
make amendments to that policy, it’s cascaded globally on a weekly basis, so it’s, it’s 
quite um, it’s quite an involved process. And it can be a very minor change to the 
process but it can and often does affect us all individually.  
 
AV – OK. As part of that quality process, do you know whether they ever examine 
the language that’s used in the questions themselves? 
 
HV - Yes although not necessarily directly. One of the things that we would look at 
would be rejection points or findings and if they’re consistent, and if it would imply 
that there’s either a lack of understanding or a lack of appropriateness, if that’s not 
too an American an expression, of the question, there would be either training and/or 
amendment to the process and we have seen that regularly happens in both cases. 
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - The other thing that we need to be mindful of is that there can be changes in 
legislation in certain jurisdictions equally certain industries in certain countries can be 
perceived or reviewed differently and again we are a big part of the business but in 
relation to some of the other parts that we deal with we’re minuscule. So our voice is 
fairly quiet, but equally, the people that we’re talking to are some pretty big hitters, 
so, you know, if we got an issue with a certain part of the regulation, we can say to 
some of the guys in [inaudible] services “Look, we’re coming across this stumbling 
349 
 
  
point every single case, is there anything that you can do to put to your senior 
management to say, you know, we’ll take this on board or we’ll change this or we’ll 
do it differently or whathaveyou?”. So that is a two way street, although that happens 
less often. But there have been instances where we’ve basically, you know, tapped 
Big Brother on the shoulder and said “Hey give us a hand” and they’ve come to our 
rescue. 
 
AV - Right. OK. And have you personally received any feedback on the language 
that you’ve used or the phrasing of certain questions? 
 
HV -  Yeah, I mean that would be…less so on the phone calls. I mean, in fairness, 
the files on that cases that we complete would be essentially a snapshot of all of the 
data that we would have collected, some of which, as you’ve mentioned, would be in 
phone calls or possibly in email and we regularly get… “picked up” is probably too 
strong an expression, but yeah, we certainly get guidance, let’s say, and um, you 
know, essentially, within reason and within these four walls, whatever QA say pretty 
much is how it works. But it is dialogue, it’s open dialogue and we do occasionally 
get rejection points overturned, but broadly speaking it’s where the interpretation of 
the policy differs. So I’ll read a policy one way and think “Yep that’s fine we can go 
away and get this”, Quality Assurance might come back and say “Well actually we’re 
reading it slightly differently to that. We’re reading it this way and what you’ve 
provided isn’t adequate, you need to go away and get this”. And that’s generally 
speaking how it will work. 
 
AV - OK great. With the…obviously you’re an international bank as well, do you 
ever encounter any language difficulties when you’re communicating with some of 
your clients? 
 
HV - Um, yes. Obviously France is my primary focus and my high school French 
from many years ago is pretty rusty at best, so I’ve tended to…where I’ve 
encountered that as an issue, I’ve tended to use Google Translate but we do have a 
number of native French speakers in my pod, so what I’ve sort of said to them is 
“This is broadly what I’m trying to say, can you translate it into sort of French 
business speak, as opposed to Google Translate?” and often that works quite well and 
that’s quite well received.  
 
AV - Right. 
 
HV - From a language barrier perspective, I’ve had a couple of incidences where 
my French is nowhere near good enough and sadly our customer’s English is 
nowhere near good enough either, so that’s tended to be transacted via email.  
 
AV - Oh right, I see. And would that email be in English? 
 
HV - Um, not initially no. That would normally be in French. 
 
AV - Oh OK, so you’re translating that yourself, or getting someone to translate it, 
and then sending that out? 
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HV - Yes. I find it’s a more effective way to communicate. I think it would be a 
little bit presumptuous on our part if we’ve got a French customer who’s based in 
France that we would expect them to interact us with us in our native tongue rather 
than theirs. I know English is the international language of banking and a number of 
other industries, but, you know, I think we need to be mindful that without our 
customers we don’t have a business. So you’ve got to use deference at times and I 
think that’s one of them. 
 
AV -  Yeah, exactly. Well, I mean that’s a very good point. I guess I’m interested to 
understand then, when their response comes back, presumably that’s also in French? 
 
HV - Yes. 
 
AV - And do…when you’re interpreting that, or having it interpreted for you, are 
there any times where I guess what they’re trying to say just doesn’t really come 
across to you or doesn’t answer the question you were trying to ask? 
 
HV - Yes. There have been a couple of instances where that has been the case. 
Again to go back to your point from earlier, we’ve then got to start thinking “Was 
that a poor choice of question, is it a deliberately poor answer, have they just mis-
understood me, or, you know, are we going off down a blind alley, or is it a situation 
that they actually have got something to hide?”. So again, my boss is a native French 
speaker as well, so I regularly speak with her just to say sort of, you know, “Where 
do you think they’re going with this one?” or “Do you think these were OK 
questions?” and she’ll tap something off and then, you know, she’ll essentially send it 
under my name. 
 
AV - OK. Alright, so you quite often go back to get clarity on issues then perhaps? 
 
HV - Yes. We can’t afford to get it wrong! 
 
AV - No of course not! Right well I think I’ve covered everything I wanted to and 
I’m conscious that I’ve run over the initial 20 minutes that I said about so I’ll leave it 
there. So I’ll get busy typing all of this up. 
 
HV -  Let me know how you get on. I’d be very keen to hear what the final result is. 
 
AV - OK, Well I could always send you through a copy of my thesis if you’d like 
some bedtime reading.  
 
HV – Yes that would be good. 
 
AV – Alright, well thank you ever so much Hugo. I really do…I’m very grateful for 
this. 
 
HV - Good luck. 
 
AV - Thanks. Bye bye 
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Appendix 6 – Inter-rater Reliability Tests 
 
Inter-Rater Reliability – Part One 
Case 
Reference 
Question Raised Rater 1 –
Question 
Type 
Rater 2 - 
Question 
Type 
Agree? 
7 Could you 
confirm the 
reason for the 
cash deposit paid 
into the account? 
 
Closed Closed Yes 
14 None N/A N/A Yes 
19 None N/A N/A Yes 
24 None N/A N/A Yes 
42 Please confirm 
the legitimacy of 
the cash paid. 
Closed Closed Yes 
42 Please confirm 
the reason, 
connection and 
customer's 
association with 
these individuals. 
Multiple Multiple Yes 
42 Please confirm 
the reason, 
connection for 
these payments. 
Closed Closed Yes 
42 Please confirm 
the legitimacy of 
the cash paid. 
Closed Closed Yes 
42 Please confirm 
the reason, 
connection and 
customer's 
association with 
these individuals. 
Multiple Multiple Yes 
53 Please send the 
credit card 
statements to 
date and also 
provde the 
following details: 
The purpose of 
cash transfer 
dated DATE and 
the details of 
remitter, bank 
and account 
number for the 
Multiple Multiple Yes 
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payment dated 
DATE on the 
credit card. 
53 Also please 
advise whether 
you have any 
other concerns 
regarding the 
activity. 
 
Closed + 
Meaningless 
Closed + 
Meaningless 
Yes 
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Inter-Rater Reliability – Part Two 
Case 
Reference 
Question Raised Rater 1 –
Question 
Type 
Rater 2 - 
Question 
Type 
Agree? 
7 Could you confirm the 
reason for the cash deposit 
paid into the account? 
 
Content Content Yes 
14 None N/A N/A Yes 
19 None N/A N/A Yes 
24 None N/A N/A Yes 
42 Please confirm the 
legitimacy of the cash paid. 
Content Content Yes 
42 Please confirm the reason, 
connection and customer's 
association with these 
individuals. 
Content Content Yes 
42 Please confirm the reason, 
connection for these 
payments. 
Content Content Yes 
42 Please confirm the 
legitimacy of the cash paid. 
Content Content Yes 
42 Please confirm the reason, 
connection and customer's 
association with these 
individuals. 
Content Content Yes 
53 Please send the credit card 
statements to date and also 
provde the following details: 
The purpose of cash transfer 
dated DATE and the details 
of remitter, bank and 
account number for the 
payment dated DATE on the 
credit card. 
Content Content Yes 
53 Also please advise whether 
you have any other concerns 
regarding the activity. 
 
Polar Polar Yes 
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Case Processing Summary – Part One 
 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Rater1 * Rater2 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 
 
 
Rater1 * Rater2 Crosstabulation 
 
Count   
 
Rater2 
Total Closed 
Closed & 
Meaningless Multiple N/A 
Rater1 Closed 4 0 0 0 4 
Closed & Meaningless 0 1 0 0 1 
Multiple 0 0 3 0 3 
N/A 0 0 0 3 3 
Total 4 1 3 3 11 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Asymptotic 
Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa 1.000 .000 5.350 .000 
N of Valid Cases 11    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Case Processing Summary – Part Two 
 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Rater1 * Rater2 11 100.0% 0 0.0% 11 100.0% 
 
 
 
Total 
Content N/A Polar Total 
Rater1 Content 7 0 0 7 
N/A 0 3 0 3 
Polar 0 0 1 1 
Total 7 3 1 11 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Asymptotic 
Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa 1.000 .000 4.148 .000 
N of Valid Cases 11    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Amount of IRI Received 
Case 
Reference 
Codes for IRI 
Received 
Rater 1 – 
Number of 
Pieces of IRI 
Received 
Rater 2 - 
Number of 
Pieces of IRI 
Received 
Agreed? 
8  No 
Response 
No response Yes 
17  No 
Response 
No 
Response 
Yes 
26  No IRI 
received 
No IRI 
received 
Yes 
32 P, P, A, I 4 4 Yes 
41 P, A, I 3 3 Yes 
55  No 
Response 
No 
Response 
Yes 
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Case Processing Summary 
 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Rater1 * Rater2 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 6 100.0% 
 
 
Rater1 * Rater2 Crosstabulation 
 
Count   
 
Rater2 
Total Four 
No IRI 
Received No Response Three 
Rater1 Four 1 0 0 0 1 
No IRI Received 0 1 0 0 1 
No Response 0 0 3 0 3 
Three 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 1 1 3 1 6 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Asymptotic 
Standard 
Errora 
Approximate 
Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa 1.000 .000 4.000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 6    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Rater1 Rater2 
1 1.000** 
 .000 
6 6 
1.000** 1 
.000  
6 6 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed). 
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Appendix 7 – T-Test Results 
 
Professional Qualifications 
 
 Group Statistics     
 Please list any 
professional 
qualifications you 
hold that are 
directly relevant 
to your role 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 
Q9 - When escalating suspicious cases, do you 
generally find that your opinion is supported by 
clear and conclusive information? 
 
 
Qualified 
 
59 
 
2.02 
 
.731 
 
.095 
Not Qualified 57 2.00 .732 .097 
Q10 - When closing cases without further 
escalation, or allowing transactions / business 
activity to proceed, do you generally find that 
your opinion is supported by clear and conclusive 
information? 
 
Qualified 58 1.66 .849 .112 
Not Qualified 57 1.75 .714 .095 
Q14 - Do you feel sufficiently protected by your 
employer to conduct your enquiries effectively? 
 
Qualified 60 1.85 1.071 .138 
Not Qualified 58 2.00 1.545 .203 
Q15 - Does a customer's background (religion, 
political position, social standing, age etc.) 
influence the way you deal with them? 
 
Qualified 60 3.53 1.512 .195 
Not Qualified 58 3.95 1.549 .203 
Q19 - Speaking generally, do you have enough 
time to complete enquiries thoroughly and to the 
best of your ability? 
 
Qualified 57 2.09 .872 .115 
Not Qualified 52 2.25 .860 .119 
Q21 - When raising AML / KYC queries with 
customers, how important is it for you to build 
rapport with the person you are dealing with? 
 
Qualified 18 1.44 .616 .145 
Not Qualified 20 1.65 .671 .150 
Q22 - When raising AML / KYC queries with 
third parties (such as Relationship Managers), 
how important is it for you to build rapport with 
the person you are dealing with? 
 
Qualified 46 1.72 .720 .106 
Not Qualified 40 1.60 .841 .133 
Q23 - When asking customers awkward or 
difficult questions, how comfortable do you 
feel?  
 
Qualified 17 2.18 .951 .231 
Not Qualified 20 2.60 1.142 .255 
Q24 - When asking third parties (such as 
Relationship Managers) awkward or difficult 
questions, how comfortable do you feel? 
 
Qualified 48 1.90 .778 .112 
Not Qualified 39 2.00 .827 .132 
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 Independent 
Samples Test 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
 t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  F Sig t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Q9 - When 
escalating 
suspicious 
cases, do you 
generally find 
that your 
opinion is 
supported by 
clear and 
conclusive 
information? 
 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
 
.012 
 
.912 
 
.125 
 
114 
 
.901 
 
.017 
 
.136 
 
-.252 
 
.286 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  .125 113.851 .901 .017 .136 -.252 .286 
Q10 - When 
closing cases 
without 
further 
escalation, or 
allowing 
transactions / 
business 
activity to 
proceed, do 
you generally 
find that your 
opinion is 
supported by 
clear and 
conclusive 
information? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
2.067 .153 -.677 113 .499 -.099 .146 -.389 .191 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  -.679 110.377 .499 -.099 .146 -.389 .191 
Q14 - Do you 
feel 
sufficiently 
protected by 
your 
employer to 
conduct your 
enquiries 
effectively? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.649 .422 -.615 116 .540 -.150 .244 -.633 .333 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -.611 101.167 .542 -.150 .245 -.637 .337 
Q15 - Does a 
customer's 
background 
(religion, 
political 
position, 
social 
standing, age 
etc.) influence 
the way you 
deal with 
them? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.067 .796 -
1.47
2 
116 .144 -.415 .282 -.973 .143 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -
.1.47
2 
115.605 .144 -.415 .282 -.973 .144 
Q19 - 
Speaking 
generally, do 
you have 
enough time 
to complete 
enquiries 
thoroughly 
and to the 
best of your 
ability? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
0.55 .815 -.977 107 .331 -.162 .166 -.492 .167 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -.977 106.328 .331 -.162 .166 -.491 .167 
Q21 - When 
raising AML / 
KYC queries 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
.210 .650 -.980 36 .333 -.206 .210 -.631 .220 
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with 
customers, 
how 
important is it 
for you to 
build rapport 
with the 
person you 
are dealing 
with? 
 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -.985 35.982 .331 -.206 .209 -.629 .218 
Q22 - When 
raising AML / 
KYC queries 
with third 
parties (such 
as 
Relationship 
Managers), 
how 
important is it 
for you to 
build rapport 
with the 
person you 
are dealing 
with? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
.151 .699 .697 84 .487 .117 .168 -.217 .452 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  .690 77.318 .492 .117 .170 -.221 .456 
Q23 - When 
asking 
customers 
awkward or 
difficult 
questions, 
how 
comfortable 
do you feel?  
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
3.341 .076 -
1.21
2 
35 .234 -.424 .349 -1.133 .286 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -
1.23
1 
34.991 .227 -.424 .344 -1.122 .275 
Q24 - When 
asking third 
parties (such 
as 
Relationship 
Managers) 
awkward or 
difficult 
questions, 
how 
comfortable 
do you feel? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.001 .972 -.604 85 .548 -.104 .173 -.447 .239 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  -.600 79.205 .550 -.104 .174 -.450 .242 
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Those Who Experienced Questions Not Being Properly Addressed 
 
 Group Statistics     
 Have you ever 
experienced a 
situation where the 
questions you’ve 
asked have not been 
properly addressed? 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
 
Q9 - When escalating suspicious cases, do you generally 
find that your opinion is supported by clear and conclusive 
information? 
 
 
Yes 
 
76 
 
2.08 
 
.762 
 
.087 
No 21 2.00 .775 .169 
Q10 - When closing cases without further escalation, or 
allowing transactions / business activity to proceed, do you 
generally find that your opinion is supported by clear and 
conclusive information? 
 
Yes 76 1.72 .810 .093 
No 19 1.68 .671 .154 
Q14 - Do you feel sufficiently protected by your employer 
to conduct your enquiries effectively? 
 
Yes 80 1.81 1.137 .127 
No 22 2.32 1.887 .402 
Q15 - Does a customer's background (religion, political 
position, social standing, age etc.) influence the way you 
deal with them? 
 
Yes 80 3.75 1.579 .177 
No 22 4.18 1.220 .260 
Q19 - Speaking generally, do you have enough time to 
complete enquiries thoroughly and to the best of your 
ability? 
 
Yes 79 2.19 .863 .097 
No 20 2.00 .858 .192 
Q21 - When raising AML / KYC queries with customers, 
how important is it for you to build rapport with the person 
you are dealing with? 
 
Yes 25 1.52 .653 .131 
No 7 1.57 .535 .202 
Q22 - When raising AML / KYC queries with third parties 
(such as Relationship Managers), how important is it for you 
to build rapport with the person you are dealing with? 
 
Yes 66 1.61 .677 .083 
No 12 1.92 1.165 .336 
Q23 - When asking customers awkward or difficult 
questions, how comfortable do you feel?  
 
Yes 24 2.46 1.021 .208 
No 7 1.57 .787 .297 
Q24 - When asking third parties (such as Relationship 
Managers) awkward or difficult questions, how comfortable 
do you feel? 
 
Yes 65 1.92 .777 .096 
No 14 1.86 .770 .206 
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 Independent 
Samples Test 
Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
 
 t-test for Equality of Means 95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  F Sig t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Q9 - When 
escalating 
suspicious 
cases, do you 
generally find 
that your 
opinion is 
supported by 
clear and 
conclusive 
information? 
 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
 
.219 
 
.641 
 
.419 
 
95 
 
.676 
 
.079 
 
.188 
 
-.295 
 
.453 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  .415 31.519 .681 .079 .190 -.309 .467 
Q10 - When 
closing cases 
without 
further 
escalation, or 
allowing 
transactions / 
business 
activity to 
proceed, do 
you generally 
find that your 
opinion is 
supported by 
clear and 
conclusive 
information? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
.670 .415 .196 93 .845 .039 .201 -.360 .439 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  .220 32.465 .828 .039 .180 -.327 .406 
Q14 - Do you 
feel 
sufficiently 
protected by 
your 
employer to 
conduct your 
enquiries 
effectively? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
9.468 .003 -1.579 100 .117 -.506 .320 -.1.141 .130 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -1.199 25.338 .242 -506 .422 -.1.374 .363 
Q15 - Does a 
customer's 
background 
(religion, 
political 
position, 
social 
standing, age 
etc.) influence 
the way you 
deal with 
them? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
2.904 .091 -1.187 100 .238 -.432 .364 -1.153 .290 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -.1.373 42.404 .177 -.432 .314 -1.066 .203 
Q19 - 
Speaking 
generally, do 
you have 
enough time 
to complete 
enquiries 
thoroughly 
and to the 
best of your 
ability? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.003 .960 .880 97 .381 .190 .216 -.239 .618 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  .883 29.509 .385 .190 .215 -.250 .630 
Q21 - When 
raising AML / 
KYC queries 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
.784 .383 -.191 30 .850 -.051 .270 -.603 .500 
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with 
customers, 
how 
important is it 
for you to 
build rapport 
with the 
person you 
are dealing 
with? 
 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  -.214 11.561 .834 -.051 .241 -.578 .475 
Q22 - When 
raising AML / 
KYC queries 
with third 
parties (such 
as 
Relationship 
Managers), 
how 
important is it 
for you to 
build rapport 
with the 
person you 
are dealing 
with? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
1.431 .235 -1.291 76 .201 -.311 .241 -.790 .169 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  -.897 12.384 .387 -.311 .346 -1.063 .441 
Q23 - When 
asking 
customers 
awkward or 
difficult 
questions, 
how 
comfortable 
do you feel?  
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.987 .329 2.114 29 .043 .887 .420 .029 1.745 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
 
  2.443 12.546 .030 .887 .363 .100 1.674 
Q24 - When 
asking third 
parties (such 
as 
Relationship 
Managers) 
awkward or 
difficult 
questions, 
how 
comfortable 
do you feel? 
 
Equal 
Variances 
Assumed 
 
.211 .647 .288 77 .774 .066 .229 -.389 .521 
Equal 
Variances 
Not Assumed 
  .290 19.131 .775 .066 .227 -.410 .541 
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Appendix 8 – Case Study Analysis 
 
Question Type Analysis – Part 1 
 
Case Questions 
O
pe
n 
Pr
ob
in
g 
C
lo
se
d 
M
ea
ni
ng
le
ss
 
Le
ad
in
g 
M
ul
tip
le
 
Fo
rc
ed
 C
ho
ic
e 
O
pi
ni
on
 
N
o 
Q
ue
st
io
n 
N
o 
of
 p
ie
ce
s o
f I
R
I  
In
te
r-
ra
te
r R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
1  None                       
2  Could you confirm 
the reason for the 
activity seen?  
 
    X             0   
  Also confirm if you 
have any concerns 
on the account 
activity? 
 
    X X               
3  Could you confirm 
the reason for the 
high credits 
received? 
 
    X             4   
4  Are you happy 
with the overall 
activity on the 
account? 
 
    X X           4   
5  Could you please 
explain the reason 
for a credit of CCY 
received from 
customer's business 
account named 
COMPANY held at 
BANK on DATE? 
X                 0   
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  Also the reason for 
the credit of CCY 
received from 
customer's savings 
account at BANK 
on DATE? 
    X                 
  Also the credit of 
CCY received in 
the account from 
an individual name 
PERSON at BANK 
on DATE? 
    X                 
  The reason for 
transfers totalling 
CCY made to 
customer's account 
at BANK and 
BANK on DATE 
and DATE? 
 
    X                 
6  Are you happy 
with the overall 
activity and cash 
transactions? 
 
    X X           5   
7  Could you confirm 
the reason for the 
cash deposit paid 
into the account? 
 
    X             3 Agree 
8  Could you confirm 
the reason for the 
above mentioned 
activity on the 
account, also 
advise if you have 
any concerns on 
the account? 
 
          X       0   
9  Are you happy 
with the overall 
activity on this 
account? 
 
    X X           0   
10 Could you explain 
the activity 
mentioned on the 
account, the reason 
for the funds being 
transferred to 
X                 11   
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COMPANY? 
  Also advised if you 
have any concerns 
on the activity seen 
on the account? 
    X X               
11  No case details                       
12 Could you please 
confirm the source 
for the cash 
deposits totalling 
CCY paid into the 
account? 
    X             0   
  Also the reason for 
electronic transfers 
totalling CCY 
received from 
PERSON and 
PERSON at 
BANK? 
    X                 
  Also the reasons 
for electronic 
transfers for CCY 
to a second hand 
car dealing firm 
named COMPANY 
at BANK on 
DATE? 
    X                 
  Also do you have 
any concerns on 
the account activity 
of the customer? 
 
    X X               
13  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for the large value 
credits? 
    X             0   
  Also do you have 
any concerns on 
the overall activity 
on the account? 
 
    X X               
14  None                     Agree
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15  Are you happy 
with the overall 
activity on this 
account? 
 
    X X           0   
16 Erroneous request                       
17 Request to check 
and let us know if 
you have any 
concerns on the 
above mentioned 
activity seen on the 
customer's 
account? 
 
    X X           0   
18  Duplicate                       
19  None                     Agree 
20  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for the credits 
totalling CCY 
received with 
references as 
'remittance 
received by order 
of COMPANY, 
CUSTOMER 3 
etc.' 
    X             9   
  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for the transfers 
made to banks 
suspense account, 
quoting references 
as 'foreign 
exchange'. 
    X                 
  Do you have any 
concerns regarding 
the activity on the 
customer's private 
banking account? 
 
    X X               
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21  Request to explain 
the reason for high 
credit turnover and 
reason for the high 
credits received 
from BANK and 
COMPANY at 
COUNTRY. 
          X       0   
  Also advise if you 
have any concerns 
on the above 
mentioned account. 
    X X               
22  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for credits totalling 
CCY payments 
received from 
CUSTOMER 1's 
personal account at 
BANK. 
    X             0   
  Also the reason for 
the credit totalling 
CCY received from 
CUSTOMER 1's 
account held at 
BANK COUNTRY 
    X                 
  Also can you 
confirm the reason 
for bill payment for 
CCY made to 
CUSTOMER 1 at 
BANK. 
    X                 
  Do you have any 
concerns on the 
account? 
 
    X X               
23  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for electronic 
credits totalling 
CCY received from 
an individual 
named PERSON at 
BANK. 
    X             3   
  Do you have any 
concerns on the 
account? 
 
    X X               
24  No RFI in system                     Agree 
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25  Can you please 
confirm the reason 
and legitimacy of 
credits received 
from an account at 
BANK, quoting 
reference as 
'Voluntary S 
Overse'? 
    X             2   
  Also can you 
please confirm the 
reason for numeous 
payments to a 
dissolved firm 
named 
COMPANY? 
    X                 
  Can you confirm 
the reason for high 
turnover seen on 
the business 
accounts? 
    X                 
  Also do you have 
any concerns 
regarding the 
overall activity 
seen on the 
accounts? 
 
    X X               
26  Please advise the 
background to 
these transfers and 
if you are happy 
with the activity on 
this account? 
 
          X       0   
27  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for large value 
credits and wire 
transfer payment. 
    X             0   
  Also, do you have 
any concerns on 
the overall activity 
on the account? 
 
    X X               
28  Kindly advise the 
reason for the 
credits from 
COMPANY at 
BANK. 
    X             0   
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  Also advice if you 
have any concerns 
on the above 
mentioned account. 
    X X               
29  Could you please 
confirm the reasons 
and legitimacy for 
the credits received 
as Global transfers 
(from COUNTRY) 
ranging between 
CCY and CCY 
made to customer's 
joint account.  
    X             0   
  Also the reason and 
legitimacy of an 
automated credit 
for CCY received 
from customer's 
account at BANK. 
    X                 
  Also the reason for 
an automated credit 
for CCY received 
from a law firm 
named COMPANY 
at BANK on 
DATE. 
    X                 
  Also the reason for 
the bill payments 
totalling CCY sent 
to the joint account 
of the customers' at 
OTHER BANK. 
    X                 
  Do you have any 
concerns on the 
account? 
 
    X X               
30  None                       
31  None                       
32  Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for the cash 
deposits and 
numerous bill 
payments received 
from CUSTOMER 
2. 
          X       4   
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  Also, do you have 
any concerns on 
the overall activity 
on the account? 
 
    X X               
33 Could you please 
confirm the reason 
for credits received 
and payments made 
also, confirm 
whether the 
customer is an 
employee of 
BANK. 
          X       0   
  Also, do you have 
any concerns on 
the overall activity 
on the account? 
 
    X X               
34  What is the source 
of these funds and 
do you have any 
concern regarding 
this this 
transactions? 
          X       7   
  Do you have any 
concerns regarding 
these transactions? 
    X X               
35  Erroneous case 
reference 
                      
36  Unable to access - 
not a UK Case 
 
                      
37  Also if you could 
provde us with any 
significant 
information about 
the customer's 
background and if 
you have any 
concerns regarding 
the overall 
activities seen in 
the account. 
 
          X       4   
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38  Please provide the 
name of the 
counterparty and 
the purpose behind 
the transaction? 
 
          X       3   
39  Hi Team, can you 
explain the reason 
for the electronic 
transfer for CCY 
received from 
COMPANY into 
custome's US 
dollar account on 
DATE and the 
regular credits 
received from 
PERSON? 
X                 0   
  Can you explain 
the relationship 
between 
COMPANY and 
the customer? 
X                     
  And can you 
explain the 
relationship 
between the 
customer and 
PERSON? 
X                     
  Also confirm 
whether you are 
happy with the 
overall conduct of 
the account? 
    X X               
  If you have also 
any concerns on 
the customer, 
request to confirm 
regarding the same. 
 
                X     
40  Can you please 
explain the purpose 
of the transactions? 
X                 16   
  Can you please 
explain the origin 
of the credits and 
the purpose behind 
these transactions? 
 
X                     
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41  Could you please 
help us with the 
information 
regarding the 
reason for high 
value credits and 
high turnover on 
the account? 
    X             3   
  Customer holds 
multiple accounts 
in the same profile, 
so could you 
provide us with the 
information 
regarding the 
legitimacy of the 
credits and the 
overall activity on 
the account? 
          X           
  Also, if you have 
any concerns on 
the account please 
update us as to take 
further course of 
action. 
 
                X     
42  Please confirm the 
legitimacy of the 
cash paid. 
    X             0 Agree 
  Please confirm the 
reason, connection 
and customer's 
association with 
these individuals. 
          X         Agree - 
although 
all are 
valid 
questions 
  Please confirm the 
reason, connection 
for these payments. 
    X               Agree 
  Please confirm the 
legitimacy of the 
cash paid. 
    X               Agree 
  Please confirm the 
reason, connection 
and customer's 
association with 
these individuals. 
 
          X         Agree - 
although 
all are 
valid 
questions 
43  Please advise the 
reason for the large 
value credit from 
CUSTOMER 2 and 
          X       0   
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advise the reason 
for the large value 
credit from 
CUSTOMER 2 and 
the payment made 
to an individual 
named PERSON at 
BANK. 
 
44  Can you please 
explain the purpose 
of the transaction 
and the customer 
relation with 
PERSON? 
X                 4   
  Can you please 
explain the purpose 
of the transaction? 
 
X                     
45 Please can you 
confirm the 
legitimacy and the 
background of 
these transactions?  
    X             0   
  Is overall activity 
in line with the 
nature of business? 
 
    X                 
46  Could you please 
provide me the 
details of payment 
(AMOUNT and 
BENEFICIARY) 
the customer 
wanted to make? 
    X             0   
  Could you please 
provide me the 
details of payment 
(AMOUNT and 
BENEFICIARY) 
the customer 
wanted to make? 
 
    X                 
47  Could you please 
let us know the 
source of cash 
deposits and credits 
received from 
various businesses? 
    X             0   
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  Could you please 
confirm if the cash 
deposits paid in the 
account are in 
relation to sale of 
property? 
        X             
  Also, please 
confirm, if you 
have seen any 
documentary 
evidence in relation 
to the sale of the 
property. 
 
    X                 
48  Please help me find 
rationale behind the 
below mentioned 
transactions of the 
customer. 
 
                X 3   
49  Kindly explain the 
reasons for regular 
cash deposits paid 
into the above said 
accounts and also 
explain the original 
source of cash. 
X                 0   
  Also let us know if 
you have any 
concerns on the 
account activity. 
 
    X X               
50  Please give us 
some insight about 
this debit. 
                X 1   
  What is the 
purpose for the 
customer to send 
these funds to the 
individual? 
    X                 
  Please give us 
some background 
about the source of 
these funds? 
 
X                     
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51  Could you kindly 
let us know the 
source for the 
funds received into 
the customer's 
BANK accounts 
and the reason for 
the payments made 
through customer;s 
Euro account. 
          X       8   
  Also let us know if 
you have any 
concerns regarding 
the overall 
activities on all the 
account of the 
customer. 
 
    X X               
52  Can you please 
explain the 
background to the 
electronic transfer 
credit received 
from COMPANY? 
 
X                 2   
53  Please send the 
credit card 
statements to date 
and also provde the 
following details: 
The purpose of 
cash transfer dated 
DATE and the 
details of remitter, 
bank and account 
number for the 
payment dated 
DATE on the credit 
card. 
          X       0 Agree - 
although 
all are 
valid 
questions 
  Also please advise 
whether you have 
any other concerns 
regarding the 
activity. 
 
    X X             Agree 
54  Could you explain 
the reason for large 
funds received 
from Solicitors? 
X                 0   
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  Could you explain 
the reason and the 
background of the 
funds received 
from the individual 
named PERSON? 
X                     
  The connection 
between the 
customer and the 
individual? 
    X                 
  Could you explain 
the background of 
the payments made 
to individuals 
named PERSON, 
PERSON and 
PERSON? 
X                     
  The connection 
between these 
individuals? 
 
    X                 
55  Could you please 
let me know the 
remitter and 
remitter bank 
details? 
 
    X             0   
56  Could you please 
explain the reason 
for the electronic 
transfer for the 
CCY received from 
a law firm named 
COMPANY at 
BANK with the 
reference of 'net 
proceed - estate of 
CUSTOMER 2' on 
DATE? 
X                 4   
  Can you please 
explain the reason 
for the two bill 
payments totalling 
CCY made to 
HMRC - 
Inheritence? 
 
X                     
  Totals 17 0 63 24 1 14 0 0 4     
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1  None         
2  Could you confirm the reason for the 
activity seen?  
 
    X    
  Also confirm if you have any concerns on 
the account activity? 
 
X        
3  Could you confirm the reason for the high 
credits received? 
 
    X    
4  Are you happy with the overall activity on 
the account? 
 
X        
5  Could you please explain the reason for a 
credit of CCY received from customer's 
business account named COMPANY held 
at BANK on DATE? 
    X    
  Also the reason for the credit of CCY 
received from customer's savings account 
at BANK on DATE? 
    X    
  Also the credit of CCY received in the 
account from an individual name PERSON 
at BANK on DATE? 
    X    
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  The reason for transfers totalling CCY 
made to customer's account at BANK and 
BANK on DATE and DATE? 
 
    X    
6  Are you happy with the overall activity and 
cash transactions? 
 
X        
7  Could you confirm the reason for the cash 
deposit paid into the account? 
 
    X   Agree 
8  Could you confirm the reason for the 
above mentioned activity on the account, 
also advise if you have any concerns on the 
account? 
 
    X    
9  Are you happy with the overall activity on 
this account? 
 
X        
10 Could you explain the activity mentioned 
on the account, the reason for the funds 
being transferred to COMPANY? 
    X    
  Also advised if you have any concerns on 
the activity seen on the account? 
X        
11  No case details         
12 Could you please confirm the source for 
the cash deposits totalling CCY paid into 
the account? 
    X    
  Also the reason for electronic transfers 
totalling CCY received from PERSON and 
PERSON at BANK? 
    X    
  Also the reasons for electronic transfers for 
CCY to a second hand car dealing firm 
named COMPANY at BANK on DATE? 
    X    
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  Also do you have any concerns on the 
account activity of the customer? 
 
X        
13  Could you please confirm the reason for 
the large value credits? 
    X    
  Also do you have any concerns on the 
overall activity on the account? 
 
X        
14  None        Agree 
15  Are you happy with the overall activity on 
this account? 
 
X        
16 Erroneous request         
17 Request to check and let us know if you 
have any concerns on the above mentioned 
activity seen on the customer's account? 
 
X        
18  Duplicate         
19  None        Agree 
20  Could you please confirm the reason for 
the credits totalling CCY received with 
references as 'remittance received by order 
of COMPANY, CUSTOMER 3 etc.' 
    X    
  Could you please confirm the reason for 
the transfers made to banks suspense 
account, quoting references as 'foreign 
exchange'. 
    X    
  Do you have any concerns regarding the 
activity on the customer's private banking 
account? 
 
X        
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21  Request to explain the reason for high 
credit turnover and reason for the high 
credits received from BANK and 
COMPANY at COUNTRY. 
    X    
  Also advise if you have any concerns on 
the above mentioned account. 
X        
22  Could you please confirm the reason for 
credits totalling CCY payments received 
from CUSTOMER 1's personal account at 
BANK. 
    X    
  Also the reason for the credit totalling 
CCY received from CUSTOMER 1's 
account held at BANK COUNTRY 
    X    
  Also can you confirm the reason for bill 
payment for CCY made to CUSTOMER 1 
at BANK. 
    X    
  Do you have any concerns on the account? 
 
X        
23  Could you please confirm the reason for 
electronic credits totalling CCY received 
from an individual named PERSON at 
BANK. 
    X    
  Do you have any concerns on the account? 
 
X        
24  No RFI in system        Agree 
25  Can you please confirm the reason and 
legitimacy of credits received from an 
account at BANK, quoting reference as 
'Voluntary S Overse'? 
    X    
  Also can you please confirm the reason for 
numeous payments to a dissolved firm 
named COMPANY? 
    X    
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  Can you confirm the reason for high 
turnover seen on the business accounts? 
    X    
  Also do you have any concerns regarding 
the overall activity seen on the accounts? 
 
X        
26  Please advise the background to these 
transfers and if you are happy with the 
activity on this account? 
 
    X    
27  Could you please confirm the reason for 
large value credits and wire transfer 
payment. 
    X    
  Also, do you have any concerns on the 
overall activity on the account? 
 
X        
28  Kindly advise the reason for the credits 
from COMPANY at BANK. 
    X    
  Also advice if you have any concerns on 
the above mentioned account. 
X        
29  Could you please confirm the reasons and 
legitimacy for the credits received as 
Global transfers (from COUNTRY) 
ranging between CCY and CCY made to 
customer's joint account.  
    X    
  Also the reason and legitimacy of an 
automated credit for CCY received from 
customer's account at BANK. 
    X    
  Also the reason for an automated credit for 
CCY received from a law firm named 
COMPANY at BANK on DATE. 
    X    
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  Also the reason for the bill payments 
totalling CCY sent to the joint account of 
the customers' at OTHER BANK. 
    X    
  Do you have any concerns on the account? 
 
X        
30  None         
31  None         
32  Could you please confirm the reason for 
the cash deposits and numerous bill 
payments received from CUSTOMER 2. 
    X    
  Also, do you have any concerns on the 
overall activity on the account? 
 
X        
33 Could you please confirm the reason for 
credits received and payments made also, 
confirm whether the customer is an 
employee of BANK. 
    X    
  Also, do you have any concerns on the 
overall activity on the account? 
 
X        
34  What is the source of these funds and do 
you have any concern regarding this this 
transactions? 
    X    
  Do you have any concerns regarding these 
transactions? 
X        
35  Erroneous case reference         
36  Unable to access - not a UK Case 
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37  Also if you could provde us with any 
significant information about the 
customer's background and if you have any 
concerns regarding the overall activities 
seen in the account. 
 
    X    
38  Please provide the name of the 
counterparty and the purpose behind the 
transaction? 
 
    X    
39  Hi Team, can you explain the reason for 
the electronic transfer for CCY received 
from COMPANY into custome's US dollar 
account on DATE and the regular credits 
received from PERSON? 
    X    
  Can you explain the relationship between 
COMPANY and the customer? 
    X    
  And can you explain the relationship 
between the customer and PERSON? 
    X    
  Also confirm whether you are happy with 
the overall conduct of the account? 
X        
  If you have also any concerns on the 
customer, request to confirm regarding the 
same. 
 
X        
40  Can you please explain the purpose of the 
transactions? 
    X    
   
Can you please explain the origin of the 
credits and the purpose behind these 
transactions? 
 
    X    
41  Could you please help us with the 
information regarding the reason for high 
value credits and high turnover on the 
account? 
    X    
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  Customer holds multiple accounts in the 
same profile, so could you provide us with 
the information regarding the legitimacy of 
the credits and the overall activity on the 
account? 
    X    
  Also, if you have any concerns on the 
account please update us as to take further 
course of action. 
 
X        
42  Please confirm the legitimacy of the cash 
paid. 
 
    X   Agree 
  Please confirm the reason, connection and 
customer's association with these 
individuals. 
    X   Agree 
  Please confirm the reason, connection for 
these payments. 
    X   Agree 
  Please confirm the legitimacy of the cash 
paid. 
 
    X   Agree 
  Please confirm the reason, connection and 
customer's association with these 
individuals. 
 
    X   Agree 
43  Please advise the reason for the large value 
credit from CUSTOMER 2 and advise the 
reason for the large value credit from 
CUSTOMER 2 and the payment made to 
an individual named PERSON at BANK. 
 
    X    
44  Can you please explain the purpose of the 
transaction and the customer relation with 
PERSON? 
    X    
  Can you please explain the purpose of the 
transaction? 
 
    X    
45 Please can you confirm the legitimacy and 
the background of these transactions?  
    X    
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  Is overall activity in line with the nature of 
business? 
 
X        
46  Could you please provide me the details of 
payment (AMOUNT and BENEFICIARY) 
the customer wanted to make? 
    X    
  Could you please provide me the details of 
payment (AMOUNT and BENEFICIARY) 
the customer wanted to make? 
 
    X    
47  Could you please let us know the source of 
cash deposits and credits received from 
various businesses? 
    X    
  Could you please confirm if the cash 
deposits paid in the account are in relation 
to sale of property? 
     X   
  Also, please confirm, if you have seen any 
documentary evidence in relation to the 
sale of the property. 
 
X        
48  Please help me find rationale behind the 
below mentioned transactions of the 
customer. 
 
    X    
49  Kindly explain the reasons for regular cash 
deposits paid into the above said accounts 
and also explain the original source of 
cash. 
    X    
  Also let us know if you have any concerns 
on the account activity. 
 
X        
50  Please give us some insight about this 
debit. 
    X    
  What is the purpose for the customer to 
send these funds to the individual? 
    X    
  Please give us some background about the 
source of these funds? 
 
    X    
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51  Could you kindly let us know the source 
for the funds received into the customer's 
BANK accounts and the reason for the 
payments made through customer;s Euro 
account. 
    X    
  Also let us know if you have any concerns 
regarding the overall activities on all the 
account of the customer. 
 
X        
52  Can you please explain the background to 
the electronic transfer credit received from 
COMPANY? 
 
    X    
53  Please send the credit card statements to 
date and also provde the following details: 
The purpose of cash transfer dated DATE 
and the details of remitter, bank and 
account number for the payment dated 
DATE on the credit card. 
    X   Agree 
  Also please advise whether you have any 
other concerns regarding the activity. 
 
X       Agree 
54  Could you explain the reason for large 
funds received from Solicitors? 
    X    
  Could you explain the reason and the 
background of the funds received from the 
individual named PERSON? 
    X    
  The connection between the customer and 
the individual? 
    X    
  Could you explain the background of the 
payments made to individuals named 
PERSON, PERSON and PERSON? 
    X    
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  The connection between these individuals? 
 
    X    
55  Could you please let me know the remitter 
and remitter bank details? 
 
    X    
56  Could you please explain the reason for the 
electronic transfer for the CCY received 
from a law firm named COMPANY at 
BANK with the reference of 'net proceed - 
estate of CUSTOMER 2' on DATE? 
    X    
  Can you please explain the reason for the 
two bill payments totalling CCY made to 
HMRC - Inheritence? 
 
    X    
  Totals 28    70 1   
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Appendix 9 – Amount of IRI Obtained 
 
Investigation 
Relevant 
Information 
Code Code Explanation 
Person P Information of the person/entities both making and receiving 
the payment, including, where appropriate, details of 
occupation, salary and source of wealth or funds. 
Action A The amount and/or method by which the transaction was 
made, eg. cash or cheque. 
Location L The country or address of those involved in the transactions. 
Item I The purpose or rationale for the payment, e.g. the purchase 
of a house. 
Temporal T The timing or date(s) of the transaction(s) 
 
 
 
Case 
Number 
Codes No 
response 
observed 
SAR 
Raised 
Inter-Rater Reliability 
Comments 
1 Alert only  No  
2  X Yes  
3 P, I, T, T  No  
4 P, P, I, I  No  
5  X No  
6 P, A, A, I, L  No  
7 P, P, A  No  
8  X Yes Agree 
9  X Yes  
10 P, P, P, P, P, P, 
I, I, L, L, L 
 No  
11 No case details  N/A  
12  X Yes  
13  X Yes  
14 Alert only  No  
15  X Yes  
16 Erroneous 
request 
 N/A  
17  X No Agree 
18 Duplicate  N/A  
19 Alert only  No  
20 P, P, P, I, I, I, I, 
I, L 
 No  
21  X Yes  
22  X Yes  
23 P, A, L  No  
24 No RFI in 
system 
 Yes  
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25 P, I  No    
26   Yes Agree 
27  X Yes  
28  X Yes  
29  X No  
30 Alert only  No  
31 Alert only  No  
32 P, P, A, I  Yes Agree 
33  X Yes  
34 P, P, A, I, I, I, T  No  
35 Erroneous case 
reference 
 N/A  
36 Unable to access 
– not UK 
 N/A  
37 P, I, I, T  No  
38 P, I, L  No  
39  X Yes  
40 P, P, P, P, P, P, 
P, P, A, A, I, I, I, 
I, T, T 
 No  
41 P, A, I  No Agree 
42  X Yes  
43  X Yes  
44 P, A, L, I  No  
45  X Yes  
46  X No  
47  X Yes  
48 P, I, L  No  
49  X Yes  
50 P  No  
51 P, P, P, P, P, P, 
L, I 
 No  
52 P, P  No  
53  X No  
54  X No  
55  X Yes Agree 
56 P, P, A, I  No  
 
Total 
 
P = 45 
A = 11 
L= 10 
I = 28 
T = 6 
 
24 
 
21 
 
 
  
390 
 
  
Appendix 10  – Form UPR16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
